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ABSTRACT 
 
MIKE STOBBE: The Surgeon General and the Bully Pulpit 
 
(Under the direction of Ned Brooks) 
 
This project looks at the role of the U.S. Surgeon General in influencing public opinion 
and public health policy. I examined historical changes in the administrative powers of the 
Surgeon General, to explain what factors affect how a Surgeon General utilizes the office’s 
“bully pulpit,” and assess changes in the political environment and in who oversees the 
Surgeon General that may affect the Surgeon General’s future ability to influence public 
opinion and health. This research involved collecting and analyzing the opinions of 
journalists and key informants such as current and former government health officials. I also 
studied public documents, transcripts of earlier interviews and other materials. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This project looks at the role of the U.S. Surgeon General in influencing public opinion 
and public health policy. I examined historical changes in the administrative powers of the 
Surgeon General, to explain what factors affect how a Surgeon General utilizes the office’s 
“bully pulpit,” and assess changes in the political environment and in who oversees the 
Surgeon General that may affect the Surgeon General’s future ability to influence public 
opinion and health. This research involved collecting and analyzing the opinions of 
journalists and key informants such as current and former government health officials. I also 
studied public documents, transcripts of earlier interviews and other materials. 
BACKGROUND/OVERVIEW 
U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt once told a friend; “Most of us enjoy preaching, and 
I’ve got such a bully pulpit.” He was referring to the White House as being a splendid (or 
“bully”) platform from which to persuade the public. 
More properly defined, a bully pulpit is a public office of sufficiently high rank that it 
provides the office holder with an opportunity to speak out and be heard on any matter. The 
U.S. presidency is a bully pulpit, but there are similar offices in the world of public health. 
The U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services has a bully pulpit, to a certain degree, as 
does the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The U.S. Surgeon 
General does also. 
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But there’s a difference between the Surgeon General and these other offices, which is 
highlighted by another Roosevelt quote; “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” The saying is 
an advisory to leaders to have the resources to enforce their will beyond persuasion. 
President Bush, the chief executive of the nation, has such ability. U.S. Health and Human 
Services Secretary Mike Leavitt, who heads one of the largest divisions of the executive 
branch, commands significant resources as well. CDC Director Julie Gerberding has power, 
too, overseeing an agency with nearly 9,000 employees and a budget of $8 billion. [1] When 
Bush, Leavitt and Gerberding speak, their words are backed not only by the prestige of an 
office but also by their control over significant public health resources. 
That’s also true of leaders in the business world, in the military and other leadership 
realms. In those settings, great leaders demonstrate the ability to communicate a mission to 
their followers and persuade them to accomplish a goal. But though skill at utilizing a bully 
pulpit is important, it is not absolutely necessary in those settings. 
The Surgeon General is in a different position. 
The office of the U.S. Surgeon General was created in 1870 to oversee the Marine 
Hospital Service, a national hospital system for sailors that is the ancestor of the U.S. Public 
Health Service. In 1889, the Surgeon General gained the additional responsibility of running 
the Commissioned Corps, a personnel system of doctors and other professionals that from the 
beginning was organized along military lines. [2] Commissioned Corps members staffed the 
hospital service and subsequent federal public health agencies that were created. As the 
National Institutes of Health, the Food and Drug Administration and the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention came into existence, the Surgeon General was placed in charge of 
them as well. 
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The Surgeon General was the head of the Public Health Service agencies, including the 
NIH, FDA and CDC, with control over the administrative and financial management. The 
Surgeon General, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, reported directly 
to the U.S. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.  But that changed in 1968, when 
those powers were transferred to the new position of Assistant Secretary for Health. The 
Surgeon General, stripped of control over staff and financial resources, became an advisor 
within Health, Education and Welfare (now known as the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, part of the executive branch of the U.S. government). 
Currently, the Surgeon General remains the titular head of the Commissioned Corps, but 
no longer has the ability to transfer or command Corps members aside from the dozen or so 
who report to him. Surgeons General cannot order implementation of a program, or enforce a 
law or anything of that sort. But the Surgeon General has continued to carry out one 
influential role – that of being a spokesman for the Public Health Service. The position still 
carries a historical prestige, which draws audiences and commands respect. In other words, 
their one real power remaining is that of the bully pulpit. 
They face constraints in how they wield that power. Appointed by the President to four-
year terms, they must deal with political pressures. If they speak too strongly in opposition to 
positions held by the Administration, they may be asked to resign, as Dr. Joycelyn Elders 
was in 1994, only a year after taking office. At what point in history they take office may 
also be a factor – if an individual takes office after a brash and controversial predecessor, he 
or she may face new constraints created by political leaders who felt stung by the previous 
Surgeon General. 
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U.S. Surgeons General seems uniquely poised to lead public health policy changes and 
improve the nation's general health. Indeed, some recent Surgeons General – most notably 
Dr. C. Everett Koop in the 1980s – were highly influential individuals who were perceived as 
having sway over public opinion and behavior. 
My dissertation will focus on the seven Surgeons General who held office since the late 
1960s, after the government restructured the position and stripped it of control over monetary 
and staff resources. I will explore the primary role of the position in that recent time, which 
has been use of the bully pulpit. 
In case study analyses of each of the seven Surgeons General, I will briefly reflect on 
some of the four theories that key informants said might explain the performance of people 
who held the office. The ‘Great Man Theory’ suggests the genius, charisma or other personal 
attributes of a person explains his or her success. The ‘Long Leash Theory’ holds that each 
Surgeon General’s success in the bully pulpit was influenced by the political or 
administrative environment in which he or she worked. The ‘Great Issue Theory’ suggests 
that some Surgeons General benefited from an unusual event or set of circumstances that 
occurred during their watch. And finally, the ‘Chorus Theory’ posits that how well a Surgeon 
General stood out was influenced by how many other government official were speaking to 
the public at the time and whether what they were saying was similar or different from what 
the Surgeon General was stumping on. 
The theories, and their applicability, are discussed in greater depth later in the 
dissertation, in Chapter 4. 
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RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
That the Surgeon General matters – that individual leadership can make a difference in 
public health, but that the political environment and the characteristics of the individuals who 
oversee the Surgeon General may diminish or increase the Surgeon General’s influence. My 
hypothesis will explore the commonly voiced observation that the Surgeon General’s 
visibility and influence has declined in recent years, and the idea that the change is attributed 
to one or some or all of the following factors – the personal characteristics of the people who 
have held the office; the political interests and personality traits of others in the federal 
government who for various reasons may not want the Surgeon General to be visible and 
influential; and the public health circumstances of the nation at the time and the opportunities 
they present for a Surgeon General. 
In the end, my work considers whether the office should be revived and whether it truly 
is important to the public health. 
PROJECT COMPONENTS 
The first part of this dissertation project involved a literature review, involved later in this 
chapter. 
Next was a quantitative piece of work – a survey of health journalists, designed to 
ascertain the opinions of reporters about the newsworthiness and credibility of the Surgeon 
General as compared with five other prominent federal officials who also communicate 
important government health messages. The methodology for the survey is described in 
Chapter 2. The results are detailed in Chapter 4. 
The largest part of this project involved qualitative research into how different Surgeons 
General used the bully pulpit, and the factors that influenced those performances. The 
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methodology for the qualitative work is described in Chapter 2. What I learned is woven into 
a historical narrative in Chapters 3. Thematic findings are summarized and analyzed in 
Chapter 4. 
The last part of the project is a proposal, derived from the information and perspectives 
accumulated. That’s contained in Chapter 5. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review was designed to explore the influence of the Surgeon General and 
the office’s use of the bully pulpit. Little has been written on those topics, so I expanded the 
search to more general questions about power, politics, influence and persuasive 
communication. 
Some definitions used: 
Power, as defined by organizational leadership scholar Gary Yukl, is “the capacity of one 
party (the agent) to influence another part (the target). It is a flexible concept that can be 
used in many different ways.” [3] Webster’s Dictionary offers a more common definition – 
“the ability to control others.” [4] 
Yukl notes the varying categories of power. Those include legitimate power, which stems 
from formal authority over work activities; reward power, in which a target believes the 
agent controls desired resources and rewards; coercive power, which stems from an agent’s 
ability to punish a target; and ecological power, in which an agent controls a target’s physical 
environment, technology and organization of work. [5]  
Those definitions speak to an agent’s ability to influence a target, but not to directly 
control them. 
7 
Control, according to Webster’s, is the power to direct or regulate, and involves the 
reprisals and loss of rewards described in the Yukl categories of legitimate, reward, coercive 
and ecological power. 
In contrast, influence, is defined here as the ability to produce effects indirectly, without 
necessarily having the authority or resources to control a target. The Surgeon General can 
have influence over the public and other government officials, and to varying degrees may 
enjoy what Yukl calls referent, expert and information power. But the Surgeon General 
cannot control them, and therefore does not have controlling power. 
Persuasion, or persuasive communication, is a better descriptor of the type of influence 
power a Surgeon General has. The term is defined as the act of causing an agent to do 
something, by reasoning with them or through convincing or urging. The agent’s ability to 
persuade may be helped if the target perceives the agent to have some degree of referent, 
expert or information power, as described above. However, if the agent has actual power (as 
described above), the act of influence is not persuasion, but a form of control. 
Bully pulpit, as previously defined, is an office or position of sufficiently high rank that it 
provides the office holder with an opportunity to speak out and be listened to on any matter. 
The U.S. President has a bully pulpit, in part because he controls the nation’s armed forces 
and the executive branch of the federal government. Legislators have a bully pulpit, because 
they have the ability to tax members of the public and provide or withhold government 
services. The Surgeon General is relatively unique in government for having a bully pulpit 
without controlling power. 
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Public opinion is the prevailing attitude or view within a specified society. Unless 
otherwise differentiated, this paper will refer to U.S. public opinion. This paper explores the 
extent to which someone without actual power can affect public opinion. 
Politics is, in conventional terms, the science of government. But it is more broadly 
defined by political scientists as who gets what, when, how and why. I will look for the 
term’s application to situations that describe how health policy decisions are made and 
influenced by the President, Congress and by top-ranking officials in the government agency 
now known as the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 
Search Terms, and Databases 
Multiple search terms were used in my literature review, including “power,” “influence,” 
“leadership,” “persuasive communication,” “politics,” and “public opinion.” All are MeSH 
terms. “Bully pulpit” and “Surgeon General” are not MeSH terms, but also were used. 
The literature review involved a search of computerized databases available through the 
UNC online library system. Databases used include PubMed, CINAHL, Web of Science and 
CSA Sociological Abstracts. Outside the UNC system, searches were done using Google 
Scholar and the GAO electronic archives. 
Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria 
Only articles written in English were used. Peer-reviewed empirical studies were 
included. Commentaries and historical articles from peer-reviewed journals also were 
included. 
Only studies done within the United States were included. Other countries do not have a 
direct equivalent to a Surgeon General, and the dynamics that affect the influence public 
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opinion (for example, the power of the media, and the form of government) are not easily 
compared from country to country. 
There were no exclusion criteria for how old studies could be. 
My search focused on the term “Surgeon General” as applied to the office of the U.S. 
Surgeon General, within the U.S. Public Health Service. Other types of surgeons general 
were excluded. The term ‘surgeon general’ apparently comes from the English Civil War, 
when the title first began to appear in reference to certain medical officers. [6] Today, 
branches of the U.S. military have surgeons general. 
Even with a narrowed focus, not every article turned out to be relevant. That is, despite 
promising titles and/or some brief passages that seemed on point, they focused on topics 
other than the bully pulpit role of government officials and/or the interchange of politics and 
personalities in determining the role and accomplishments of the U.S. Surgeon General or 
other government health officials. Those articles that were deemed relevant – about 100 – 
were reviewed in a more thorough, later-stage analysis. They included empirical studies as 
well as theoretical articles and commentaries. 
I also reviewed dozens of history and policy analysis books and biographies. Their titles 
are listed in the bibliography. Among them: 
• The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House by James 
David Barber, 1992. Barber divided presidents into the categories based on their 
activism and personality. 
 
• Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents by Richard Neustadt, 1990. Neustadt 
discusses how different presidents exercised the power to persuade. 
 
• The Politics Presidents Make by Stephen Skowronek, 1997. Skowronek explores how 
presidents are agents of change. He finds some non-charismatic men have wielded 
great authority, and some men of great reputation and charisma failed. 
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• On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit by George C. Edwards III, 2003. This 
book looks at how presidents use the bully pulpit to try to sway pubic opinion. 
 
• The Bully Pulpit: The Politics of Protestant Clergy by James L. Guth et al., 1997. 
This text analyzes political activism by protestant clergy, looking at ideology and 
church politics as influences on what clergy attempt to accomplish. 
 
• Influence: Science and Practice by Robert B. Cialdini. The author is a social 
psychologist who explores methods of influence. 
 
• Speaking Truth To Power by Aaron Wildavsky. An expert explored what public 
policy is and how societal changes have affected it. 
 
• For Your Own Good: The Anti-Smoking Crusade and the Tyranny of Public Health 
by Jacob Sullum. The writer critiques public health messaging on the topic of 
smoking and cancer. 
 
• The Mediating Effect of Public Opinion on Public Policy by Richard E. Chard. 
Focusing on the Health Security Act, the author develops a theory on how public 
opinion influences public policy outcomes. 
 
• Koop by Dr. C. Everett Koop. This is Koop’s autobiography. 
 
• Joycelyn Elders, M.D. by Dr. Joycelyn Elders and David Chanoff. Another Surgeon 
General’s autobiography. 
 
• Inside A Public and Private Life by Joseph A. Califano, Jr. Autobiography of the 
activist HEW Secretary during the Carter administration, who personally lead anti-
smoking and other crusades that formerly were handled by Surgeons General. 
 
• Quarantine! by Howard Markel. A University of Michigan public health historian 
examines the role of the U.S. Surgeon General and other health officials in dealing 
with typhus and cholera epidemics that swept through New York City in 1892. 
 
• Emerging Illnesses and Society: Negotiating the Public Heath Agenda, edited by 
Randall M. Packard et al. Includes material on former Surgeons Generals roles in 
setting health policy. 
 
• Plagues and Politics by Dr. Fitzhugh Mullan. A history of the U.S. Public Health 
Service which several sources recommended as an important first stop in researching 
my dissertation topic 
 
• Are We Ready? Public Health Since 9/11 by David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz. 
Includes discussion of botched HHS communications to the public during the 2001 
anthrax crisis. 
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• The Cutter Incident by Dr. Paul A. Offit. Discusses the role the U.S. Surgeon General 
played in dealing with fear and controversy that erupted in 1995 when polio vaccine 
made by Cutter Laboratories inadvertently carries live, virulent virus. 
 
• Ashes to Ashes by Richard M. Kluger. This Pulitzer-winning history of the public 
health campaign against tobacco includes great detail on Surgeon General Luther 
Terry’s influential report on smoking. 
 
Setting aside valuable historical detail, thematic literature review results that were useful 
can be grouped under three categories: 
 
General studies of influence and public opinion: 
Some of the literature looked at the general question of persuasive communication and 
influence. Papers include attempts by academicians to describe how agents use persuasive 
communication to influence targets. Some of the literature looked at the general question of 
persuasive communication and influence. Papers include attempts by academicians to 
describe how agents use persuasive communication to influence targets. 
In a theoretical paper from 1963, Parsons posited that influence is based on 
“Gemeinschaft solidarity” – a sense of belong together in society. He states that people are 
influenced through appeal to loyalties and by the interpretation of norms, and the “honor” or 
reputation of an agent is a factor in the success of the influence. [7] This suggests to me that 
the title and historical prestige of the Office of the Surgeon General may be a factor in how 
the bully pulpit was established, and may lead to questions about the current amount of 
prestige accorded that office. 
Cialdini highlighted characteristics of leaders adept at persuasion. He noted studies that 
show people like – and listen to – people who praised them and seemed to like them and be 
like them. He mentioned empirical research from 1963 that used data from insurance 
company records to show people were more likely to buys a policy from a salesman who was 
similar to them in age, religion, politics or even cigarette-smoking habits. [8] 
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Cialdini also noted research that shows people defer to those who are clearly defined as 
experts. Studies have shown that when an expert’s opinion was published in a New York 
Times news story or aired on national television, public opinion shifted between 2 percent 
and 4 percent. [9] His conclusions prompt me to consider whether the Surgeon General is 
considered and expert, and how his expert status is established, and whether the Surgeon 
General’s age, religion, politics or habits affects the public’s receptiveness to his or her 
messages. 
From the world of organizational behavior, Cable (a UNC business professor) and Judge 
took an empirical look at tactics managers use to influence others by reviewing longitudinal 
data from 140 organizations. They showed different personality types tended to employ 
different manners of persuasion. The researchers also found that the characteristics of a 
leader’s superior were associated with the methods of persuasion that the leader used. When 
a supervisor was transformational, the leader was more likely to use coalition building, 
inspirational appeal and pressure tactics. When the supervisor was more laissez-faire, the 
leaders’ approach tended to be more open with an appeal that was more rational than 
inspirational. [10] 
That was echoed in an empirical study by Garko, who found that the way physician 
executives communicate is affected by the way their superiors communicate with them. [11] 
The Cable and Garko articles suggest to me that I should consider personalities and 
relationships within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, including the 
interactions between the Surgeon General and his or her supervisor. 
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Literature on influence, health and public opinion: 
One subset of literature addressed influence of public opinion by Surgeons General and 
other agents in the world of health. 
In a theoretical paper that drew on empirical data, Worden and Flynn noted the Surgeon 
General’s 1964 report on smoking and disease, by itself, was not enough to change smokers’ 
behavior. It had to be supplemented by a campaign of persuasive communication messages 
that addressed the targets’ social needs and expectations. Information by itself is not 
sufficient, the authors conclude. [12] 
They summarized earlier research they had done with school-age children that showed 
students in communities where anti-smoking messages were in the media and community 
were at least 35 percent less likely to be smokers than those only receiving the messages in 
schools. [13] Their work, and some of the research that is summarized below, suggests that I 
should research the manner and mediums in which Surgeons General try to communicate 
with the public. 
DeJong assessed the role of mass media communications campaigns to promote public 
health. In a theoretical paper that summarized and drew from empirical data, he noted that 
much research before the 1980s concluded that mass communication campaigns could 
reinforce existing attitudes and behaviors, but it could not do much else, because the public 
generally chooses to only retain information that supports existing opinions. [14] Health 
promotion campaigns are not easily compared with advertising, because health promotion 
seeks to change behaviors and develop new attitudes, and not just influence selection of a 
brand. [15] 
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However, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, studies showed that long-term health 
communication campaigns targeting tobacco and alcohol did have some effect, particularly 
when they involved television. [16] Officials should be cautious when using a “celebrity” 
spokesman in a health campaign, and perceptions of the spokesman’s trustworthiness and 
credibility must be carefully assessed. [17] 
DeJong’s conclusions suggest that using a Surgeon General as a spokesman makes more 
sense than an actor or musician, whose popularity or credibility may wane during the 
campaign. 
Perea and Slater performed an empirical study that looked at responses by 73 Mexican 
American and Anglo American young adults to televised drinking-and-driving warnings. 
Latinos rated ads featuring the Surgeon General as the source of information as more 
believable than ads without the Surgeon General. For Anglo Americans, the opposite was 
true. [18] 
A 1988 GAO report detailed government AIDS communications to the public in the late 
1980s. The CDC abandoned plans for a 1987 household mailing of AIDS information 
because it could not obtain clearance from the White House. The CDC produced 38 public 
service announcements for television, but they were only aired on seven occasions in the first 
two months, and mostly after 11 p.m. after that. [19] In contrast, a Surgeon General’s report 
on AIDS was successfully sent to every U.S. household in the fall of 1986. The White House 
was not involved in that report’s printing and distribution, according to a different GAO 
report. [20] 
In an empirical work, Guttman analyzed the extent to which people trust official sources 
of AIDS information and how it was reflected in personal health beliefs. More than 1,600 
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people were interviewed in 1991. About 94 percent had heard of the Surgeon General and 78 
percent had heard of the CDC. But the CDC had the highest overall reliability rating, 
followed by the Surgeon General, then state health departments. People who had a poor 
understanding of HIV transmission tended to rank the CDC lower. [21] 
In a theoretical work that drew on empirical data, Franke examined cigarette demand in 
the 1960s. The researcher found the Surgeon General’s 1964 report on smoking and health 
was followed by a significant reduction in consumption, but that decline lasted only a few 
months. Changes in the price of cigarettes seemed to have a more long-lasting impact. [22] 
The peer-reviewed literature is extremely limited on the media affects how the Surgeon 
General communicates with – and is perceived by – the general public. I found fewer that a 
dozen articles through PubMed and CINAHL. Most of the articles merely summarized a 
communications strategy involving the media rather than giving insights into analyzing the 
relationship. A few analyzed the resonance of articles quoting the Surgeon General with 
press coverage that used state health officials as the sources. Perhaps the best source on this 
topic is Media Advocacy and Public Health by Lawrence Wallack et al. It doesn’t discuss the 
Surgeon General per se, but posits that the mass media “presents the perspective of the ruling 
class to their audience” and plays a large role in setting the public policy agenda. [23] I 
derived from Wallack’s book the idea that if top Administration officials communicate a 
perception that the Surgeon General is not an important spokesman, than the media gradually 
may not seek him or her out, and his or her messages may fall by the wayside. 
Lessons from influencers with power: 
A large amount of literature involving search terms like “power,” “influence” and 
“leadership” focuses on the U.S. presidency and how chief executives attempt to sway people 
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who cannot simply be ordered to do something. In the literature, the audiences presidents 
most seek to persuade tend to cluster in two groups. The first group is made up of other 
political leaders, particularly members of Congress, whom presidents cajole or press in 
attempts to either pass or kill specific pieces of legislation. The second group is the media 
and the general public, whom presidents seek support or positive portrayals from, not only to 
get re-elected but also to pressure Congress. 
Books by Barber, Neustadt and Skowronek offer scholarship on the roles charisma and 
personality play in helping Presidents persuade other politicians, the media and the public. 
However, their approaches and conclusion vary, with Neustadt and Skowronek both voicing 
cautions that charisma and speaking ability may not be key elements to effective leadership. 
[24] 
A similar conclusion is reached in a theoretical paper by Mouw and MacKuen, who find 
that presidents exert hardly any influence on congressional voting. They find political and 
ideological alliances – factors they refer to as “strategic configuration” – are more important 
than charismatic persuasion. [25] 
According to a theoretical paper by Newman that draws on empirical data, how members 
of the public perceive the integrity of a President can affect how they evaluate his job 
performance and how able he, in turn, is able to persuade them. But performance in national 
and international issues is more important than a President’s character, Newman found. [26] 
Discussion 
The literature is lacking in analysis of the power and bully pulpit role of the U.S. Surgeon 
General, and how that’s changed, particularly in relation to other public health leaders inside 
and outside of government. 
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The literature is also limited in examining how those in positions like the Surgeon 
General – that is, someone who does not command the manpower or financial resources to 
force or implement a course of action – uses the bully pulpit to achieve goals through 
persuasion. 
Part of the problem is the uniqueness of the Office of the Surgeon General. At one point 
in history, it was a powerful government position, with oversight over the FDA, CDC and 
other health agencies of the federal government. The office was stripped of those powers and 
duties, but somehow has maintained much of its traditional prestige – the Surgeon General 
continues to be known as “the nation’s top doctor.” [27] 
Literature on the U.S. Presidency offers some insights into the practice of persuasion in 
certain instances in which the President does not have direct controlling power over a target, 
such as when the Administration is trying to influence members of Congress to pass or kill 
legislation. 
But the power dynamic is vastly different. A President has bargaining power and can 
bestow rewards. For example, a popular President may promise to make campaign 
appearances with a member of Congress that might help that representative get re-elected. A 
Surgeon General does not have comparable influence over his or her targets. 
In addition, the literature on both Presidents and other leaders is made up mostly of 
theoretical works that draw conclusions from facts or limited empirical studies. The 
empirical studies themselves often are polling data or limited surveys – helpful in the social 
sciences, but not exactly double-blinded, case-controlled research. 
However, much of the research does seem to hold together – that is, it appears to have 
convergent validity, to use Trochim’s terminology. [28] 
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But the general literature, and polling data specific to the Surgeon General, suggests that 
when Surgeons General succeed in the bully pulpit, it is for other reasons. They are viewed 
by the public as better educated and more expert in the issues they speak about. That 
expertise is an asset that could and should be used, as is suggested by Cialdini’s look at how 
public opinion is swayed by expert opinion that appears in mass media. 
Lacking in the literature is a focused assessment of Surgeons General, their levels of 
influence, and what explains the influence they have. Because Surgeons General are 
physicians who inform the public about health issues, they don’t fit the “guys like us” mold 
that is described as an asset in some political leaders. 
More generally, some of the most important literature on how people without controlling 
power influence public opinion is decades old. Cialdini’s paper noted much of the most 
detailed empirical work looking at influence on the public by non-politicians was done in the 
1960s, and Parsons’ paper comes from that same era. Much about society have changed since 
then, including the ways businesses do advertising and sales and the types of media the 
public turns to for information. It’s not clear if some of the research is outdated. Perhaps, 
they remain timely, demonstrating “eternal truths” about what agent characteristics make 
them acceptable and influential to targets that still hold true today. Much of the work needs 
to be replicated to see if the conclusions still hold true. 
Regarding the Surgeon General, some of the most valuable data that speaks to the 
question of influence and public opinion is an indirect indicator of credibility of the Surgeon 
General as a source of public health information that was provided in the 1991 survey 
discussed in Guttman’s paper. But that survey is 15 years old, and was conducted not long 
after Dr. C. Everett Koop – generally considered the most charismatic and influential 
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Surgeon General in the last half century – left office. It’s quite possible that there has been a 
significant deterioration since then in what the public knows about the Surgeon General and 
how credible they see that official as a source of public health information. New polling 
needs to be done. 
Although some literature discusses the importance of the media as a megaphone for those 
who would use a bully pulpit, more study should be done of the dynamics of that interaction. 
Some literature – only briefly discussed in this paper – examines “media priming,” in which 
the impact of issues and personalities covered by the media impacts political judgments made 
by the public. [29] The literature focuses on media priming related to issues, but not people. 
In other words, the literature is comparatively thin in assessing how the type and quantity of 
media appearances by specific officials influences public opinion, particularly those without 
controlling power. One of the few works that did, previously mentioned in this paper, was the 
expert’s opinion study noted by Cialdini. [30] 
Despite these weaknesses, the literature informs potentially important new questions for 
exploration. The article by Cable and Judge, as well as the one by Garko, found that how 
leaders practice their powers of persuasion is influenced by what type of person they report 
to. This lesson may be applicable to the Surgeon General. Though they had many 
differences, Surgeon General Koop was in many ways cut from the same cloth as the 
President who appointed him, Ronald Reagan. Both were skilled, highly visible and forceful 
communicators who spoke with moral certainty. That too should be explored further. 
In summary, the literature fails to adequately explore how leaders without power 
influence public opinion. Some of the research that best addresses the question is 40 years 
old, and new and more expanded work needs to be done. Generally speaking, there’s 
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insufficient empirical research on how leaders of any kind influence public opinion, and a 
clear scarcity of study focused on the influence of people without controlling power. But the 
literature does provide valuable examinations of important tangential questions that provided 
valuable fodder for my inquiry. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
METHODS 
 
STUDY DESIGN AND DATA SOURCES 
This is a mixed methods study, involving a quantitative survey and qualitative work such 
as key informant interviews and historical research. 
I considered various approaches to measure the influence of Surgeons General. One 
example: Surgeons General periodically issue reports on specific health topics, such as the 
1964 report of smoking by Surgeon General Luther Terry, which is generally considered to 
be a turning point in reducing U.S. smoking rates. However, it must be noted that Surgeon 
General reports are products of committees of people at various federal agencies, they are 
promoted by an array of officials, and it is problematic to tease out the degree to which an 
individual Surgeon General is responsible for what the report says and for its impact on the 
general public. Indeed, a 1994 study suggested that the decline in smoking that could be 
directly attributed to the Surgeon General’s report only lasted three months. [1] 
Another possible approach involved surveying members of the public, or of reporters 
who cover health issues, to ask the degree to which they view different health officials as 
credible and/or influential. Such a survey was done in 1991. [2] Though I decided to include 
a survey component to my project, survey data are limited in helping me answer my research 
question, which is qualitative in nature. 
What I ended up with was a project with three parts – that is, three types of data 
collected. 
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The first part was a quantitative survey of health journalists, who are considered “the 
megaphone” through which government health officials most often communicate with the 
general public. 
I sought a representative sample, as it was beyond my time and economic resources to 
interview all the U.S. journalists who have covered federal health agencies and policy. I 
sought to gather results that are generalizable to the total population of U.S. journalists who 
cover public health and health policy. The problem is we don’t know the denominator – there 
is no good census of the total number of health journalists working in various media 
(including newspaper, magazines, wire services, Web sites, television and radio stations). A 
rough estimate, several years old, is 3,000. [3] 
There are several professional organizations to which at least some of those journalists 
belong to, including the National Association of Science Writers and the American Medical 
Writers Association. But those organizations include only a small number of journalists who 
cover government health policy, at least partly because the NASW is heavily focused on 
science and not public health, and AMWA’s membership is largely public relations people. 
So instead I focused on the Association of Health Care Journalists. AHCJ, with more than 
1,000 members, is the nation’s largest organization of reporters and editors who cover public 
health and health policy. It is believed to have the largest number of journalists that cover the 
Surgeon General and other government officials who speak and act on matters of public 
health. 
Using an online survey tool – SurveyMonkey – I asked journalists to share their opinions 
about the news value of appearances and reports put out by different government health 
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officials. In a manner of speaking, I was seeking to learn to what extent reporters care what 
the Surgeon General says. 
I am an AHCJ member, and an elected member of the AHCJ Board of Directors. In the 
summer of 2007, I approached the organization’s executive director and other members of 
the governing board about my hope to survey AHCJ members for this dissertation project. 
After receiving their consent, I posted an e-mail invitation to participate on Sept. 27. Follow-
up e-mail requests were posted on Nov. 1 and Nov. 29. 
The questions used in the survey are in Appendix D. 
The responses were tabulated, and I used a scoring system to better analyze how the 
journalists viewed the newsworthiness and credibility of six different federal health officials 
– the director of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; director of the National 
Institutes of Health; director of the NIH’s National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases; U.S. Surgeon General; U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services; and 
Assistant Secretary for Health at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 
The results and analysis are fully described in Chapter 4. 
The second part of my project involved key informant interviews of 30 people who have 
held the office of Surgeon General, worked with people in that office, or who are considered 
knowledgeable in the Surgeon General’s role in speaking to the public and trying to influence 
public opinion, health behaviors and policy. 
My selection criteria: I sought to interview as many people as my time and resources 
allowed who had direct knowledge of the workings of the Office of the Surgeon General, or 
who were identified to me by insiders and experts as being knowledgeable about the Office. 
My list of interview subjects was limited by the resources of this project – I could only afford 
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to interview about 30, because of financial limitations that included transcription costs, travel 
limitations and the deadline for completing this dissertation. In addition, five potential 
interview subjects declined or did not respond to interview requests – current Acting Surgeon 
General Steve Galson, former Surgeon General Antonia Novello, former Acting Surgeon 
General Audrey Manley and former CDC Director William Foege. I also attempted to 
interview the current nominee for Surgeon General, James W. Holsinger Jr., just after a 
Senate confirmation hearing last July, but was told by HHS officials who intercepted me that 
Holsinger would not comment while the confirmation is pending. (It is still pending.) 
In nearly every interview, the key informants were asked the same core set of questions, 
but additional questions were also posed based on the individual’s experience and on 
responses to the core questions. Those questions are listed in Appendix B. 
The complete list of questions was not asked in some interviews in which the time was 
limited or in which some of the questions did not apply – for example, an interview of U.S. 
Rep. Henry Waxman was limited to 20 minutes, and I did not ask him some of the questions 
specifically geared toward Surgeons General, such as; “How much direction did you receive 
from other HHS or Administration officials about what topics to address in the Surgeon 
General’s bully pulpit capacity?” 
I attempted to interview all of the seven Surgeons General since the office was 
reorganized since 1968, as well as other U.S. health officials. Six of them did interviews with 
me – Jesse Steinfeld, Julius Richmond, C. Everett Koop, Joycelyn Elders, David Satcher and 
Richard Carmona. Antonia Novello was the only one of the seven who declined an interview 
(she did not clearly state a reason). 
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The other key informants were: U.S. Rep. Henry Waxman; former HEW Secretary 
Joseph Califano; former HHS Secretary Louis Sullivan; former HEW Under Secretary Hale 
Champion; former ASH Phil Lee; former ASH James Mason; former CDC Director David 
Sencer; former CDC Director Jeff Koplan; former Acting Surgeon General Ken Moritsugu; 
HHS spokeswoman Rebecca Ayer; public health historian Fitzhugh Mullan; public health 
historian Howard Markel; American Public Health Association President Georges Benjamin; 
U.S. Senate staffer David Bowen; U.S. House staffer Art Kellermann; former HHS staffer 
Ken Thorpe; former HHS staffer Damon Thompson; former HHS staffer Karen Near; former 
HHS staffer Bill Pierce; Harmon Eyre, the former chief medical officer of the American 
Cancer Society; Jerry Farrell, executive director of the Commissioned Officers Association 
of the U.S. Public Health Service; and Jeff Levi, Kim Elliott and Sherry Kaiman, all with the 
public health advocacy organization Trust for America’s Health. 
I conducted all the interviews myself. The interviews were taped and transcribed in their 
entirety, with the key informant’s knowledge and consent. Consent forms were offered to, 
and signed by, the key informants. They were informed that they could go on background or 
off the record, and that they had the right to withdraw from this project at any time. 
No subjects were excluded because of age, gender, ethnicity, health status or other 
personal characteristics. No monetary inducement was provided, and no direct benefit to 
study participants was forecast. An improved understanding of the role of the Surgeon 
General in influencing public opinion on health issues may suggest measures for improving 
behavior- and policy-affecting communications. No risks to subjects are anticipated. There 
were no costs to subjects other than their time. 
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Interview subjects were allowed to designate the setting for interviews, meaning they 
may chose a location as private as they wished. When possible, the interviews were done in 
person – I did 23 in person and 7 on the telephone. Some of the in-person interviews were 
done in the Atlanta area, where I live, but others involved trips to Boston; Washington, D.C.; 
Hanover, N.H.; and Pomona, Calif. 
Interview notes, tapes and other documents and materials related to the research were 
stored in a locked filing cabinet or in a password-protected computer. 
The third part of my research involved reviewing books, public records and other 
documents that pertain to my research question. Among them: Transcripts of oral interviews 
done by the historian of the U.S. Public Health Service with former Surgeons General, 
biographies and historical texts, and public records from the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services that include such things as drafts of Surgeon General reports and the 
calendars/appointment books of Surgeons General. 
My data were mostly qualitative – key informant interviews, containing observations and 
perspectives and historical facts, as well as historical documents. 
The advantage of such data is they allowed a nuanced look at social, political and cultural 
factors that may be hard to quantify. “We aim to account for events rather than to simply 
document their sequence,” wrote the researchers Matthew Miles and A. Michael Huberman, 
in describing the merits of qualitative research. [4] 
A potential challenge or limitation, however, is that methods of qualitative analysis often 
are not well formulated. “…The analyst faced with a bank of qualitative data has very few 
guidelines for protection against self-delusion, let alone the presentation of unreliable or 
invalid conclusions to scientific or policy making audiences,” Miles wrote. [5] 
29 
How did I guard against that? First, I used available tools to do a systematic analysis of 
qualitative data. Perhaps the most significant was ATLAS.ti, a software program that allowed 
me to code and congregate information from key informant interviews and other documents 
by theme and topic. 
Also, as a check and balance, I discussed emerging themes and ideas with the experts I 
interviewed to hear their perspective on what does and does not make sense about different 
possible conclusions. 
DATA MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS 
As noted earlier, I used ATLAS.ti to code and analyze the key informant interview 
transcripts. Themes developed from that process were used to analyze public records and 
other documents. 
Themes I used included “’great man’ theory/personal characteristics,” referring to the 
traits of individual Surgeons General that might account for leadership success or failure; 
“politics/interactions,” referring to the individuals who had oversight of Surgeons General 
and to what degree they allowed Surgeons General the opportunities to lead; “issues/policy 
environment,” referring to public health issues that arose and needed addressing, irrespective 
of who was in office at the time; and “other conditions/public attitudes,” referring to other 
factors, including issues concerning the general public’s willingness to listen to – and be lead 
by – public health officials. 
Materials grouped under those themes were broken down into more specific sub-
categories. 
IRB AND CONFIDENTIALITY ISSUES 
In 2006, I was presented with two unusual opportunities. 
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I was going to be traveling through northern New England and learned that Dr. C. Everett 
Koop, the famous former Surgeon General, would be willing to let me interview him at his 
home in New Hampshire. Because Koop was 90 and having health problems, and because 
it’s usually difficult for me to make such a trip, I saw it as my best (and perhaps only) chance 
to do this important key informant interview. 
At about the same time, U.S. Surgeon General Richard Carmona was due to visit Atlanta, 
where I live and work, and indicated a willingness to talk to me. Normally such an interview 
would be difficult, given his busy schedule and the fact he was based in the Washington, 
D.C. area. 
For those reasons, I approached the IRB and asked for an expedited review that would 
allow me to do the interviews. I was granted approval, but with the understanding that I 
would return to the IRB for further approvals. I have since been given clarification that 
interviews with current and former public officials do not require added approval, but other 
interviews will. 
In my IRB application, and in my early key informant interviews, I used a consent form 
and fact sheet that I wrote with guidance from similar documents previously authored by 
Bryan Weiner. (Please see Appendix A and Appendix C). I also used a standard set of 
questions which were the basis for each interview, although each interview also involved 
follow-up questions – which varied from person to person – based upon their response. (The 
questions are seen in Appendix B.) 
I went back to the IRB in the summer of 2007, after review and approval of my project 
from my dissertation committee. I was granted IRB approval and did a second, much larger 
set of key informant interviews, as well as the survey of journalists. 
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In my consent forms and in discussions with key informants before the interviews, I 
stated that the information gathered may also be used in a book or other work of journalism. 
If a key informant wished to say something off the record or not for attribution, they were 
told in advance that they had to tell (me) the interviewer his or her wishes and I had to agree. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
HISTORY AND CASE STUDIES 
 
HOW THE SURGEON GENERAL GAINED POWER AND A BULLY PULPIT 
The U.S. Marine Hospital Service was falling apart. 
Congress created the Service in 1798 to provide health care to sick and injured merchant 
seamen. But by 1869, only nine of the Service’s 31 hospitals were functioning. One had 
burned down, one washed into a river, two were abandoned, two unfinished and most of the 
others had been sold off. “The marine hospital service of the country is upon the whole in an 
unsatisfactory condition,” said Treasury Secretary George S. Boutwell, summarizing a staff 
report. [1] 
Boutwell pushed for legislation, passed in 1870, that included a series of administrative 
changes for the Service. Among them was creation of a ‘Supervising Surgeon’ – a title that 
changed in 1873 to ‘Supervising Surgeon General.’ It was to be a civilian physician, 
Congress decided. [2] 
However, the first to hold the job came with a military bent. Dr. John Woodworth, 
formerly of the Union Army, was appointed in 1871. Woodworth had played an important 
medical role in the Civil War – during General William T. Sherman’s “March to the Sea,” 
Woodworth was in charge of the ambulance train that brought the sick and wounded to 
Savannah. [3] Woodworth put the Service’s doctors in uniforms, and centralized the 
personnel system so that doctors were no longer assigned to a specific hospital but to the 
general service. He also put in place examinations for applicants that replaced the former 
34 
practice of appointing doctors based on the recommendations of the local Collector of 
Customs. [4] Those exams – strengthened by Woodworth’s successor – far eclipsed the 
scattershot standards of U.S. medical schools at the time. [5] 
Together, the changes created an elite group of mobile, career public health professionals 
known as the Commissioned Corps. They were a cadre of uniformed physicians that operated 
uniquely from the political patronage systems so common in post-Civil War America. [6] 
“To get into the Commissioned Corps, particularly in the early 20th Century, was an 
extremely competitive thing. You had to take a series of examinations, and you had some 
really good, smart people doing that,” said Howard Markel, a public health historian at the 
University of Michigan. [7] 
Public health, by tradition and legal precedent, had long been the domain of state 
government. Woodworth worked to establish the Service as national leader on public health 
issues, and to assert its role in dealing with public health emergencies. The Service’s role 
expanded even more under his successor, Dr. John B. Hamilton, and under Dr. Walter 
Wyman, who was appointed when Hamilton resigned in 1891. 
A series of federal laws in the early 1890s gave the Service the authority to establish 
national quarantines against epidemic cholera, smallpox, plague and yellow fever, and placed 
ultimate authority for quarantine enforcement with the Supervising Surgeon General instead 
of the states. [8] 
In 1891, Congress also gave the Service responsibility for medical inspection of 
immigrants, including at the Ellis Island depot, which opened in 1892. “The officers of the 
Public Health Service, uniformed and disciplined as they were, constituted the immigrant’s 
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first contact with Americans in America,” wrote Fitzhugh Mullan, in his historical text 
Plagues and Politics: The Story of the United States Public Health Service. [9] 
It was during Wyman’s twenty-year tenure that President William McKinley was 
assassinated and succeeded by a more dynamic and progressive politician, Teddy Roosevelt 
– to whom the phrase “bully pulpit” is credited. 
Under a law signed by Roosevelt in 1902, the title Supervising Surgeon General was 
shortened to ‘Surgeon General,’ the name of the Service was lengthened to ‘the Public 
Health and Marine Hospital Service,’ to better encompass the growing number of roles the 
Service was playing, including quarantine activities and scientific research. [10] 
It was also during this period that the Surgeon General gained more prominence in the 
press. Wyman was frequently mentioned in the New York newspapers when quarantine 
measures against a cholera epidemic were instituted there in 1892, and the Service played a 
leading role in imposing harsh quarantine restrictions targeted at Asians as part of an effort to 
control plague in San Francisco in 1900. Wyman also played a prominent role in the nation’s 
response to yellow fever epidemics. 
The mass media at the time were essentially newspapers and magazines, so opportunities 
to communicate with the public much more limited than in later eras, and Wyman was more 
bureaucrat than public speaker. But he understood the public nature of his role and the need 
to communicate public health messages. [11] “He was definitely a Washington player,” and 
was often quoted in the press, Markel said. [12] 
After Wyman died in 1911, Dr. Rupert Blue was appointed his replacement and over the 
next nine years helped grow the power and prestige of the Public Health Service (PHS) – as 
it was called from 1912 onward. In 1912 and 1913, the PHS gained the authority and funding 
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to initiate field research independent of state and county health departments, which lead to 
pamphlet-spreading public health education campaigns, such as one against trachoma in 
eastern Kentucky in 1913. [13] 
Blue played an important role in the federal government’s “Safety First” campaign of 
1916, which sent a train of exhibit cars across the country. Using motion pictures, lantern 
slides, models and other means, the PHS car presented the dangers of careless garbage 
disposal and unsanitary toilets and explained how contagious diseases spread. More than 
348,000 people visited PHS exhibits in the two months ended June 30 of that year. “The 
attendance exceeded all expectations,” Blue reported at the time. [14] 
In World War I, the role of the PHS continued to increase. The Service established 
venereal disease control programs, and produced vaccines against tetanus, typhoid and other 
illnesses. In 1919, it was tasked with providing health care for veterans, establishing a group 
of veterans hospitals that was later turned over to the Veterans’ Bureau that Congress created 
in 1922. [15] 
Blue resigned in 1920, and Dr. Hugh Smith Cumming was appointed, holding the job for 
the next 16 years. The new Surgeon General hosted a delegation of health officials from the 
League of Nations, showing off the PHS’s Hygienic Laboratory in Washington, which had 
become a draw for international medical experts performing special studies. [16] In 1930, the 
lab was expanded and renamed the National Institute of Health. 
Cumming was a quoted expert whose name was invoked in legislative debates. One 
example: In 1929, in a failed push by U.S. Sen. Reed Smoot for a law that would allow the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration to regulate tobacco products, the Utah Republican cited 
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a statement Cumming had made that cigarettes caused nervousness, insomnia and other ill 
effects in young women. [17] 
As the visibility and responsibilities of the Public Health Service grew, Surgeons 
General’s insistence on some of the military-like details of Service life gradually faded. The 
Commissioned Corps had numbered about 100 at the turn of the century, a time when their 
martinet-like leader – Wyman – decided to minute detail the uniforms to be worn on hospital 
duty, at quarantine stations and on special occasions. [18] Indeed, photos of Wyman and 
Blue show doctors in full military regalia, sometimes even with swords. [19] 
But as the Public Health Service grew, it added nurses, sanitary engineers and other staff. 
Most were civil service employees. By 1915, commissioned officers accounted for only 187 
of the PHS’s 2,131 staff. By 1925, there were about 250 regular service and reserve officers 
among 4,672 employees. [20] In the 1930s, commissioned officers routinely wore uniforms 
in hospitals and in quarantine areas, but the military dress was usually absent in field service 
and other assignments. “I got the uniform and kept it in a closet,” said Dr. Warren Palmer 
Dearing, a PHS veteran, recalling his first years in the Corps in the mid-1930s. [21] 
When Cumming retired in 1936, he was succeeded by Dr. Thomas Parran Jr., a Service 
veteran who became one of the most visible Surgeons General in the history of the federal 
government – though usually dressed in a suit. 
Parran had gained national prominence in 1934, when he served as New York’s state 
health commissioner while Franklin Delano Roosevelt was governor. He campaigned against 
venereal disease, and was asked to appear on a CBS radio program but was cut off the air 
when a station employee realized he was going to talk about syphilis – a topic many reporters 
and station manager felt was unsuitable for general audiences. [22] 
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“That was, you might say, a real taboo,” said Dr. Philip R. Lee, a public health scholar at 
the University of California-San Francisco. [23] 
But Parran got around that. He called a friend in the press, Ernest Lindley, and CBS’s 
decision hit the newspapers. [24] 
At his first press conference as Surgeon General in 1936, Parran again confronted 
censorship by the media. After he named syphilis and tuberculosis as two major preventable 
causes of death, an Associated Press reporter interrupted: “But Dr. Parran, the AP never uses 
the word ‘syphilis,’” the reporter said. “The Associated Press will use it from now on or it 
will probably have to omit all the pronouncements of the Surgeon General of the Public 
Health Service,” Parran replied. [25] 
Parran appeared on the cover of TIME magazine in October 1936, and came to be known 
as “the No. 1 New Dealer in national health matters.” [26] In 1937, he published Shadow on 
the Land, a best-selling book about syphilis. In it, Parran argued syphilis must be dealt with 
frankly, and health officials had to not only treat the disease but identify contacts and work 
with law enforcement in addressing prostitution. [27] His influence with the public helped 
persuade Congress to pass the National Venereal Disease Control Act of 1938, which 
authorized $15 million over three years – or roughly $1.7 billion in today’s dollars – for the 
fight against sexually-transmitted diseases. [28] 
In 1945, he addressed another taboo topic, labeling mental health as a top priority for 
health officials. “Mental illness is not a skeleton to be hidden in the family closet,” he 
declared. [29] 
Some noteworthy changes in the administration of the Public Health Service followed. In 
1939, the PHS moved from the Department of the Treasury – its traditional home – to the 
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newly created Federal Security Agency. In 1943 and 1944, new laws established a four-
bureau structure for the Service that remained in place until 1967. They set forth that the 
Surgeon General was to be appointed by the President to a four-year term, selected from the 
Commissioned Corps, and his appointment was to be ratified by the U.S. Senate. [30] 
After World War II, the International Health Conference in New York elected Parran its 
president, and he used that position to help engineer the creation of the World Health 
Organization in 1948. [31] Parran considered the diplomacy involved in that effort – and the 
resulting product – to be one of his greatest achievements, some say. [32] 
Roosevelt, Parran’s great political patron, died in 1945. Roosevelt’s death proved to be 
one of several political developments that contributed to the ouster of the popular Surgeon 
General, public health veterans and scholars said. 
Another was Parran’s role in a debate over creating a system of national health insurance. 
Parran was a supporter of an effort to create a national health insurance system, such as was 
proposed in the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill introduced in 1943. He supported the Hospital 
Survey and Construction Act of 1946, also known as the Hill-Burton Act, as an 
infrastructure-supporting measure that would precede federal funding for medical care. [33] 
Understanding that national health insurance was bitterly opposed by the American 
Medical Association and other interest groups, Parran tempered his public advocacy of 
national health insurance. [34] But quietly, Parran wanted the PHS to play a principal role in 
the national system that would be created. [35] 
Nevertheless, AMA editorialist Morris Fishbein attacked Parran for supporting Truman’s 
call for national health insurance, and some believe Parran became a political victim of the 
backlash. [36] 
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Another problem for Parran was his contentious relationship with Oscar R. Ewing, who 
in 1947 succeeded Watson B. Miller as Federal Security Administrator. Ewing didn’t brook 
opposition, but Parran – a long-time, well-known national public health leader – was not one 
to roll over. “Parran was speaking up,” Dearing recalled. [37] Among their disagreements 
was what role the federal government should take in supporting medical education, and on 
the timing of a National Health Assembly in May 1948 that was intended to propel a 
compulsory health insurance bill. [38] 
In 1948, President Truman declined to renew Parran’s term, and Dr. Leonard Scheele was 
appointed Parran’s successor in April of that year. 
Scheele benefited from growing support for biomedical research. The Service’s NIH – it 
became the plural National Institutes of Health in 1948 – received the generous and forceful 
support of entities like the American Cancer Society and the influential philanthropists Albert 
and Mary Lasker, who became allies of Scheele’s. [39] 
In 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower elevated the Federal Security Agency to 
cabinet status. It was renamed the U.S. Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW), 
with Oveta Culp Hobby named as Secretary. Hobby was the lone woman in Eisenhower’s 
cabinet, and received significant attention from the press. [40] Also a new position, Special 
Assistant for Health and Medical Affairs, was established in the Secretary’s office to handle 
high-level negotiations on politically sensitive matters. The position was meant to 
accommodate the AMA’s desire to have a designated physician high in the ranks of the new 
department. [41] That position would later evolve to become the undoing of the Surgeon 
General’s administrative powers, but in the 1950s the Special Assistant did not directly 
infringe on the Surgeon General’s responsibilities. [42] 
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Indeed, no laws were rewritten in the creation of the HEW, and the Surgeon General 
retained all of his authorities. [43] HEW was basically “a holding company” in the 1950s. 
“The agencies (under it) were almost autonomous,” said John Kelso, a long time HEW 
administrator. [44] 
Scheele proved much less active in the bully pulpit than Parran, but at certain times made 
important statements to the public. One, considered a success, occurred in 1951: He made a 
public and unqualified recommendation for the fluoridation of drinking water – a 
controversial innovation. [45] 
Considered by many to be a failure, though, was his handling of what came to be known 
as ‘the Cutter incident.’ 
In the early 1950s, at the height of a national polio epidemic, Dr. Jonas Salk and other 
scientists developed vaccines against the disease – one of the great public health triumphs of 
the century. Salk developed a protocol for manufacturing a vaccine that was 55 pages long, 
but as production of polio vaccine was fast-tracked, U.S. officials shortened the protocol and 
did not require manufacturers to notify the government about batches of vaccine that failed 
safety tests. Hobby pressed for speedy approval from a licensing advisory committee, giving 
them only hours to decide. Late on the afternoon of April 12, 1955, Hobby held a press 
conference to announce the signing of licenses granting permission for five pharmaceutical 
companies to distribute polio vaccine. [46] 
Only weeks into the vaccination campaign, however, reports of new cases of polio 
emerged in children who had been vaccinated and in those they had been in contact with. 
Cutter Laboratories, the first manufacturer to distribute vaccine, immediately came under 
scrutiny. On April 27, Scheele asked the company to voluntarily recall all of its vaccine. 
42 
Scheele issued a statement, saying that in the judgment of the Public Health Service, there 
was no cause for alarm. He also it was not clear there was a link between the vaccine and 
new cases of polio. But public alarm grew, as reports of children who were paralyzed or 
killed proliferated, reaching 30 by April 30. [47] 
A government investigation indicated safety tests couldn’t be trusted and the vaccine 
manufacturers were not consistently able to inactivate polio virus. On May 6, Scheele 
announced the postponement of polio vaccinations until further notice. Two days later he 
went on television to address the public: 
“Because the Public Health Service believes that every single step in the interest of safety 
must be taken, we are undertaking, with the help of manufacturers, a reappraisal of all their 
tests and processes. This can be thought of, if you like, as a double-check…But we believe – 
and I am sure the American people join us in believing – that in dealing with the lives of our 
children, it is impossible to be too cautious.”  [48] 
A day later, Scheele again appeared before the press, emphasizing that Cutter was the 
only company to release a product linked to paralysis and death and those shots were off the 
market. [49] But in the weeks that followed, cases were also linked to a lot made by another 
manufacturer, Wyeth Laboratories. 
HEW officials came under heavy criticism for their handling of the matter. “There is no 
excuse for starting and stopping, scaring everyone to death… It is one of the worst bungled 
programs I have ever seen,” said U.S. Sen. Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, in subsequent 
hearings. [50] Hobby received much of the criticism, and resigned in the summer of 1955. 
[51] 
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Scheele regretted his decision to allow companies to withhold information on vaccine lots 
that had failed safety tests. [52] He “was spiritually a casualty” of the Cutter incident, 
Dearing said. [53] 
Scheele resigned in 1956. Some say he was forced out when his term expired, although 
Dearing maintained that Scheele took a job in industry – with a pharmaceutical company, 
Warner-Lambert – only after learning he was appointed to his third four-year term. [54] 
Eisenhower appointed Dr. Leroy Edgar Burney in August 1956. By all accounts he was a 
quiet administrator who generally stayed away from the bully pulpit and focused instead on 
his administrative duties with the Public Health Service. His interest was in keeping public 
health separate from medical care; his guiding credo was “don’t get identified with anything 
that organized medicine would really take out after you,” said Dr. William Stewart, a PHS 
physician who would later become Surgeon General. [55] 
“He never created much of a stir about anything,” said Dr. David Sencer, who in 1965 
became director of the PHS’s Communicable Disease Center in 1965. [56] 
Well, almost never. In 1956, Burney had urged the American Cancer Society and others 
to form a study group on the impact of cigarette smoking on health. In July 1957, after 
receiving the group’s report, Burney issued a statement to newspapers saying excessive 
smoking was likely a cause of lung cancer – a statement the journalist and public health 
historian Richard Kluger described as “tepid.” [57] 
Tepid as it was, it made Burney the first Surgeon General to publicly link smoking with 
lung cancer. In 1959, Burney made a similar statement, after another study group produced 
more information on such a link. The statement did not include a call to action or a push for 
new policy. However, it was attacked in a Journal of the American Medical Association 
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editorial that argued there were not enough facts to warrant a statement on causation. Burney 
was shocked by the response. [58] Burney had an article in the same issue, but it had no 
impact. [59] 
It was during Burney’s tenure that the Office of the HEW Secretary began to really assert 
itself. “I recall well the stories that whenever Congress – and I guess the White House, too – 
wanted to deal with matters of health, they dealt directly with the Surgeon General’s office or 
with the components of the Public Health Service,” said Dr. Charles Miller, who joined the 
PHS in the 1950s and later became a prominent HEW administrator. But that changed 
noticeably in the late 1950s, as the Secretary’s office played a larger and larger role in 
determining program priorities and developing budgets, he said. [60] 
Burney resigned when his term expired in 1961, allowing the new Kennedy 
Administration to pick its own man. PHS veterans note, however, that the changeover was 
unusual – Scheele, Parran and other Surgeons General were reappointed even when 
Democrats and Republicans switched places in the White House. “Burney was so poor and 
weak as the Surgeon General, he was the only Surgeon General in the whole history of the 
Surgeon General with a term appointment that was not reappointed,” said Dearing, who 
unsuccessfully lobbied to become Burney’s replacement. [61] 
Kennedy instead chose Dr. Luther Terry, a cigarette-smoking heart specialist with a keen 
interest in research. Kluger described him as “a honey-voiced Alabaman who, as a youngster, 
had picked tobacco.” [62] According to legend, politics played a major role in his selection – 
the influential U.S. Sen. Lister Hill called the White House and recommended Terry, who 
was Hill’s personal physician. [63] 
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Although the AMA had proved unfriendly on the issue of tobacco and smoking, Terry 
quickly heard from another group pushing for action. Three months after Terry took office, 
Kennedy received a June 1 letter from the American Cancer Society, American Heart 
Association and other groups urging the government to establish a commission to study the 
effects of smoking on health. [64] Terry set up such a commission the next year, after an 
influential report from the Royal College of Physicians in Britain concluded smoking was a 
clear cause of lung cancer and bronchitis, and probably contributed to cardiovascular disease 
as well. [65] 
Terry released his Advisory Committee’s report on Jan. 11, 1964. Terry later described it 
as “probably having the greatest impact of any government report every issued.” [66] 
The report said smoking caused lung cancer and bronchitis, and added that there was 
evidence suggesting – but not proving – that it also caused emphysema, cardiovascular 
disease and some other types of cancer. Furthermore, the committee concluded that smoking 
was a hazard and the government should do something about it. [67] 
Released on a Saturday, the report made newspaper front pages across the country on 
Sunday morning – the day of the week with highest newspaper circulation. It was treated as 
blockbuster news: The New York Herald Tribune’s headline said; “It’s Official – Cigarette 
Smoking Can Kill You.” The New York Times said the report effectively dismissed the 
arguments against the ill effects of smoking that had been made by the tobacco industry and 
others. [68] 
U.S. cigarette consumption dropped by about 20 percent in the three months after the 
report was issued. It later crept back to near normal levels, but Terry’s report served as an 
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important first salvo in a public health campaign that ultimately drove smoking rates down 
from about half of all adults in the 1960s to fewer than a quarter today [69] 
It marked a turning point in government policy regarding tobacco. The next year, 
Congress passed the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, which mandated health 
warnings be placed on cigarette packs. It also required that the Surgeon General report 
annually to Congress on cigarette advertising and the relationship of smoking to illness. It 
also created a National Clearinghouse on Smoking and Health, and sparked other measures to 
draw attention to, and discourage, cigarette smoking. 
Much of Terry’s term was consumed with testifying to Congress about smoking and 
working on the tobacco issue. That work made him a public health hero, said Dr. Harmon 
Eyre of the American Cancer Society’s recently retired chief medical officer. 
Of the Surgeon Generals up to that time and since, “he made the biggest impact on the 
health of this country,” Eyre said. [70] 
He was echoed by Dr. Philip Lee, who years later would become an important agent of 
change for the U.S. Public Health Service. “If you look at the long term, probably the 
Surgeon General who accomplished the most would be Luther Terry. Thirty million people 
quit smoking following this report,” Lee said. [71] 
Nevertheless, Terry did not endure in the office. A new HEW Secretary, John Gardner, 
came into office in August 1965 with a mission to shake things up. Terry, though only 54, 
retired from government service in October as his term ended. Apparently, President Lyndon 
Johnson wanted someone new, said Stewart, the man who would succeed Terry. [72] 
The soft-voiced Stewart, who Burney had recruited to join his staff in 1957, was 
surprised when he was nominated to replace Terry. Only weeks earlier, Terry had appointed 
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Stewart as director of the National Heart Institute at the NIH, a post Stewart considered his 
career goal. [73] Dr. Jim Shannon, the widely respected head of NIH, was surprised as well – 
he felt Stewart was not the caliber of leader needed to run the Public Health Service, an 
opinion he also held of Terry and Burney. [74] 
President Johnson called Stewart to the White House, and told him; “They tell me you 
can run the Public Health Service. I’m not sure of that, but they tell me you can. I’ll be 
watching you,’” Stewart later recalled. [75] 
It was a responsibility Stewart would not hold for long. 
HOW THE SURGEON GENERAL LOST POWER, BUT NOT HIS PULPIT 
In Stewart’s Senate confirmation hearing in September 1965, the first question came 
from Sen. Jacob K. Javits of New York. 
“To what extent do you feel the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare has authority 
over the Surgeon General?” Javits asked. 
Stewart replied the Surgeon General had many authorities, although he noted HEW had 
been growing and some of the new activities had been placed under the jurisdiction of the 
HEW Secretary. 
“Do you feel that you are a political or a professional official?” Javits asked next. 
“I feel that I am a professional official,” Stewart responded. 
A moment later, Javits continued; “Are you prepared, if the professional responsibility 
calls for it, to declare that your professional responsibility comes first if you differ with the 
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare?” 
“I think I would stand on my professional responsibilities.” 
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“Can you conceive,” Javits persisted, “of a situation where you felt so strongly about 
your professional responsibilities that you would be willing to resign rather than to carry out 
the orders of a Secretary under whom you serve? 
“I can conceive of it, but I hope it does not happen.” 
“But can you conceive of it?” 
“Yes.” 
“Are you morally, in good conscience, prepared to assume that kind of responsibility?” 
“Yes, I am,” Stewart replied. [76] 
Javits’ questions would prove prophetic. How Surgeons General respond to the political 
pressures of government superiors would become a standard by which Stewart and others 
would be judged. 
For Stewart in particular, Javits’ questions would cut to the core of an HEW 
reorganization effort over the following three years that would strip the Surgeon General of 
most of the powers the position had accumulated over more than 90 years. Stewart would 
lose his authorities precisely because he was professional, not political. And many of his 
peers would judge him harshly for his compliance with the most significant shake-up in the 
history of the office. 
“It was really the politicization of the Public Health Service,” said Sencer, referring to the 
changes that occurred during Stewart’s term. [77] 
HEW Secretary Gardner clearly had plans for changes in the Public Health Service. In 
announcing Stewart’s appointment, Gardner said of the PHS; “It stands at a critical point in 
its history. It will either take a leap forward, or it will become mired in its own internal 
conflicts and history will pass it by.” [78] 
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One of the primary challenges involved Medicare, the federal health insurance program 
for the elderly, which Congress created in 1965 and placed in the hands of HEW. The 
program was to take effect in 1966, but Gardner and some of his key administrators had been 
disturbed by the unwillingness of PHS staffers to play a role. “I heard people in those days in 
PHS say ‘We’re not in the check-writing business,’” recalled Kelso, the former HEW 
administrator. [79] 
Some say PHS officials were reluctant to become involved in a program like Medicare 
because past battles with organized medicine over the issue had made many of them gun shy. 
The mighty Parran was the last Surgeon General to champion national health insurance, and 
some believed it had cost him his job. “The bitterness of this 30-year fight with the AMA 
made a lot of people just not want to tackle it,” said Dearing, who served in the PHS from 
1934 until 1961. [80] 
But in the eyes of Gardner and one of his top lieutenants, Wilbur Cohen, not tackling the 
issue was not an option. Cohen was “a liberal of the first order” and proponent of national 
health insurance. “And when he didn’t get an enthusiastic response, he wanted to fix things,” 
Kelso said. [81] But Cohen liked Stewart – they worked closely together in the early 1960s, 
when Cohen was HEW Assistant Secretary for Legislation and Stewart was a sort of in-house 
expert at PHS on issues related to health services delivery and third-party reimbursement. 
[82] 
Initially, Stewart – a pipe smoker – was active in the bully pulpit, speaking out on the 
dangers of smoking on “The Today Show” and in other forums, sometimes in debates with 
officials from the tobacco industry. [83] Stewart said President Johnson was pleased with his 
job as, essentially, the government’s point man on tobacco issues. He recalled being at the 
50 
White House one time when Johnson pulled him aside and said; “Keep it up, but don’t let it 
get up here” to the White House. [84]  Indeed, Lee argues that Stewart was as active on 
tobacco as Dr. C. Everett Koop, the outspoken Surgeon General of the Reagan years, but 
Koop received more credit because his anti-tobacco speeches were a stark departure from 
what others in the Reagan administration were saying, whereas Stewart’s served in an 
administration that was more supportive. [85] 
But Gardner quickly gave Stewart other assignments. One had to do with Medicare: The 
government had said that for hospitals to be eligible for Medicare reimbursement, they had to 
be certified as in compliance with Title 6 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In other words, 
they had to be desegregated. And Stewart was put in charge of making that happen. 
It was an extremely difficult task. Lee, a key Gardner aide at the time, recalled a visit to 
Atlanta’s Georgia Baptist Hospital at the time. “A cardiologist said ‘Dr. Lee, if I put a nigger 
in a room with one of my patients, it will kill the white patient.’ That’s the kind of attitude 
they had.” [86] Many field staff with the Public Health Service were not much help, saying 
things like; ‘Can’t you compromise this Title 6 stuff so that we can get patients into the 
hospital?’ recalled George Silver, another important administrator in HEW at the time. [87] 
The PHS field staff were reflecting the resistance of the communities in which they were 
supposed to provide leadership, said Silver, who like Cohen and others, developed a low 
opinion of the Service. “It was sort of an anachronistic animal, anti-Semitic, anti-black, had 
to be dragged kicking and screaming into the 20th Century,” Silver said. [88] 
Stewart, however, was a forceful agent of change in meetings with hospital leaders 
regarding desegregation of the facilities, Lee said. “It’s one thing for a Social Security person 
to say ‘You have to be desegregated or we’re not going to pay you.’ It’s another for a doctor 
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to say ‘You have to desegregate because it’s best for the patient.’ And so he had a very, very 
strong influence,” Lee said. [89] Those discussions weren’t covered much in the media, but 
had a huge impact on the nation, he added. [90] 
At about the same time, Stewart was called on to oversee a reorganization of the Public 
Health Service intended to make it more responsive to the political agenda set by the Johnson 
Administration and the 89th Congress. On April 25, 1966, Gardner issued a directive 
transferring all the statutory authorities of the Surgeon General to the Secretary, giving 
Gardner the power to restructure the PHS. He put the Surgeon General in charge of five 
bureaus, and Stewart announced specifics of the reorganized PHS in October of that year. 
[91] The change conflicted with the federal Public Health Service Act of 1944, but Johnson 
in 1966 worked with Congress to empower the HEW Secretary to reorganize the Public 
Health Service without formal Congressional approval. [92] 
It lasted 15 months. The commissioned officer physicians at the top of the PHS resisted 
the change, and Gardner quickly grew impatient and didn’t see the progress he was 
expecting. Stewart asked for patience, and on at least one occasion refused to dismiss a 
commissioned officer that Gardner wanted out. [93] “His style was to bring people in the 
Corps along, not just order them,” Silver said, recalling that Stewart like to say; ‘You don’t 
always pull a tree up by its roots to see whether it’s growing.’ [94] 
But Gardner showed little inclination to wait for the PHS to come around. There had been 
a swing back in the 1966 election, with some liberals losing office, and Congress could no 
longer be counted on to approve the Johnson administration’s health proposals. [95] 
What’s more, for years Gardner and his key lieutenants had watched the PHS pass up 
opportunities to lead the government’s efforts in health insurance, environmental regulation, 
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automobile safety, family planning and other initiatives important to advocates, Congress and 
the public. In some cases, the PHS was not only unwilling to respond; it was unable to, 
lacking leaders with expertise in some of the emerging areas of public health concern. [96] 
In 1967, Gardner quietly decided he had to take responsibility for the Public Health 
Service away from Stewart. [97] He put it in the hands of Lee, who was serving in the 
Special Assistant for Health and Medical Affairs position created in 1953, which had been 
re-titled Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs. 
(Gardner wasn’t there long enough to oversee the transition. He resigned in 1968, 
effective March 1. He wanted Johnson, pushing both his ‘Great Society’ agenda and fighting 
the Vietnam War, to go to Congress to raise taxes. But Johnson would not, and Gardner 
refused to make more cuts in the HEW budget.) [98] 
Gardner’s successor, Cohen, implemented Gardner’s plan on March 13, ordering a 
reorganization that placed the PHS and FDA under the supervision of the Assistant Secretary 
for Health and Scientific Affairs. “For the first time in the history of the PHS, a non-career 
official had become the nation’s top health officer,” the public health historian Fitzhugh 
Mullan wrote. [99] 
Lee was a physician, but technically the ASH position didn’t have to be a doctor. [100] 
The change meant a political appointee now had official oversight of about 45,000 HEW 
employees and programs budgeted at nearly $3 billion. [101] The Surgeon General was made 
a deputy to Lee, his powers and administrative support scattered to Lee, Cohen and others in 
HEW. 
It was understood at the time that the Surgeon General would still function as an 
important spokesman on health issues – a career professional free of politics. “They would 
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leave the Surgeon General free to make public pronouncements, whether they were 
politically popular or not,” Kelso said. [102] 
But it was small consolation to Stewart, who earlier had tried to persuade Gardner against 
the reorganization. “I didn’t like the idea of having to have a spokesman who had no 
authority to do anything,” Stewart said. [103] Indeed, some key health officials within HEW 
had already lost respect for his position, including Jim Shannon, the powerful head of NIH. 
Shannon routinely skipped meetings Stewart called, even when they were held on the NIH 
campus, Ehrlich recalled. “He felt the NIH was an agency that was bigger and stronger and 
had more political clout than the Public Health Service did. In some respects, he may have 
been correct,” he added. [104] 
Stewart grew frustrated and apathetic after the reorganization, some said. “After that, he 
never really put out,” Silver said. [105] 
Richard Nixon was elected President in November 1968. Stewart submitted a letter to 
Nixon the following April. He said he wished to resign effective Aug. 1 so he could take a 
job at the LSU Medical Center in New Orleans. LSU officials wanted him to be in place 
before the start of the academic year, and his term was almost up anyway. [106] 
At the time, and in the years that followed, Commissioned Corp members criticized 
Stewart for not trying harder to retain control of the Public Health Service. “He sort of let 
things roll over him and didn’t take any kind of strong leadership position. I’m sure he would 
not agree with that characterization, but at least that is what many people said,” said Dr. Paul 
Ehrlich, a Commissioned Corps officer who would become Acting Surgeon General in the 
1970s. [107] 
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Critics also vilified Cohen, Lee and Silver as arrogant wiz kids who dismantled a time-
honored organization because its leaders didn’t comply with their politics. Coordination 
between public health agencies was never the same again, some say. And the administrative 
powers that had first enabled Surgeons General to speak with authority were torn away. 
Dr. Donald Whiteside, a dentist who served for years in the Public Health Service, 
repeated a common perception of how leadership of the PHS had changed. “… that guy (the 
Surgeon General) was appointed, had a four-year appointment, and he did not have to 
kowtow to the administration. He could say, ‘I don’t care what the administration’s policy is 
on any health issue. I’m going to tell you what is in the best interest of the American public, 
so far as a health issue is concerned. I don’t care who likes it. I don’t care who doesn’t like it. 
I’m here for four years and you can’t touch me.’ And we had Surgeon Generals who did that, 
I mean who went up against the administration and said ‘Kiss off.’ Now what you have is a 
Public Health Service that is run by political appointees…” [108] 
Other public health leaders offered less impassioned assessments, but agree the 
reorganization was lamentable. 
“Phil’s heart is in the right place, and I think Phil’s a wonderful policy guy, but I think 
they were wrong in doing this. I really do,” said Dr. Georges Benjamin, executive director of 
the American Public Health Association. [109] 
It’s unclear whether the reorganization would have achieved what Gardner, Cohen and 
Lee intended. Nixon’s election meant the political appointees who had gained control of the 
PHS were suddenly on their way out. Cohen was replaced by a new HEW Secretary in 
January 1969 and Lee left the government a month later. 
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“Stewart left, Phil Lee left, and then it was ‘Okay, these changes have been made. Now 
how are they going to be implemented in 1969?’ I think that’s when things kind of went from 
bad to worse,” Ehrlich said. [110] 
DR. JESSE STEINFELD, 1969-1973 
Almost immediately, the Nixon Administration had a problem with the newly-created 
position of Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs – setting off a chain of 
events that would usher in one of the most activist Surgeons General of the bully pulpit era, 
Dr. Jesse Steinfeld. 
The problem with the ASH position, as it came to be called, was that new HEW Secretary 
Robert Finch was unable to fill it. He wanted to hire Dr. John H. Knowles, the general 
director of Boston’s Massachusetts General Hospital. Knowles was an admired and 
innovative administrator, but also a critic of the size of doctor’s fees, and an advocate for 
comprehensive health insurance for all Americans. The American Medical Association and 
conservative Republicans fought the idea. The battles dragged on for months. 
“Nixon’s office finally told Finch; ‘Pick someone else, or we will,’” said Dr. Roger 
Egeberg. He was Finch’s next choice. [111] 
Egeberg was dean of the University of Southern California’s medical school. He was 
seen as loyal to Nixon, and ‘the Knowles fiasco’ had dragged on too long, impacting Finch’s 
ability to run the department. True, Egeberg was a Democrat, but in this case Nixon’s people 
seemed OK about that. “I guess the assumption was it would be easier to get him confirmed” 
by a Senate that was still largely Democratic, Ehrlich said. [112] 
Egeberg needed help, and leaned on Dr. Jesse Steinfeld, a cancer researcher who was just 
finishing up a stint as deputy director of the National Cancer Institute. For several years, 
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Steinfeld had been a medical professor at USC, where he had impressed Egeberg. “I’d been 
at meetings at USC, where he’d been teaching, and I had liked the way he looked for facts. 
And I liked the way he often went against the grain,” Egeberg recalled. [113] 
Steinfeld and his family had been planning to return to California – indeed, his wife had 
already left Washington with the kids – but Steinfeld agreed to stay on for a few weeks. He 
was quickly involved in meetings with Finch and other top officials, and had an influential 
voice regarding fluoridation of water and other important topics. He liked it. “It was kind of 
exciting. I mean, I had never been at the center of things,” Steinfeld said. [114] 
At about that time, HEW officials had a meeting at Camp David to discuss the structure 
of the department, and whether to do away with the reorganized Public Health Service and 
the defanged Surgeon General. After the meeting, Steinfeld recalled, “Bob Finch came to me 
and said; ‘Would you stay here if we appointed you Surgeon General and we kept the Public 
Health Service?’” [115] 
Steinfeld agreed – a decision Egeberg and other Nixon Administration officials grew to 
regret. 
Small in stature, smart in school 
Jesse Leonard Steinfeld was born Jan. 6, 1927 in a town in western Pennsylvania, not far 
from Pittsburgh. He was a short kid, but academically gifted, skipping grades and finishing 
high school at age 16. He graduated the University of Pittsburgh two years later, and 
completed medical school at Cleveland’s Western Reserve University at age 22. [116] 
He enlisted in the Public Health Service a short time later, when the Korean War started. 
He was always interested in research, and was soon assigned to a National Cancer Institute 
outpost in San Francisco, followed by NCI assignments in the Washington, D.C. area. He 
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found he was among a number of smart young doctors who had joined the PHS for the same 
reasons. “The major attraction was to avoid the Army, Korea, or being shot at. So we had our 
choice, generally – people who were very high in their class and interested in research,” he 
recalled. [117] 
He left the government in 1959 to teach at USC where he came to know Egeberg. 
Steinfeld returned to the NCI in Washington in 1968, thinking he was getting in line to 
become the NCI’s Director – the man in the job, Dr. Ken Endicott, was expected to take over 
the NIH when Jim Shannon retired. But Endicott didn’t get the job, and Steinfeld had 
decided to return to the Los Angeles area to try and start a cancer hospital. 
That’s when he was asked to stay on in Washington for a few weeks, and then to be 
Surgeon General. He was 42 at the time. 
He stepped into a bit of a mess. Much of it had to do with Egeberg, who was new to 
government and had taken a position that was not well defined. Although the Assistant 
Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs was the titular head of the Public Health Service, 
many of the administrative powers over the PHS were placed with other officials. Budget 
management, personnel management and other functions were instead placed under other 
HEW officials, and the leaders of PHS agencies like the FDA and NIH began going around 
Egeberg on a variety of matters. [118] 
By the spring of 1970, press accounts described a department in disarray. 
“Morale is sagging. A lack of leadership from Dr. Roger O. Egeberg, who has not yet 
mastered the complexities of his health empire, has caused more than one official of an 
operating program to throw up his hands in despair trying to get decisions out of the front 
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office,” wrote Washington Sounds, a newsletter of the National Association of Hearing and 
Speech Agencies, in its June 18, 1970 issue. [119] 
The same week, TIME magazine ran an article entitled ‘Sickness at HEW,’ which 
described a department torn by struggles between the Nixon Administration’s desire for hard-
line budget trimming and by progressive HEW staffers with more Democratic ideals.  Finch 
was leaving, but some of the blame was laid at the feet of Egeberg, who had presided over a 
series of top-level firings at the FDA and other disruptive personnel changes, but was having 
trouble finding replacements that were politically acceptable to Nixon’s men, TIME reported. 
[120] 
Egeberg’s relationship with Steinfeld was also deteriorating. 
Steinfeld had wanted some line authority to go with the Surgeon General job, and so was 
also appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary. [121] It lead to conflicts, as Egeberg began to 
believe that Steinfeld was keeping important information from him. 
Said Egeberg; “He became imbued with the idea that I was the enemy of the Public 
Health Service, because I was in this new job which was really put over the Public Health 
Service. So he went, I think, beyond what any other person would have done in his efforts to 
discredit me and keep me in the dark about things. You know, I finally had to go to his 
secretaries and say; ‘I’m going to try to get you people transferred if you don’t give the mail 
that comes to me, to me!’” [122] 
Egeberg gradually started holding meetings without Steinfeld. For his part, Steinfeld told 
associates he was surprised Egeberg was acting the way he did, Ehrlich recalled. [123] The 
root of the clashes has remained a subject of speculation. Some believe Steinfeld, not willing 
to accept what was largely a figurehead job, was behaving like he had more power than he 
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actually had. [124] Others felt Egeberg was the problem, and that perhaps he was made to 
mistrust Steinfeld by civil servants who convinced Egeberg the Surgeon General and his 
Commissioned Corps were problems that HEW had to get rid of. [125] 
The relationship was further strained by Steinfeld’s use of the Surgeon General’s bully 
pulpit. 
Steinfeld and the Bully Pulpit 
Early in his tenure, Egeberg had proved himself to be a funny and effective public 
speaker, and clearly enjoyed it. Indeed, when he was first considered for the ASH position, 
Egeberg asked if he could also be Surgeon General. He was told that was not possible 
because of a requirement at the time that the Surgeon General had to be younger than 65, 
recalled Egeberg, who was just over that age limit at the time he was named the Assistant 
Secretary. [126] 
Egeberg has said in interviews that he never intended to take over the traditional bully 
pulpit of the Surgeon General. “The Surgeon General was our representative all over the 
world, and he had gained a great deal of respect over the years. I certainly didn’t think any 
administration should or could step in and destroy something that was as important and 
useful as that,” he said, in a 1988 interview. [127] 
Nevertheless, other HEW officials said it irked Egeberg that Steinfeld quickly proved 
aggressive about speaking to Congress and the public on a range of health topics, and that 
those audiences clearly preferred to hear from the Surgeon General. 
“It was always a problem then and even continued later, because the public and the 
Congress recognized the name Surgeon General, or the title of the Surgeon General. 
Whenever there was some testimony that had to be given, the congressional committee 
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would always ask for the Surgeon General, not for the Assistant Secretary. That used to just 
rankle the Assistant Secretary and the people around him. They would frequently go back to 
the committee and say, ‘The Surgeon General is not the spokesman on this issue. The 
Assistant Secretary is. If you want somebody, the Assistant Secretary will come.’ And that 
used to antagonize some of the people in Congress, because they didn’t want some Assistant 
Secretary testifying; they wanted the Surgeon General. That just added fuel to the fire of the 
Assistant Secretary not being identified as the senior line officer, and the Surgeon General 
being his deputy,” Ehrlich said. [128] 
Others who served in HEW around that time shared that assessment. Egeberg wanted to 
be the No. 1 health voice. But Steinfeld believed that was his role. “I think Roger was either 
threatened or resented it,” said Dr. Merlin DuVal, who was appointed to replace Egeberg in 
1971. [129] 
“By the time I got there, the two men were literally no longer speaking to each other,” 
DuVal said. [130] 
Steinfeld became highly visible on a number of topics. He advocated mild sanctions, but 
not imprisonment, for marijuana users. [131] He was a leading voice in arguing against 
proposals to do away with the Commissioned Corps, which some argued was an unnecessary 
second personnel system within HEW. And he was the medical expert at HEW press 
conferences, fielding press questions on topics ranging from FDA warnings about oral 
contraceptives to the storage of poison gas. [132] 
He also was a much-quoted government voice on cyclamate and saccharin, artificial 
sweeteners linked to cancer in animal experiments. Steinfeld was part of the October 1969 
announcement that the FDA was banning the sale of cyclamate in the United States. [133] 
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Sencer, who was CDC Director at the time, described Steinfeld’s role in the announcement as 
“courageous” and said it was “one of the first times the Public Health Service had taken a 
strong stand on an environmental issue or a toxic substance issue.” [134] 
But probably the two highest-profile topics Steinfeld spoke on were cigarette smoking 
and television violence. 
Of course, speaking on smoking had essentially become part of the job description. 
Especially since the Terry report in 1964, Surgeons General were considered the 
government’s spokesmen on the issue. That role was formalized in the Cigarette Labeling 
and Advertising Act of 1965, which required the Surgeon General to make an annual report 
on smoking and health to Congress. 
But whereas Terry and Stewart – both smokers – were careful and even diplomatic in 
their presentations, Steinfeld was impassioned. He removed the ashtrays Stewart had left 
around, and worked to hit new dangers of smoking in the annual report to Congress. [135] 
The 1971 report blamed maternal smoking for retarding fetal growth and discussed new 
studies that said carbon monoxide in smoke lead to heart disease. It also tacitly endorsed a 
study that found dogs that had been exposed to cigarette smoke for more than two years had 
higher rates of lung cancer. Steinfeld took that endorsement a step further in the 1972 report, 
in which he warned of the dangers of secondhand smoke to people. [136] 
His statements stoked a nascent nonsmokers’ rights movement in the country, and 
sparked discussions about banning cigarette smoke in public buildings and transportation. It 
was an alarming development to tobacco companies, who complained Steinfeld had far 
exceeded science in his statements and accused him of anti-smoking propaganda. 
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“The results of public misinformation are evident. Public transportation, for example 
(including the open-decked Staten Island Ferry), is beset with no smoking policies on the 
basis of the Surgeon General’s arbitrary campaign to ban all smoking,” wrote David S. 
Peoples, the president of R.J. Reynolds Industries Inc., in a letter to the HEW Secretary in 
1972. [137] 
Steinfeld’s status on the tobacco front was enhanced by a law passed by Congress in 
1969 designed to update its 1965 cigarette labeling legislation. The new law mandating that 
beginning in 1971, the warning label in cigarettes was broadened to include the words 
‘Surgeon General.’ Specifically, all packages began to announce: “Warning: The Surgeon 
General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous To Your Health.” [138] 
“Even this the industry found oppressive; to concede that that their product ‘is dangerous’ 
was going a good deal further than to admit that it ‘may be hazardous,’ as the expiring law 
had worded it,” Kluger wrote, in his Pulitzer-winning history of tobacco-related health policy 
battles in America. [139] 
Steinfeld became a regular presence in the newspapers and even television – in February 
1972, he appeared on “The Mike Douglas Show” during a week it was co-hosted by John 
Lennon and Yoko Ono. John and Yoko even suspended their chain-smoking during his 
appearance. [140] 
Still, Steinfeld is not remembered as a mesmerizing orator. “He was not a good speaker,” 
Sencer said. “He gave a good scientific paper, but he was not a stem winder.” [141] 
It didn’t help that at times Steinfeld grew tired of stumping on the hazards of tobacco. “I 
must say that after giving the talk a couple of times I didn’t like to do it. I felt that my 
occupation had changed from physician to minister. Now maybe public health people give 
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the same talks over and over again, but I had been doing research and I wanted to talk about 
new things. And this really wasn’t new. It was something that had been known for a long 
time. So I did give a number of talks but it always bothered me that wherever I went people 
just wanted to hear that talk,” Steinfeld later recalled. [142] 
He found a new topic in 1972, when he spoke out on television violence. 
A commission reporting to Steinfeld prepared the report, which concluded that TV 
violence does incite a small percentage of children to behave aggressively and 
inappropriately. “Not necessarily in everyone, maybe only in a few individuals – but it 
doesn’t take very many violent individuals to create havoc in a society,” Steinfeld said years 
later, summarizing the findings. [143] 
When the commission’s findings came out, the White House ordered Steinfeld not to 
testify about it to Congress. Steinfeld was subpoenaed to appear. DuVal, who had taken over 
as ASH, also appeared, but he was quickly dismissed, his written testimony being entered 
into the record. Steinfeld, however, was given plenty of time at the microphone and gave 
testimony at the March 1972 hearing that hadn’t been cleared by the White House. [144] 
Steinfeld said there should be a period of broadcasting when violence should be subdued 
or stopped, he called for a “violence index” review and he made plans to prepare a 
government booklet for parents on how to watch TV with their kids. It was the first time a 
government health official had so publicly raised questions about the effect of the new 
medium on public health, and it alienated him to yet another powerful group of executives.  
“This was a significant item that unfortunately did not endear me to the Administration… 
the networks contributed (to political candidates) and also influenced how people were 
perceived – politicians, that is,” Steinfeld said. [145] 
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But at that point, he was already on the outs. 
How Steinfeld lost his job 
Steinfeld started out under Bob Finch and Roger Egeberg, and flourished in the bully 
pulpit as Finch and Egeberg stumbled in their jobs. But his work environment changed when 
Finch was replaced as HEW Secretary by Elliot Richardson in 1970, and Egeberg was 
replaced by Merlin DuVal in 1971. 
DuVal recognized the weakness of the ASH in its ability to govern the Public Health 
Service. With the backing of Richardson, he set about a reorganization that put the ASH 
more directly in control of the FDA, NIH and other Public Health Service agencies. He 
accomplished it in 1972, along with a shortening of his title – “and scientific affairs” was 
dropped, leaving it as Assistant Secretary for Health. 
DuVal also asserted his role as spokesman as important health controversies arose. One 
striking examples was his handling of the disclosure of the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, a 
Public Health Service experiment started in the 1930s in which researchers watched the 
progression of syphilis in black sharecroppers, but did not treat it. 
When an Associated Press reporter broke the story in July 1972, it was DuVal who 
fielded questions from the press and appointed a commission designed to give the issue harsh 
scrutiny. “I wanted a panel that would be sympathetic to the public point of view rather than 
the scientific or factual point of view, so I loaded it with angry blacks,” he said in 1973. “I 
knew we were going to pay a penalty for Tuskegee, and I figured we should take the whole 
penalty – that way there would be no criticism.” [146] 
But DuVal found that he was not allowed to voice his position on controversial topics he 
wanted to address. He believed firearm ammunition should be treated as a hazardous product, 
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and tried to get other HEW officials to have a public dialog on the idea of legalizing heroin, 
as England had done. “But it simply wouldn’t fly,” DuVal recalled. [147] 
DuVal said he got along with Steinfeld, but made it clear to him that the new HEW 
regime intended to abolish the Surgeon General position. [148] The struggle became public 
in February 1972, when NBC Nightly News reported the Nixon Administration was trying to 
force Steinfeld to resign, and even drafted an announcement saying they would strip him of 
his authority if he would not step down. [149] 
The campaign to dump Steinfeld had taken some petty forms, NBC reporter Ron Nessen 
said. For example, although Steinfeld had been instrumental in negotiating an agreement with 
the Soviet Union to increase cooperation in medical research, the Surgeon General was not 
invited to the ceremony where the agreement was announced. [150] 
It has become an often-repeated legend among people in the Public Health Service that 
once Administration officials realized they couldn’t legally force Steinfeld to resign, they 
attempted even nastier measures. “Steinfeld, they took away his office, took his secretaries, 
they took away his parking. He wandered around with no place to sit except chairs in the 
hall,” said Dr. C. Everett Koop, who became Surgeon General about ten years later. [151] 
But Steinfeld said much of that is false. “I didn’t lose any (privileges). I just was not 
consulted,” he said. [152] 
While Steinfeld could not be fired without cause, the President could choose to not 
reappoint him to another 4-year term. When Nixon was re-elected by a landslide in 
November 1972, he asked for the resignation of top officials. Steinfeld – who still had a year 
to go in his term – believed his would not be accepted, because he needed only another year 
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or two until he qualified for retirement benefits. “Usually they were very nice to people who 
have another year or two to go to retirement,” Steinfeld said. [153] 
Nixon accepted Steinfeld’s resignation, but Steinfeld was the only one who was 
surprised. “He was quite angry,” Ehrlich recalled. [154] His resignation was effective Jan. 
30, 1973. [155] 
Steinfeld’s term is an example of the Great Man Theory in action. He was a self-
described zealot who aggressively used the bully pulpit, sometimes to the displeasure of 
officials about him in the bureaucratic hierarchy. The Long Leash Theory also has resonance 
in his case, in that his opportunities to be a leading federal voice on public health issues were 
gradually decreased and he was tricked into resigning early. 
After his departure, HEW officials – tired of the headaches caused by the aggressive 
Steinfeld – had no intention of having a Senate-confirmed replacement. “The last thing we 
wanted was a Surgeon General to deal with; we had problems enough without having a 
Surgeon General,” said Dr. Charles Edwards, who became the Assistant Secretary for Health 
in 1973. [156] 
Indeed, HEW pushed for legislation to abolish the position of Surgeon General, but U.S. 
Rep. Paul Rogers of Florida – who headed the committee overseeing Public Health Service 
programs, and was known at the time as “Mr. Health” – told them the Surgeon General is a 
very important position and such a bill would never make it to the floor. [157] 
Ehrlich became Acting Surgeon General in 1973, a role he held until Jimmy Carter was 
elected President in 1976. It was under Carter that the Surgeon General job would be revived 
– but overshadowed by a limelight-loving HEW Secretary named Joseph Califano. 
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DR. JULIUS RICHMOND, 1977-1981 
Victor Cohn was suspicious. 
The medical reporter for The Washington Post was peppering federal health officials with 
questions about the simultaneous appointment of Dr. Julius Richmond to two positions – 
Surgeon General and Assistant Secretary for Health. The journalist was “thinking of all kinds 
of ulterior motives,” Richmond later recalled. [158] 
Joseph Califano, the outspoken HEW Secretary who picked Richmond, told Cohn that 
putting one guy into two jobs was a money-saver for the government. Plus, it meant a little 
bit more salary to entice Richmond, a prominent child development expert who had started 
the government’s Head Start program, to join the new Carter Administration. 
Califano told Richmond about his chat with the press, and Richmond winced. “I said, 
‘No, Joe, that’s not quite the way it is,’” said Richmond, who had proposed the dual 
appointment.  Richmond called Cohn. He explained there were other reasons, having to do 
with his wish to combine a position of historical prestige and visibility (the Surgeon General) 
with a less-recognized job with more administrative power (the Assistant Secretary for 
Health). [159] 
On May 31, 1977, Cohn’s story about Richmond’s selection appeared in the Post, 
describing a choice that promised a powerful new presence in HEW. “He is a gentle, soft-
spoken man with a velvet glove, his friends say. But inside the velvet glove is a steel hand,” 
Cohn wrote, of the 60-year-old Richmond. [160] 
Richmond served four years in the position, and became one of the most powerful and 
accomplished Surgeons General of the bully pulpit era. He is credited with creating the so-
called Healthy People report, which for the first time set national goals for health 
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improvement and helped shift public perceptions to a great acceptance of personal 
responsibility for illness prevention. He also became a globe-trotting diplomat, and was an 
important domestic spokesman on issues ranging from cigarette smoking to toxic shock 
syndrome. 
But Richmond never relished public speaking, and was overshadowed by Califano, a 
crusading politician who personally took on the tobacco industry and was HEW’s first 
speaker on a host of other health issues. “I was really the bully pulpit, in a sense,” Califano 
recalled. [161] 
Richmond did not disagree. “You can’t tell a Secretary, you know, that he shouldn’t 
appear here or there or anywhere,” he said. [162] 
‘A well-developed social conscience’ 
Julius B. Richmond was born Sept. 26, 1916 in Chicago. He was raised in the Chicago 
area, traveling downstate to attend the University of Illinois at Urbana and then returning to 
Chicago for medical school, an 18-month rotating internship at Cook County Hospital, and 
two pediatric residencies. 
Most of his education occurred during the Great Depression, and he developed an intense 
interest in the creation of new programs that addressed societal health problems. “I seemed to 
have a well-developed social conscience,” Richmond recalled. [163] 
During World War II, he was inducted into the Army Air Corps (subsequently called the 
U.S. Air Force). Richmond served from 1942 until 1946, as a flight surgeon with the Flying 
Training Command. His duties included examinations of Air Force cadets – a group he 
expected to be in better physical and mental condition than most other recruits, but who had a 
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surprising amount of psychological and social problems. From that experience, Richmond 
developed an interest in the development of young children, he said. [164] 
“… If these young people represented the cream of the crop, then there were earlier 
experiences that should have – and perhaps could have – been better, and should have created 
an atmosphere of greater competence,” Richmond said. [165] 
After World War II, Richmond finished his pediatric training and moved into a series of 
academic positions, first at the University of Illinois, then at the State University of New 
York at Syracuse College of Medicine, where he became dean in 1965. During that time he 
increasingly focused on how a child’s cognitive abilities developed, and how poverty 
threatened that development. His research came to the attention of Sergeant Shriver, who 
created the Peace Corps in the Kennedy Administration and became head of a new federal 
agency, the Office of Economic Opportunity, under President Johnson. Shriver wanted 
Richmond to head a new program to be called Head Start, which would provide 
comprehensive education, health, nutrition, and parent involvement services to low-income 
children and their families. 
“So with the excitement of the era and all, I had, of course, to come face to face with the 
fact that we had only done our studies on a small scale; and here he was asking me to… 
implement something on a national scale. I remember it intrigued me considerably, but I sort 
of teased him with the notion that, well, if you wanted to do a large-scale program, why 
didn’t you get somebody who had been doing large-scale programs? Then typical of 
Shriver’s fashion, he said, ‘Well, if I’d wanted a bureaucrat, I would have looked for one,’” 
Richmond recalled. [166] 
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Richmond served as Head Start’s director for about two years, in what was technically a 
part-time position for him – he was on leave from his job in Syracuse, an arrangement he 
brokered with Shriver. [167] While at Head Start, Richmond helped develop a grant program 
that provided grant funding to local institutions and embedded the program in communities. 
He returned to Syracuse in 1967, after a bout with tuberculosis, and then moved to 
Boston in 1971, where he became chief of psychiatry at Boston Children’s Hospital, a 
professor of child psychiatry and human development at Harvard, and director of the Judge 
Baker Guidance Center. Not long after he got there, a Harvard dean asked him if he would 
also chair the university’s department of preventive and social medicine. 
Richmond recalled the conversation; “… I said, ‘But I came, really, to focus my attention 
on some issues in child development and child psychiatry.’ And he smiled and said, ‘Well, 
you’ve always held more than one job, so this will be sort of in character.’” [168] 
‘A very activist kind of Secretary’ 
After he was elected President in the fall of 1976, Jimmy Carter selected Joseph Califano 
to lead one of the federal government’s largest and most important divisions, the Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare. 
Califano was a political veteran who had served as President Johnson’s senior domestic 
policy aide. He was no shrinking violet, and had demonstrated time and again he was willing 
to take on powerful entities, including the government itself. He also was receptive to the 
idea of working with the press: Indeed, as a Washington lawyer in the early 1970s, Califano 
represented The Washington Post when it faced possible threat of a legal injunction when it 
decided to publish portions of the Pentagon Papers, the leaked, top-secret federal report 
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documenting the government’s internal planning and policy making regarding the Vietnam 
War. 
“… I had a grudging respect for the power of the media. In the LBJ White House, I saw 
how the press drove so much of what we did,” Califano recalled. [169] 
As he began to build his HEW staff, Califano looked for a dynamic physician with strong 
credentials to lead the department’s Public Health Service Programs. Like Secretary Finch at 
the beginning of the Nixon Administration, he initially pursued the general director of 
Massachusetts General Hospital, who at the time was Dr. Charles Sanders. Sanders turned 
him down because the position didn’t pay enough, said Hale Champion, who was Califano’s 
undersecretary for health. [170] 
“Money. Straight-out money” was the reason, Champion recalled. “As a matter of fact, 
he would have taken the job if somehow we could have found a way for him to get another 
$50,000… He was willing to make a sacrifice, but not that big a sacrifice at that time” [171] 
Califano turned to Dr. Chris Fordham of the University of North Carolina, who agreed to 
the ASH program and began working with Califano in Washington. But he left after only a 
few weeks – a decision that was widely seen as being prompted by Califano’s penchant for 
meddling. “I think Califano, as he has a tendency to do, was just getting too much involved 
in what Fordham and others felt were the duties of the Assistant Secretary,” said Paul 
Ehrlich, the Acting Surgeon General from the Nixon and Ford years who remained with 
HEW in the early days of the Carter Administration. [172] 
Califano asked Richmond in the spring of 1977, and Richmond – ‘Julie,’ to his friends – 
said he would take it if he could also be Surgeon General. Richmond believed that having 
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separate individuals in the two jobs would create operational problems, as well as confusion 
for outsiders who still perceived authority in the Office of the Surgeon General. 
“The fact that there had only been an acting Surgeon General for that length of time 
indicated to me that the position really wasn’t serving all that important a function. And yet, I 
was also aware of the fact that the symbolic role of the Surgeon Generalship was really very 
important, “Richmond said. [173] 
“I don’t even know if I hadn’t brought up the Surgeon Generalship, whether he would 
have thought about it as an issue, because nobody was stirring any pot about that,” Richmond 
continued. “I think that he saw it as an expediency. He said, ‘Well, if that’s what it takes to 
get you, why not?’” [174] 
Whether combining the two jobs was originally Richmond’s idea is a subject of historical 
debate. It’s likely that Richmond was the first to mention the idea in the conversations 
between he and Califano, Champion said. But the idea of combining the jobs had been 
discussed regarding other ASH candidates, he added. [175] Charles Miller, who became a 
deputy to Richmond in 1978, has noted that different people have taken credit for the idea, 
including Peter Bell, one of Califano’s assistants. [176] 
Whoever came up with the idea, it made Califano happy, Richmond said. “Califano said 
to me one day, ‘You know, that was a great idea.’ And I asked, ‘Why do you say that?’ And 
he said, ‘Well, everywhere I go, when I refer to you as Assistant Secretary, nobody knows 
quite what that means – they wonder if you take shorthand or something. But when I say the 
Surgeon General suggested this, that or the other thing, everybody thinks they know.’ So he 
felt that had sort of simplified his life,” Richmond recalled. [177] 
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But working for Califano was not easy. Administratively, Califano recruited a team of 
young people – called special assistants – who he placed throughout HEW and who reported 
to Califano, giving him intelligence on what was going on. He also tended to deal directly 
with the directors of the CDC, FDA and other public health agencies. 
“The point needs to be made that the people who served Joe Califano as Assistant 
Secretary for Education, … Assistant Secretary for Health or even the Commissioner of 
Social Security, were to some degree ineffectual, because the policy decisions were made in 
Joe’s office. If there were any major operating problems or decisions or crises, Califano or 
Champion or one of Califano’s special assistants would pick up the phone and deal directly 
with the people responsible,” Miller said. [178] 
“Califano was clearly a very activist kind of secretary,” said Richmond, who said he 
could co-exist with Califano because their values and opinions were similar on nearly every 
health issue. [179] 
“I thought that his management style was too activist; that he would often dip into 
dealing with people in the agencies without letting me know,” Richmond continued. “I could 
always confront him with it, and he’d always vow that he wouldn’t do it again. But I knew 
and he knew he would do it again. But it was never something of crisis proportions.” [180] 
Richmond and the Bully Pulpit 
Califano’s activism extended to speaking for HEW on matters of public health. 
Many newspaper and wire service articles from the period followed a similar structure: 
The government speaks on an important health issue, such as a campaign to eliminate 
measles or an investigation into workplace illnesses associated with beryllium. The first, 
punchiest quote comes from Califano. Then Richmond is introduced – identified as the 
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official who will implement the program or oversee the task force – and is, or isn’t, quoted in 
a section providing more scientific details about the situation. [181] 
“He was ‘the science,’ if you will,” Califano said. [182] “While Julius, wasn’t out front, I 
think part of the bully pulpit is the guy that turns the electricity on so that you can speak into 
the microphone. And Julius Richmond certainly gave me plenty of electricity,” he added. 
[183] 
No where was that relationship more evident that on the topic of smoking. 
Califano had smoked four packs a day during his stressful years working for Johnson, but 
gave it up when his son, turning 11, said the birthday present he most desired was for his 
father to quit smoking. [184] Carter instructed Califano to mount a health promotion and 
disease-prevention program, and the HEW Secretary decided to focus on what Richmond and 
others told him was a major issue – cigarette smoking. Indeed, he designated it ‘Public 
Health Enemy No. 1.’ [185] 
On Jan. 11, 1978, the 14th anniversary of the Terry report, Califano outlined the hardest-
hitting anti-cigarette program ever proposed by a Cabinet-level official: He proposed banning 
smoking on all commercial airline flights; prohibiting smoking in federal buildings; and 
increasing the federal excise tax on cigarettes, which had been set at 8 cents a pack for 27 
years. [186] It drew heavy political fire, particularly from politicians in North Carolina, 
Kentucky and other tobacco-producing states. President Carter’s father had died of lung 
cancer, but the White House was sensitive to political pressures and decided to distance 
themselves from Califano’s effort without disavowing it. [187] 
Following the launch of his anti-smoking campaign, Califano asked Richmond to 
assemble a 15th anniversary report that would provide strong ammunition for his effort. He 
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later summarized his instructions this way: “OK, Julie, you get the science,” Califano said. 
[188] 
Richmond made a point of putting together a doorstop report that was 1,200 pages long. 
“It was with real intent that 15th anniversary report is not a short summary, but it physically 
is a very thick volume that’s very heavy to carry around. Because I wanted particularly the 
journalists to see what has developed” in terms of research demonstrating the harmful effects 
of tobacco, Richmond recalled. [189] 
The report was political dynamite days before its scheduled Jan. 11, 1979 release. U.S. 
Sen. Jesse Helms – who had criticized Califano in 1978 for “demonstrating callous disregard 
for economic realities, particularly for the economy of North Carolina” – was clearly agitated 
about its potential impact on the public. [190] He asked for a copy in advance and 
complained to the press when Califano declined. “In short, by delaying any possibility of 
simultaneous challenge, Mr. Califano knows that the audience will be lost and that the first 
impression of his one-sided report will prevail in the minds of millions of Americans,” he 
said, in a prepared statement. [191] On Jan. 10, tobacco industry officials also attempted a 
pre-emptive strike, attacking the federal war on smoking as a “publicity stunt” staged by 
Califano, who they said displayed “all the zeal” of a “reformed sinner” who preferred 
“propaganda barrages” to responsible investigation. [192] 
In fact, Richmond did rein in Califano on a few points. For example, Califano wanted the 
1979 report to declare smoking addictive, but Richmond declined, saying at that point they 
lacked sufficient scientific data to make such an unequivocal declaration. [193] 
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The Surgeon General’s report made front-page headlines, with Califano and Richmond 
sharing the billing – but Califano spinning the better quotes. It again illustrated the symbiotic 
relationship the two had developed. 
Califano gained legitimacy on the issue, with Richmond’s name on the report and with 
Richmond standing next to him at the press conference. “I couldn’t have done any of this 
stuff without a Surgeon General. I’m not a doctor. I wasn’t a health expert,” Califano said. 
[194] 
Richmond, meanwhile, was able to focus on matters of science and face minimal political 
heat from an increasingly concerned White House and a shrill pack of tobacco industry 
officials and tobacco-state politicians. (Califano was forced to resign in 1979, and HEW was 
split into two agencies – the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department 
of Education. Califano and Champion said the dismissal was largely due to his activism on 
tobacco, and Carter’s nervousness about losing tobacco states in the 1980 election.) [195] 
Richmond also was OK with Califano doing most of the talking because, frankly, this 
Surgeon General wasn’t particularly fond of speaking to the press or public. 
“I didn’t find it enjoyable,” said Richmond, who said he did only a few press interviews 
each month and made public speeches only about once a week. He acknowledged the low 
activity level made him much less visible than later Surgeons General as C. Everett Koop, 
Joycelyn Elders and even the less-than-famous Richard Carmona. [196] “But again, if it fit 
with policy, I was glad to do it,” he added. [197] 
Besides, because he was also the ASH, he had greater administrative responsibilities than 
other Surgeons General of the bully pulpit era. And he was focused on accomplishing other 
things. 
77 
His proudest accomplishments 
Richmond has been praised for a variety of accomplishments, many of which are little-
known or little-remembered. 
Califano said it was Richmond who came to him in 1979 and pointed out that for decades 
the Public Health Service had characterized homosexuality as “a mental disease or defect” 
under immigration law, and had denied gays or suspected gays from entering the United 
States. Richmond asked Califano to change that, though he warned there might be an 
explosive reaction. [198] 
Aside from Richmond, no one else had raised it, meaning it was a controversy that could 
have lied dormant, Califano recalled. “This was no hot-button issue in those days… that kind 
of issue had never crossed my mind. And I said, ‘Absolutely, let’s do it.’ But if he hadn’t 
brought it to me, I never would have done it,’” Califano said. [199] 
The White House repeatedly expressed appreciation for Richmond’s medical diplomacy. 
The Surgeon General went to Cuba in 1977 as part of a ground-breaking exchange of 
medical personnel. [200] He went to the USSR in 1978 as part of an early step toward lifting 
a moratorium on visits by U.S. officials to the Soviet Union. [201] Also in 1978, Richmond 
met with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to talk about food and nutrition concerns. [202] 
And then in 1979, Richmond and Rosalynn Carter traveled to Thailand with Rosalynn Carter 
to tour refugee camps filled by Cambodian refugees following Vietnam’s invasion of 
Cambodia. 
“I am so grateful that you could break away on such short notice to accompany me to 
Thailand,” Rosalynn Carter wrote, in a November 1979 note to Richmond. “I am certain you 
feel as I do that this trip was one of the most significant experiences of our lives.” [203] 
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(Not everyone appreciated Richmond’s travels. Champion wasn’t crazy about Richmond 
as an administrator, and felt his trips were part of the problem. “Things would happen, and 
you’d look for Julius and he was in Budapest or some place,” said Champion, who said he 
pushed for a deputy administrator for Richmond who would be a more constant presence.) 
[204] 
Richmond also received plaudits for mobilizing Commissioned Corps officers in 
responding to sea-born refugees from the Cuban and Vietnamese governments. He impressed 
Patricia Harris, who succeeded Califano in 1979, when he said he could – within five days – 
dispatch a sizable team of Commissioned Corps officers overseas to do medical screenings of 
Vietnamese refugees and ease domestic concerns that the refugees were bring diseases to the 
United States.  “She just looked and said, ‘I didn’t think anybody could get over there before 
a month,’” Richmond recalled. [205] 
The action served as a powerful counter-argument to the perennial call by the Office of 
Management and Budget for doing away with the Corps. “She became a very potent 
advocate for what out potentialities were,” Richmond said. [206] 
But Richmond is perhaps best remembered by Public Health Service veterans for his 
leadership in creating quantitative goals for improving the public health. In July 1979, he 
released Healthy People: The Surgeon General’s Report on Health Promotion and Disease 
Prevention. The report set objectives for reducing infant mortality and improving other 
health measures by 1990, and helped the public light a fire under federal, state and county 
health officials to make more progress. 
“Once we got that out, the journalists began to get the message,” Richmond said. In 
addition to an initial splash of coverage, reporters began to mine Healthy People for statistics 
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and feature story ideas and magazine pieces. “I think that’s a pretty good example of 
dissemination,” Richmond said. [207] It also reinvigorated voluntary health agencies, he 
added. [208] 
But perhaps most importantly, Richmond and some others believe, the Healthy People 
report ultimately became a turning point in how Americans think about their health. 
Unsanitary conditions and terrible infections were no longer the largest threat – unhealthy 
behaviors were. The report called on Americans to cut their intake of alcohol, salt, sugar and 
saturated fats. Califano, who was on his way out at that point, said the report represented a 
medical consensus as important as Terry’s report on smoking and health. [209] 
It became the first in a series of Healthy People reports – subsequent reports set revised 
goals for 2000 and for 2010 – and proved a lasting legacy that is often under-appreciated by 
the general public, some experts said. 
“I think Julius was the under-rated Surgeon General,” said Dr. David Satcher, who 
became Surgeon General in the 1990s. “He is quieter, but when you look at what he did, the 
things he launched in this country, I think he was one of the most productive.” [210] 
The Healthy People report illustrated Satcher’s words well, in both positive and negative 
terms. Important as it is considered in retrospect, it got very limited play in the press at the 
time. The Washington Post buried the story on page A28, and the reporter covering it – Cohn 
– noted that it suffered from a lack of advance publicity and a failure by health officials to 
push the media to carry the message. It was simply released, along with a written statement 
by Califano, “with no fanfare whatsoever, despite its ambitious goals,” Cohn observed. [211] 
After the Reagan Administration took power in 1981, Richmond stepped down from his 
dual posts and returned to academia. 
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His term seems to illustrate the Long Leash Theory: He was consistently overshadowed 
by Califano, who in many ways took over Richmond’s bully pulpit. Nevertheless, the two 
had a good working relationship and Richmond didn’t seem to mind not being in the 
spotlight, which suggests that Richmond may not have had the ambition for frequent public 
speaking that were seen in some of the more charismatic and better remembered Surgeons 
General of the modern era. 
After Richmond left office, the posts of Surgeon General and Assistant Secretary for 
Health were again separated. And he was replaced by a new Surgeon General – a 
Philadelphia surgeon who looked like a biblical prophet and proved to be the all-time master 
at using the bully pulpit. 
DR. C. EVERETT KOOP, 1981-1989 
The Reagan Revolution opened with a federal blitzkrieg on public health. 
Within 48 hours of Ronald Reagan’s election in November 1980, the conservative 
Heritage Foundation issued a blueprint for the Public Health Service, calling for the closing 
of federal hospitals and taking PHS programs that dealt with drug abuse, mental health and 
other issues and turning them into block grant programs. By January 21, all of the Carter 
political appointments in health had been removed at the U.S. Department of Health & 
Human Services, including Richmond. “They just disappeared,” said Ed Martin, a PHS 
veteran who became an Assistant Surgeon General. [212] 
The conservatives backing Reagan had strong opinions about who should take over key 
public health roles at HHS. For Surgeon General, they quickly settled on Dr. C. Everett 
Koop, a pediatric surgeon who built a brilliant career at Children’s Hospital in Philadelphia. 
Koop – known as “Chick” to friends and colleagues – was credited with establishing the first 
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neonatal intensive care unit in the nation, and was awarded the French Legion of Honor for 
his work in surgical procedures on newborn infants. [213] His unquestioned medical 
credentials were an attraction to conservatives, but so was Koop’s controversial 
outspokenness on the subject of abortion. 
Koop had conducted a lecture tour in 1979, telling audiences in twenty cities that 
abortion was akin to euthanasia of the elderly and Nazi death camp morality. [214] Koop had 
also helped create a movie project called Whatever Happened to the Human Race? Koop 
appeared several times on film, including one infamous scene in which he stood on a tiny 
island in the Dead Sea surrounded by a thousand floating dolls, each representing the 
abortions a thousand unborn babies in the United States. [215] He also was on the governing 
boards of several anti-abortion groups, including National Right to Life. [216] 
“… I was maybe the most outspoken physician against abortion in the country,” Koop 
later recalled. [217] 
In the summer of 1980, Koop was contemplating retirement from Children’s Hospital – 
he was going to turn 65 the next year – when he received calls from three Reagan supporters 
to see if he’d be interested in joining the Reagan administration as Surgeon General. One of 
the calls was from the Heritage Foundation: “When they called me they said that I had turned 
up in their database as the kind of person they wanted,” Koop recalled years later. [218] 
Koop was lukewarm to the proposal at the time, but after Reagan’s election in November, he 
found the phone numbers, called them back, and gave them a more emphatic yes. [219] 
The next month, he was in Washington meeting with Reagan’s transition team. They said 
they were submitting his name to Richard Schweiker, Reagan’s Secretary of Health and 
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Human Service. [220] Koop knew Schweiker, a former U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania, 
from ribbon-cutting ceremonies. [221] 
The men were on friendly terms, but by several accounts Schweiker and many PHS 
veterans were leery of giving Koop any power at HHS. Many felt Koop knew next to nothing 
about public health, let alone the Public Health Service, and perceived Koop to be a religious 
zealot. Indeed, the American Public Health Association broke its tradition of being neutral 
about Surgeon General nominees to voice strong opposition to Koop’s nomination. [222] 
Schweiker had political and administrative concerns. He wanted his own man to serve as 
Assistant Secretary for Health, and envisioned that person as the main force over government 
public health. “Koop was not Schweiker’s man,” said Charles Miller, the former deputy to 
Richmond, who was Acting Assistant Secretary for Health for the first few months of the 
Reagan administration. [223] 
There was another problem: Koop was about to turn 65, which would exceed the 
statutory age limit for members of the Public Health Service Commissioned Corps, of which 
the Surgeon General – by law – had to be a member. The law needed to be changed if Koop 
was to take office, meaning liberals who opposed Koop would have another lever, another set 
of hearings, in which to oppose him. 
Schweiker selected Koop and agreed to push for the law change, under pressure from the 
White House. Knowing it might take time to amend the age ceiling and get Koop confirmed, 
he appointed Koop Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health for the interim. But it was merely a 
placeholder. Miller wrote the job description, but was told to change it to make clear that 
Koop would not assume any of the ASH’s responsibilities if the ASH was absent. “The idea 
was to keep Koop out of the line” of authority, Miller said. [224] 
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Koop said he was only dimly aware of the organization chart machinations going on at 
the time. “The Surgeon General would drop down one echelon in the hierarchy and would 
now report to the assistant secretary,” Koop said, of how his position as Surgeon General 
would differ from Richmond’s. “All this mattered little to me at the time, and I understood it 
even less. I was simply relieved that I would, after all, become the Surgeon General.” [225] 
But the arrangement put Koop in grueling limbo from March 1981, when he started as 
Deputy ASH, until January 1982, when he was sworn in as Surgeon General. He had left his 
surgical career and pro-life group board positions for a job with no power, no budget and no 
voice.  Schweiker told Koop to keep his head down and his mouth shut during the 
confirmation process. [226] The Assistant Secretary for Health who was selected, Dr. 
Edward Brandt, quickly established himself as a tough administrator who was capable of 
talking to the press and public about public health matters. 
Meanwhile, it seemed to Koop impossible to get a fair hearing in the press – The New 
York Times and other prominent newspapers editorialized about what a terrible choice he was 
for Surgeon General.  Even the United Mine Workers opposed him. [227] And at HHS, he 
was isolated both by his own ignorance of how the department worked and by PHS veterans 
who deemed him unfit for such a historically important, science-based office. 
“One day I decided to have lunch in the Humphrey Building cafeteria. As I walked into 
the dining room itself, I heard someone say, ‘Here he comes.’ By the time I reached my 
intended table at the far end of the room, the usual hum and clutter had subsided and a hush 
had fallen over the entire room. As I walked to my seat, I was absolutely astounded to see 
how many forks were poised in midair between plate and mouth as this unbelievable two-
headed monster, the most unqualified Surgeon General appointee in history, prepared to eat 
84 
his lunch,” Koop recalled. “My sense of isolation grew even worse. It was really more like 
solitary confinement.” [228] 
But as he sat in meetings with PHS officials, they found him personable and gradually 
felt sympathy. “Those of us who knew Dr. Koop during those days sort of marveled at the 
fact that he stayed here in town, because of the enormous attacks upon him,” Martin said. 
[229] 
Koop said those days in limbo proved pivotal to his later success. He established rapport 
with key officials at the FDA, the CDC and elsewhere in the department. “… Out of those 
tough months I made a number of very important friends in HHS who believed in me, 
believed I was being given a raw deal, who did think I was credible, who did think I was 
able, who did think when I had an idea and the ability to do something with it, I would be 
successful,” Koop said. He would later call on those friends to lend him staff and funding for 
the Surgeon General workshops and reports that helped make him famous. [230] 
‘Crabs in a barrel’ 
Charles Everett Koop was born in Brooklyn, New York on Oct. 14, 1916, an only child 
and a descendant of Dutch settlers. [231] 
He developed an interest in medicine as a young boy, impressed by Dr. Justice Gage 
Wright, a commanding, neatly-pressed homeopathic physician who made house calls 
carrying a huge doctor’s bag filled with hundreds of corked glass vials. “When he entered the 
house my family spoke more softly, as though a normal sound would break the spell,” Koop 
wrote in his autobiography. [232] 
Koop went to Dartmouth College, graduating with a bachelor’s in 1937, and then went to 
Cornell Medical School, which he graduated from in 1941. He interned at Philadelphia 
85 
Hospital for a year and then a University of Pennsylvania surgical professor – an intimidating 
bear of a man named Dr. I. S. Ravdin – invited him to do a five-year residency. [233] Ravdin 
helped get Koop declared as essential to Penn and thus excused him from military service in 
World War II. [234] 
In 1946, at Ravdin’s urging, Koop became a specialist in pediatric surgery and was soon 
named surgeon-in-chief at Children’s Hospital. At the time, surgeons customarily operated 
only on adults, and it was extremely rare for surgeons to specialize in pediatric cases. Koop 
was, by his own count, just the sixth U.S. doctor to make that his focus. [235] Over the next 
three decades he built the surgical program at Children’s, and it had eight divisions of 
surgical specialties at the time he left the hospital. [236] He became known as one of the 
fathers of pediatric surgery, and was recognized around the world for his contributions. 
His medical experiences left him somewhat unsuited for life inside a government 
bureaucracy. He had never really worked for anyone before, and he was, well, a surgeon. 
“You know, I’ve never met a surgeon who didn’t have a strong ego,” said Brandt, who 
became Koop’s supervisor at HHS. “As a matter of fact, I think it is probably essential to 
going in the operating room and picking up a knife and start cutting on people. If you don’t 
believe you are right, it would be pretty hard to do that.” [237] 
Surgical training is extremely competitive and helps form such personalities, said Dr. 
Georges Benjamin of the American Public Health Association. “Everyone who goes into 
surgical training doesn’t end up as a surgeon, and so it’s crabs in a barrel. And so that means 
he’s tough,” Benjamin said. [238] 
Of course, the Reagan Administration and Congressional Republicans were powerful 
allies during the nomination process. In July 1981, a complex compromise had been reached 
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to remove the age limit of 64 on the Surgeon General and other members of the Public 
Health Service Commissioned Corps. [239] In November, the Senate confirmed Koop by a 
vote of 64 to 28, and Koop was sworn in as Surgeon General on Jan. 21, 1982. 
A war on tobacco 
Koop’s first press conference was held a month later, to present the latest in the annual 
series of Surgeon General reports on smoking. Brandt, the ASH, was there also. But Koop 
stole the show. 
Koop proved a commanding presence in his Commissioned Corps uniform and 
distinctive, mustache-less beard, which gave him a look that has been described by various 
wags as akin to an Amish farmer, a Dutch sea captain, an Old Testament prophet, and one of 
the founders of the Smith Brothers cough drop company. 
But what most swayed to the press, Koop later said, were his clear and unsparing answers 
to reporters’ questions about smoking dangers. The report broadened the list of cancers 
attributable to tobacco use and dismissed arguments by the Tobacco Institute that a scientific 
conclusion on causation could not yet be reached. “The evidence is strong and scientific and 
we stand by it,” Koop said in the press conference, according to The New York Times’ front-
page account the next day. [240] Koop also called smoking “the most important public health 
issue of our time.” [241] 
Koop had prepared for that press conference, knowing that smoking had become the issue 
most closely linked with the Surgeon General. “I think I saw smoking as the most visible 
thing my predecessors had done, and if I wanted to have some kind of platform from whence 
to jump to other things, I better do that one well,” he said. [242] 
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Koop quickly emerged as a striking contrast to other members of the Reagan 
Administration regarding the topic of smoking. Federal Trade Commission Chairman James 
C. Miller III told the press he didn’t have time to read the results of a five-year FTC 
investigation into cigarette advertising abuses and had no interest in strengthening health 
warnings. “If people want to smoke, that’s their business,” Miller said. [243] Brandt, though 
pledging that expanded cigarette warnings had a high priority, was unable to accomplish 
change. [244] 
Koop had no real authority to make such a change, either, but he quickly became known 
for his blunt talk about the need for it. “Over the ensuing seven years, Koop’s would be the 
sole voice within the administration to speak out forcefully on the smoking peril,” the 
journalist Richard Kluger wrote, in his Pulitzer-winning book Ashes to Ashes. [245] 
Koop said the February 1982 press conference was the turning point in his relationship 
with the press. “… I never withheld any of the venom that I had for the cigarette companies, 
and still do. And the press attitude toward me changed overnight. Whereas I had been a 
pariah and nobody had a kind word to say, I began to be quoted as an authority. And the 
press from that time on were on my side until I left Washington,” he said. [246] 
Each year, Koop came out with a new report on the dangers of tobacco. He also gave 
speeches to medical associations, high schools and numerous other groups, hammering away 
at the same message. In May 1984, speaking at the annual meeting of the American Lung 
Association, Koop called for a smoke-free society by 2000. Edward Horrigan, chief at R.J. 
Reynolds, wrote Reagan two months later to complain about “the increasingly shrill 
preachments” of Koop, which he called “the most radical anti-tobacco posturing since the 
days of Joseph Califano.” [247] 
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Shrill or not, he was widely considered to be effective. Current smoking rates dropped 
from 38 percent in 1981 to 27 percent in 1989, according to Gallup poll information. That 
was the largest drop seen since Gallup started regular polling on smoking rates in the early 
1940s. [248] 
Baby Doe, and other issues 
Koop did indeed use tobacco as a springboard into other topics. He talked about the 
dangers of marijuana, and lectured on youth violence. By the fall, he was upsetting the video 
game industry by fingering them as unhealthy and a contributor to youth violence. Koop’s 
words were “one of the most irresponsible and unthinking statements we have ever heard 
from an official of the federal government” and could “cast serious doubt on every action and 
statement emanating from the office of the Surgeon General,” according to a statement 
released in November 1982 by the National Coin Machine Institute, which represented the 
cigarette machine and video game industries. [249] 
But aside from smoking, Koop’s biggest early media splash came from the controversial 
topic of Baby Doe, an infant born in Bloomington, Indiana in April 1982. The boy was blue 
and was diagnosed as having Down syndrome. The obstetrician who delivered the child said 
the baby would be severely retarded and would probably die of pneumonia in a few days, but 
other doctors said he should be referred to an Indianapolis hospital for surgery. The parents 
agreed with the obstetrician, and went along with medical orders to sedate the child. Others 
said the sedation and other steps ordered by the obstetrician endangered the baby’s life, and a 
fierce battle broke out among the medical staff about the right course of action. The situation 
rapidly escalated, hitting the media and the courts, with other families trying to adopt the 
boy. The baby died six days after his birth. [250] 
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Reporters called Koop – the renowned pediatric surgeon and suddenly credible Surgeon 
General – for comment. He initially declined, but a combination of factors would cause him 
to be the government’s lead spokesman on the matter. 
President Reagan was moved by the story of Baby Doe, and instructed HHS Secretary 
Schweiker to develop rules to prevent doctors from stepping back from infants born with 
birth defects, with the intent of allowing such children to die. But Schweiker left office by 
March 1983, when the rule was introduced. Brandt, the Assistant Secretary for Health who 
had opposed the rules as too harsh, was overruled and stood aside. [251] 
The rules were promptly challenged in federal court by medical groups that included the 
American Academy of Pediatrics and the National Association of Children’s Hospitals and 
Related Institutions. [252l Margaret Heckler, Schweiker’s replacement, was unfamiliar with 
clinical issues and averse to controversy. [253] She let Koop do the talking. 
In a hastily called press conference in March 1983, Koop defended the rule as necessary. 
[254] The regulations failed to pass, and Koop said this time he wanted more control. “After 
having taken all that flack, I went to Margaret Heckler and said, ‘If you think I should 
continue to take this flack, I think it is only fair that I write the next set of regulations, so that 
at least any flack I take is deserved,’” Koop recalled. [255] Koop wrote a new set of 
regulations, which also were struck down in court. But he also gathered the American 
Academy of Pediatrics and other groups together to forge a consensus document, which led 
Congress to expand the definition of child abuse to include the withholding of fluids and 
nutrition – a victory of sorts – which Reagan signed into law in October 1984. 
Koop’s handling of Baby Doe and other issues won him respect inside and outside HHS, 
which gained even more visibility as power vacuums began to appear at the end of Reagan’s 
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first term. Brandt and others left HHS, creating “a period where we had ‘Actings’ 
everywhere,” Martin remembered. [256] 
Among them was Dr. James Mason, the CDC Director, who agreed to also be the Acting 
Assistant Secretary for Health in 1984 – a role he would keep until 1986. Mason was very 
busy running the Public Health Service, and was happy to let the Surgeon General continue 
in the bully pulpit. “I don’t see my big ability as public speaking and it’s not something I 
particularly enjoy doing,” Mason said. “I could not have done what I was doing plus what he 
was doing, nor could he have administered the United States Public Health Services and its 
agencies and still been an effective spokesman.” [257] 
Koop forged a similar relationship with Dr. Otis Bowen, appointed in 1985 to replace 
Margaret Heckler. Bowen, the former governor of Indiana, was an astute politician who 
recognized Koop had built tremendous credibility with the media. He was content to not only 
give Koop a long leash, but also to tap him as spokesman for Bowen on certain controversial 
health topics. “When we wanted to explore an idea or had something that we wanted to get a 
fair shake, Chick talked about it for us. Chick operated within the Public Health Service, but 
I gave him broad discretion on what he did,” Bowen later recalled in his autobiography. 
[258] 
Koop was given a second term in office as Surgeon General. After that, Bowen and other 
administration officials decided to rely on Koop to speak about the public health scare of the 
decade – AIDS. 
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Koop and AIDS 
In June 1981, while Koop was still in his confirmation limbo, the CDC published the first 
report of an immune system-destroying disease that was later called Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome. 
AIDS was a natural topic for a Surgeon General to talk about, Koop said. “If ever there 
was a disease – an opportunity for a command performance, regarding the Surgeon General – 
AIDS is it! By Congressional mandate – by public health law – the one thing that is 
absolutely clear and indisputable is that the Surgeon General is to provide information to the 
public on how they can protect themselves against disease, and what they can do to promote 
good health,” he said. [259] 
But Brandt told him he would not be assigned to cover AIDS. And when Koop was to 
appear before the media, HHS public affairs staff told reporters he would not be answering 
questions on AIDS. “The attitude of the people that handled public affairs for me – who dealt 
with my speaking engagements and so forth – was almost as though there was some tribal 
taboo on the very word AIDS passing through my lips,” Koop said. [260] 
Koop said he initially didn’t consider himself muzzled on AIDS, but rather felt the 
disease had been made the responsibility of other health officials through a division of labor. 
Brandt in 1983 had created an Executive Task Force on AIDS, that included top-level staff 
from the Public Health Service. Koop found his exclusion awkward, but Brandt said it was 
simply an administrative decision. [261] Heckler and Brandt were the ones answering AIDS 
questions at news conferences, calling it the administration’s “number one health priority” 
but generally providing assurances about risks to the general public and fending off questions 
about why the government wasn’t spending more on AIDS research. [262] 
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Brandt was, at times, muzzled and restricted. One example: In May 1984, he had agreed 
to attend an annual awards dinner held by the Fund for Human Dignity, the fund-raising arm 
of the National Gay task Force. He was to present an award to a San Diego organization that 
had recruited hundreds of disease-free lesbians to give blood. Conservative groups heard 
about the appearance and flooded the White House with telegrams demanding Brandt be 
fired if he attended. Heckler was worried about the political fallout, and soon after an HHS 
spokesman announced Brandt was disappointed but he would not be going to the dinner 
because of another meeting. [263] 
Brandt left HHS that year and Heckler grew embattled. Her claims that the administration 
was giving researchers what they needed were challenged by prominent researchers and by 
U.S. Rep. Henry Waxman, a California Democrat, and other members of Congress. [264] In 
late 1985, the CDC stopped spending money on AIDS education, buckling to pressure from 
White House conservatives who believed the government was essentially teaching gay men 
how to commit sodomy. [265] 
President Reagan had been silent on the issue of AIDS, prompting growing criticism 
from the gay community and others. Finally, in February 1986, Reagan asked Koop to 
prepare a report on AIDS for the American people. The Surgeon General spent most of the 
rest of the year interviewing health officials, researchers, leaders of the gay community and 
others. His report, released in 1986, called for Americans to set aside their differences and 
work together to prevent the spread of the AIDS virus. Koop’s report – described as 
“unusually frank” by reporters – also called for condom use and sex education which, he said 
in answer to a reporter’s question, should start in the 3rd grade. He also opposed compulsory 
testing. [266] 
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Koop did almost all of the writing of the report himself. He did not submit it for White 
House clearance, and had tens of thousands of copies made. It was a media sensation, wrote 
the journalist Randy Shilts. 
“This wasn’t some tedious call for a blue-ribbon commission or bureaucratic 
coordination; this was about rubbers and sex education,” Shilts wrote in And The Band 
Played On, his book about the AIDS epidemic. “Uncorrupted by the language of AIDSpeak, 
Koop was able to talk in a way that made sense; at last, there was a public health official who 
sounded like a public health official. Not only that, he was able to utter words like ‘gay’ 
without flinching… Koop quickly became so in demand for speeches that he was called a 
‘scientific Bruce Springsteen.’” [267] 
Some in the White House, however, were not pleased. Particularly unhappy was Gary 
Bauer, Reagan’s domestic policy advisor and a staunch defender of “family values,” public 
health officials recalled. 
“You know, this same-gender attraction thing was such an enigma to the White House 
that, I hope I’m not misjudging, but it was almost as though it was a vindictiveness toward 
the gay man and they were hoping that this disease would take them all out,” Mason recalled. 
[268] He noted that some in the White House were in favor of mandatory testing and 
isolating the infected from the rest of society – something Koop had argued against. 
Some Reagan staffers were extremely irritated about Koop’s frank talk about condoms. 
Two people from the White House visited Koop a few months later, asking that he drop the 
word ‘condom’ from the next edition of the report. Koop didn’t believe they had been sent by 
Reagan himself, but rather by others in the White House, and refused. [269] 
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Koop also wrote “Understanding AIDS,” a brochure sent to all 107 million households in 
the United States in 1988. It was the largest public health mailing ever done. [270] 
Koop said Bauer made it difficult for him to call or meet with the President. But he 
believed Reagan was not against him. “Ronald Reagan had the attitude ‘I appoint people 
after I have consulted with whom I think are the most knowledgeable people, and I make the 
best choice I possibly can. And until my appointee proves to me he is not doing the job, I 
leave him alone. And I support him in every way I can.’ He never corrected me. He never 
called me up…  His staff would call up my staff and say ‘My boss didn’t like what your boss 
said.’ We had a standard answer; ‘When your boss feels that way and talks to my boss, he’ll 
get some action.’ Period. He never called about anything like that,” Koop said. [271] 
Pride in the uniform 
While AIDS was becoming a speaking-circuit superstar, Koop was also working on an 
issue that was highly controversial within HHS – reinvigorating the Commissioned Corps of 
the Public Health Service. 
Koop had never seen military service, yet he immediately adopted the Navy-modeled, 
vice-admiral uniform that went with his title. He perceived it would give him a greater aura 
of authority, but also saw it as important for assuming his role as the titular head of the 
Commissioned Corps. [272] 
The uniform had fallen out of favor at PHS agencies like the NIH, FDA and CDC, which 
were full of researchers who lacked military inclination. The Vietnam War hadn’t helped, nor 
had the perception that some of those who had joined the Corps in the late 1960s and early 
1970s were mainly trying to avoid service in the real military, giving birth to the derisive 
description of Corps members as ‘yellow berets.’ 
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“The uniform became a symbol of derision. I mean, if I was to have worn my uniform in 
the ‘70s through the Humphrey Building or even the Parklawn Building, I think people 
would have thrown eggs at you,” said Paul Ehrlich, the former Acting Surgeon General, 
referring to two Washington, D.C.-area buildings where PHS administration was 
concentrated. [273] 
The Corps was seen as a second personnel system that bestowed better benefits, and 
carried with it the chance that a member would be pulled out of his or her job in a time of 
emergency and sent to a disaster area or place of concern. For many, it was just a choice of 
benefit structures, with no greater meaning, Ehrlich said. [274] 
But Koop took his role seriously, and believed the 5,500-person Corps – just a fraction of 
the people who worked at PHS agencies – had languished. Without action, he believed, the 
Office of Management and Budget would succeed in its long-standing attempts to do away 
with the Corps. [275] 
Koop believed Corps members needed to start wearing their uniforms again to make 
them more visible and build a perception that they were a vital group of personnel. With 
Bowen’s support, Koop assumed formal command authority over the Corps’ officers in April 
1987. He required people to wear the uniform more often, promoted recruitment to the Corps 
and revised mobilization guidelines. [276] As many predicted, it did not go over well with 
many PHS researchers and scientists. 
“There were a couple of places where we had some very serious problems. The first place 
was among some of the officers in the Center for Disease Control,” recalled Martin, who was 
appointed Koop’s chief of staff for promoting revitalization. He described a meeting at the 
CDC with hundreds of officers upset about ‘What does mobility mean to me?’ and ‘What’s 
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this bullshit about wearing a uniform?’ and ‘Here I am, a lab scientist. What do you mean 
I’m going to be sent to the Indian Health Service?’ 
But CDC’s leadership stood behind Koop, and Koop was – as usual -- forthright and 
forceful. “He just said, ‘This is the way we’re going to do it, and we are not just another 
personnel system,’” Martin said. [277] 
Opposition dissolved in six to twelve months within the PHS. It didn’t hurt that OMB 
officials in the late 1980s voiced support for the Corps – the first such statement from that 
office in four decades. [278] 
Koop’s final days 
Koop was on good terms with Vice President George Bush, who had sought Koop’s 
counsel on AIDS and other issues, sometimes over lunch. [279] When Bush was elected in 
1988, Koop – at the height of his popularity in the waning years of the Reagan administration 
– believed he was a logical choice to become Bush’s Secretary of Health and Human 
Services. Koop spread word of his interest through Jim Baker, Bush’s designated Secretary 
of State. [280] 
Bush, however, settled on Dr. Louis Sullivan from Atlanta, an old friend of Bush and his 
wife, Barbara. Koop quickly became disheartened. He made a call to Sullivan the day the 
announcement became official, offering congratulations and advice, but it wasn’t returned. 
His morale eroded when his friend and supportive boss, Otis Bowen, was told by a White 
House staffer to clean out his desk within three days. The Bush people were rude and Koop 
concluded he was not wanted. He submitted a letter of resignation to Bush in February 1989, 
saying he would serve several more months but would finish by the time his term expired 
that November. [281] 
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Koop’s final months were, in some ways, embittering. Sullivan’s staff took away Koop’s 
personal assistant, leaving him with two secretaries. [282] They also took away his executive 
dining room privileges. [283] 
But he enjoyed a victory lap of sorts with the media and public, as examples of his 
willingness to speak truth to power accumulated. 
In January 1989, he disclosed to the press that his office had studied the health impacts of 
abortion on women at the request of President Reagan, but determined there was not 
conclusive evidence of harmful physical and emotional consequences. Koop remained 
opposed to abortion, but “we could not prepare a report that could withstand scientific and 
statistical scrutiny,” Koop told a House subcommittee two months later. [284] 
“On the abortion issue, Koop made it clear he was the nation’s doctor, not the nation’s 
chaplain,” the syndicated columnists Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta wrote two months 
later. [285] 
In the late spring, Koop took on alcohol, recommending new taxes on beer, restrictions 
on alcoholic beverage advertising and reduction of the permissible blood-alcohol level for 
drivers. Even conservative columnist George Will – who found the proposal for raising taxes 
debatable – praised Koop for his “constructive irritability” and his “splendid legacy.” [286] 
Koop’s term officially ended Oct. 1, 1989. But nearly two decades later, he is considered 
the best-recognized Surgeon General. 
“We all remember Dr. Koop as the Surgeon General,” said Dr. Kenneth Moritsugu, who 
served as Acting Surgeon General from 2006 to 2007. “Even today, when we talk about the 
Surgeon General, people always come back at me and say, ‘Oh, you mean Dr. Koop! What 
ever happened to Dr. Koop?” [287] 
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Koop can be viewed as an illustration of several theories. Many see him as emblematic of 
the Great Man Theory, viewing him as charismatic, full of integrity and a persuasive speaker. 
Several key informants – including Koop – say the Long Leash Theory also was applicable, 
in that Reagan, Bowen and other key leaders did not try to restrict his use of the bully pulpit. 
The Great Issue Theory applied to his case as well, in that the AIDS crisis erupted on his 
watch. 
DR. ANTONIA NOVELLO, 1990-1993 
When asked recently why he settled on Dr. Antonia Novello as a candidate for Surgeon 
General, Louis Sullivan said it was because she was a Hispanic woman. 
Sullivan, who became the first black Secretary of Health and Human Services under 
President George Bush, was keenly interested in addressing the health needs of blacks, 
Hispanics and other minority populations. Sullivan had met Novello when he was president 
of Atlanta’s Morehouse School of Medicine and she was at the National Institutes of Health. 
“Several things about her stood out.  First of all, she was female and I was interested in 
having females in my administration. And secondly, she was Hispanic, and I was interested 
in promoting minorities in significant positions in my administration,” Sullivan said. [288] 
Novello declined to be interviewed for this project, and so what she accomplished during 
her three years as Surgeon General is left to the interpretation of others. 
Some are not kind. 
“She was pretty much a zero,” said Dr. David Sencer, who was director of the CDC in the 
1960s and 1970s. [289] 
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“She never focused on stuff with any kind of depth on the subject matter and, to me, she 
lacked substance in what she did,” said Dr. Jeff Koplan who ran the CDC in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. [290] 
Others gave a more positive assessment, calling Novello a capable Surgeon General and 
good speaker. Her main failing, they say, was that she wasn’t C. Everett Koop. 
“Koop was a very hard act to follow,” said Jeff Levi, executive director of the Trust for 
America’s Health, a Washington, D.C.-based public health advocacy organization. [291] 
‘A pushy mother’ 
Antonia Novello was born Antonia Coello on Aug. 23, 1944. She was born in Fajardo, 
Puerto Rico and grew up in a modest concrete house in the center of town. [292] Her father 
died when she was 8, and her mother was the guiding force in her life. 
“I was one of those middle-class kids who had a pushy mother,” Novello said, in a 1994 
interview for the Academy of Achievement, a non-profit organization that exposes students 
to political leaders and accomplished professionals. [293] 
Her mother was Ana Delia Flores, principal of the town’s junior high school, and later, of 
the high school. Her mother would sometimes be the substitute teacher for Novello’s classes, 
and would pre-select the teachers in charge of Antonia’s education. “She would say, 
‘Education is the reason by which we exist, and I will make sure that the best teaches you, 
because public school is a good system.’ She made sure of that. All my life I almost felt that 
my grades were not mine, that my grades were a product of my mother making sure that I 
was educated by the best,” Novell said. [294] 
She described herself as a cut-up and actress in school. She was the lead soprano in the 
high school chorus and did her best to make others laugh. [295] But at times, some students 
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questioned her academic achievements, suggesting her mother not only placed her with the 
best teachers, but also negotiated top grades for her daughter. “It only motivated me to be 
better,” she recalled. [296] 
Novello’s interest in becoming a doctor came from her experience as a patient. She was 
born with congenital megacolon, which left her unable to move her intestines. She spent two 
weeks in the hospital every summer as a child. “I always felt I was going to be a doctor. I 
didn’t know when, but I knew that was the only thing that I really had role models on a 
constant basis,” she said. [297] 
She was told she needed surgery at 8, but by her account got lost in the health system, 
despite the presence of her strong-willed mother. Novello didn’t receive corrective surgery 
for the condition until age 18. She suffered complications from the surgery until age 20. 
[298] 
Novello received her bachelor’s degree from the University of Puerto Rico at Rio Piedras 
in 1965, and her medical degree from the University of Puerto Rico School of Medicine at 
San Juan in 1970. She met a Navy flight surgeon, Joe Novello, and married him in 1970, the 
day after her medical school graduation. [299] 
Joe and Antonia Novello moved to Michigan in 1970, where she did her internship and 
residency in pediatrics at the University of Michigan. When she finished, she opened her own 
pediatrics office, but closed it in 1978 to take a job with the National Institutes of Health. 
[300] 
She held a series of jobs at NIH, rising to Deputy Director of the National Institute of 
Child Health and Human Development. She also served as the coordinator for AIDS research 
at NICHD, starting in 1987 – a responsibility that gave her visibility as a specialist in 
101 
pediatric AIDS. She was the U.S. delegate to an International Ethics Committee on AIDS in 
Paris, and during a legislative fellowship worked for U.S. Sen. Orrin Hatch, who later 
became her main Senate backer during the Surgeon General confirmation process. [301] 
She also gained some visibility through her husband, who had become a child psychiatrist 
who frequently made television and radio appearances in Washington to speak on health 
topics.  In addition, her marriage made her the sister-in-law to Don Novello, a comedian who 
had gained fame as playing a hip Catholic priest, Father Guido Sarducci, on the TV show 
Saturday Night Live. [302] 
Still, her nomination for Surgeon General was a complete surprise, she later recalled. “I 
almost died of shock because life has made us believe that you must be a politician to 
succeed in government life. Life has made you believe that you have to have connections, 
that you must be at the right place at the right time and have the right friends. None of those 
things happened to me,” she said. [303] 
Novello said she asked Sullivan why he picked her, and wondered out loud if it was to fill 
some kind of minority hiring quota. “And he said, ‘I have read your curriculum and I can see 
that you can do it. I don’t need quotas, because I myself am a minority.’ That’s when I said, 
‘Okay, let’s keep going on the interview,’” she said. [304] 
Asked what made her stand out as a candidate, Novello said she felt she was “a package 
deal” – a woman, a doctor with AIDS credentials, a minority who embodied the American 
Dream, and “someone who was kind of conservative, but with common sense.” [305] 
Novello’s selection was not a quick one. Koop had nearly a year left on his second term 
when Bush was elected, and speculation raged for several months about who would be 
named the replacement. Among the names circulated were Dr. Robert Redfield, a noted 
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researcher at Walter Reed Army Institute of Research; and Dr. James H. “Red” Duke, a 
charismatic Texas trauma surgeon who hosted the PBS television show Bodywatch. But 
anonymous White House sources at the time said they wanted to lower the Surgeon 
General’s profile, and some believed it should be awarded to James Mason, the former CDC 
Director, who had become the Assistant Secretary for Health and could have held the 
Surgeon General position in a Richmond-like arrangement. [306] 
In November 1989, a month after the official end of Koop’s term, the White House 
announced the selection of Novello. Her NIH colleagues told the media she was a skilled 
administrator with a non-confrontational style. The White House said she was chosen after 
Bush was satisfied she could support his opposition to abortion except to protect a woman’s 
life or in the event of rape or incest. [307] 
“We don’t hire people that don’t support our policies. That is a hard and fast rule,” said 
White House spokesman Marlon Fitzwater. [308] 
Novello’s confirmation went smoothly, and she officially began her term in March 1990, 
at the age of 45. When she was sworn in, she told Bush ‘Mr. President, thank you very much 
for bringing West Side Story to the West Wing,’ she later recalled. [309] 
One of Novello’s first official acts was to return to Fajardo, her hometown, where 4,000 
people filled the seats of a baseball stadium to cheer her as she walked down a makeshift 
runway, carrying a bouquet of flowers. “I’ve been in the White House and in the senate of 
Puerto Rico, but there is no feeling like this one,” Novello, in tears, told the crowd. “I am the 
Surgeon General of the United States, but in this town I’m still Miss Flores’ little girl.” [310] 
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Attacking Joe Camel 
Novello came into office more than a year after Sullivan and Mason were in place. 
Sullivan, also a physician, had seized the pulpit on the tissue of tobacco – a topic that had, 
except perhaps for the Richmond-Califano years, been largely as the province of Surgeons 
General. 
In his first year in office, Sullivan pushed R.J. Reynolds to cancel “Uptown,” a new 
cigarette brand aimed at blacks. He also proposed a smoking ban in all federal buildings, and 
said he expected recipients of federal health grants to restrict smoking in their offices. His 
activity prompted an approving William Raspberry column in The Washington Post that 
carried the headline “Sullivan Comes Out Smokin. ’” [311] 
“Certainly, smoking was one of my areas of great interest so I was quite prominent in 
using the bully pulpit to try and discourage smoking, but she was not excluded from that,” 
Sullivan later recounted. “She also would speak about smoking at times, but it was 
understood between us that this was really a major interest of mine.” [312] 
It was understood by HHS public affairs staff as well. Her appearances before the media 
were cleared through Sullivan’s office. “… It was very tightly controlled in the speaking 
area, and Lou Sullivan got the pick of talks and Toni got what was left over,” Mason said. 
[313] 
In addition to Sullivan’s desire for the pulpit on smoking, politics was also an obstacle. In 
early 1990, Mason delivered a forceful keynote address at a World Conference on Tobacco 
and Health meeting in Australia, saying U.S. tobacco companies had been “playing our free-
trade laws and export policies like a Stradivarius violin.” He also said it was 
“unconscionable” for those firms “to be peddling their poison abroad.” But when U.S. Rep. 
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Waxman called on Mason to repeat his statements at a Congressional hearing in May, 
Mason’s appearance was canceled with an HHS letter that said it was deemed inappropriate 
for a health official to discuss trade matters. [314] Waxman said it was an example of the 
Bush administration muzzling an anti-tobacco voice. [315] 
The incident appeared to have made an impression on the new Surgeon General. In 
September 1990, Novello was asked at a press conference why she hadn’t opposed U.S. 
Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter’s efforts to start selling U.S. cigarettes in Thailand and 
other Asian countries. (Koop had been a strong critic, saying; “There is a higher good than 
the greed market.”) [316] 
But Novello said she had no comment about that. “For me to talk about it would be 
almost disrespectful of my (political) party,” she said. [317] 
At the beginning of her term, some tobacco industry officials did not consider Novello to 
be a threat, according to internal documents from the Washington office of Philip Morris 
Cos. Inc. that were printed years later in The Washington Post. [318] 
In an Oct. 18, 1989 memo, Philip Morris lobbyist Jim Dwyer said he had learned that 
Novello was being considered for Surgeon General and had searched for any speeches, 
statements or papers she had made on tobacco and found nothing. “She seems to be a 
candidate least likely to interfere with our activities and we may well want to discuss 
possible ways to express support for her appointment,” Dwyer wrote. [319] 
In a March 8, 1990 memo, penned a day before Novello officially started her job, Dwyer 
wrote that he had discussed Novello with the White House. “We intervened with the White 
House, OMB and HHS to urge that Dr. Novello take no position on any pending anti-tobacco 
legislation. We stressed to her handlers and to interested parties that we were interested in 
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making sure she focused on non-tobacco health problems. We were successful in that both 
our objectives were met,” Dwyer wrote, without fuller explanation. [320] 
Much of Novello’s time in office was spent on other issues, but she did speak out on 
certain tobacco topics. Indeed, perhaps her most noted use of the bully pulpit was her attack 
on Joe Camel, a cartoon character that R.J. Reynolds started using in the late 1980s to market 
cigarettes. 
In March 1992, Novello and the American Medical Association asked the tobacco 
company to withdraw its cartoon campaign because they said it was an effort to encourage 
under-age smoking. It was said to be the first time a Surgeon General had called for a halt to 
a continuing ad campaign for an existing cigarette brand, and received a flurry of national 
media coverage. Novello later that year acknowledged – and voiced surprise – that her fight 
against Joe Camel had caused her highest visibility while in office. [321] 
It was, however, ultimately ineffectual. R.J. Reynolds flatly refused, issuing a statement 
that said; “No linkage has been made between advertising and the consumption of cigarette 
products.” [322] The company kept with the campaign, and its market share in the 24-and-
under crowd rose from 4.4 percent to 7.9 percent. [323] 
Almost from the beginning, some public health advocates and others labeled the Joe 
Camel campaign a weak effort that skirted more substantive issues like increased taxes on 
cigarettes, tougher trade restrictions or even an outright ban on smokes. “Of all the half-
hearted measures to come along lately, this joint government/AMA proposal to ban Old Joe 
Camel ranks up there with metal bars on park benches and cab drivers wearing jackets and 
ties,” wrote the novelist Emily Prager, in a March 1992 newspaper editorial. [324] 
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Novello and the Bully Pulpit 
Despite his strong anti-tobacco statements at the Australian conference on smoking, 
Assistant Secretary for Health Jim Mason made no concerted effort to compete with Novello 
for the bully pulpit, observers said. “Jim Mason… was not a charismatic person, had no 
interest in having a public profile, and was very happy with Toni Novello being the Surgeon 
General and was very supportive of her,” Sullivan recalled. [325] 
The bigger problem was Sullivan, who was much more interested in public speaking than 
the HHS Secretaries that Koop had worked for. “Koop had the whole field to himself because 
Bowen wanted none of that,” Sullivan observed. [326] 
Sullivan wasn’t active only on tobacco. He made key appearances on AIDS. He lead the 
charge for better food labeling He was spokesman for racial disparity issues that had a strong 
African-American angle. And he took credit for a revision of Richmond’s Healthy People 
report – this time setting goals for 2000. [327] 
Novello’s designated topics included promoting vaccinations, childhood nutrition and 
initiatives aimed specifically at the Hispanic community, Sullivan and others said. Among 
her initiatives was a series of regional workshops in Chicago, New York, Miami, Los 
Angeles and San Antonio to get a sense of Hispanic health issues on the local level in 
preparation of a national report. [328]  She endorsed medical screening for signs of domestic 
violence. [329] And she spoke out against drunken driving and underage drinking, including 
a speech to members of Mothers Against Drunk Driving – “a group that didn’t need much 
convincing,” one reporter observed. [330] 
When she was confrontational, her targets were very specific and her attacks were done 
in partnership with other groups. One example occurred in April 1992, when she joined the 
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Oglala Sioux campaign against the makers of Crazy Horse malt liquor, charging the name 
was insensitive and ignored the high rate of alcohol-related problems among Native 
Americans. The manufacturer, Heileman Brewing Co., ignored the call for a name change. 
[331] 
Novello discussed her views of negotiating the job of Surgeon General years later, in a 
dissertation she wrote in pursuit of a doctorate in public health at Johns Hopkins University. 
In her dissertation, entitled “The Modern Era Surgeon General: A Retrospective Review,” 
Novello evaluated seven of the eight Surgeons General who served from 1961 to 2000. (She 
did not evaluate herself, saying she wouldn’t be able to muster the required degree of 
intellectual detachment for that task.) 
In her evaluations, she repeatedly focused on the doctors’ ability to work within the 
political framework around them. She praised Luther Terry for his public relations savvy and 
his ability to adapt to political realities. [332] She complimented William Stewart as a realist 
who never let what he wanted cloud his judgment as to what was feasible within HEW. [333] 
And she lauded Koop – not, as many others did, for his outspoken independence – but rather 
for being a crafty politician. “As he became more secure in his position, he thought carefully 
about the players and their power, and then mapped the political terrain. He built linkages 
with other stakeholders. He recognized the value of personal contact and face-to-face 
conversations. Above all, he understood and masterfully used moral persuasion to achieve 
goals. At the end of his tenure he was as much a politician as medical expert. [334] 
Her harshest assessments were for Jesse Steinfeld and Joycelyn Elders, two of the 
Surgeons General most aggressive in using the bully pulpit. 
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She said that while Steinfeld showed courage in taking on controversial topics, but he 
was unnecessarily confrontational and didn’t know his place, failing “to understand the 
boundaries of his job and that of the three ASHs under whom he served,” she wrote. [335] 
And Elders may have been brave, outspoken and scientifically sound, but she was 
“politically naïve” and failed to think about repercussions of her statements, Novello wrote. 
[336] 
How Novello lost her job 
Bill Clinton was elected in November 1992. In the few months before he took office, his 
transition team lead the kind of house-cleaning frenzy not seen at the beginning of the 
Reagan administration. 
On Tuesday morning, Dec. 15, 1992, Novello was getting ready for work when she heard 
on the radio that the President-elect was going to make someone else the Surgeon General. 
Novello had 15 months left on her term, and had said a few weeks earlier that she planned to 
stay in office until then. [337] 
But Clinton wanted Dr. Joycelyn Elders, who had run the Arkansas Health Department 
while he was the state’s governor. Phil Lee, who had agreed to come back to government 
service as Clinton’s Assistant Secretary for Health, would negotiate Novello’s departure. 
“So it was my job as the Assistant Secretary to give Toni a job but also to convince her to 
leave gracefully and not raise a stink,” Lee recalled, adding “they wanted to give her 
(Novello) a job in a hurry.” [338] Lee talked to the head of UNICEF and secured Novello as 
a job as special assistant to the director. Novello was interested in international health and 
agreed. “She was very decent about it,” Lee said. [339] 
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Novello left office in June 1993. When asked by a reporter if she had any advice for her 
successor, she replied; “Have your facts ready and be realistic.” [340] 
Novello is seen by some as being an illustration of the Long Leash Theory, with her 
agreeably standing aside as Sullivan was the government’s lead voice on many public health 
issues. She was on a relatively short leash and didn’t seem to mind it; many of her comments 
indicate an over-riding sensitivity to political considerations. 
DR. JOYCELYN ELDERS, 1993-1994 
The selection of Dr. Jocelyn Elders as Surgeon General hit conservatives like a stomach 
punch. 
Elders, the outspoken, liberal director of the Arkansas Health Department, had already 
made national waves. She had endorsed providing condoms in schools, and during a January 
1992 appearance at a Pro Choice rally, she said abortion opponents needed to “get over their 
love affair with the fetus.” [341] 
She was, by nearly all accounts, a polarizing figure. People either prized her for saying 
what no other health official would about teen sex, abortion and other controversial issues… 
or they detested her for the same reason. 
“It’s ominous to see her in a position of so much authority,” said Wanda Franz, president 
of the National Right to Life Committee, in an interview with The Washington Post the day 
after Elders’ name surfaced as Novello’s proposed replacement. [342] 
After a stormy confirmation process, Elders would end up serving less than 15 months. 
Hers was the shortest term of any Surgeon General. But in that limited time, she became one 
of the most famous. 
110 
A review of newspaper clippings and broadcast transcripts showed that for more than a 
year and half, there was something about Elders in the media nearly every single day – a 
news item about a national controversy she had stirred; an article about one of her many 
speeches and appearances; or, most often, a letter to the editor or other opinion piece. 
Conservative radio host Rush Limbaugh ridiculed her on a weekly basis. 
Today, she remains one of the best remembered Surgeons General. Indeed, she ranks 
second only to Koop in name recognition, according to the estimations of many public health 
service veterans and advocates. 
“She was quite a pistol,” said Dr. Georges Benjamin, executive director of the American 
Public Health Association. [343] 
Babies from watermelon seeds 
Elders was born Minnie Lee Jones on Aug. 13, 1933. Her birth and childhood were in the 
tiny town of Schaal, Arkansas, in a rural area west of Little Rock. She grew up poor in a 
sharecropper family, in a house where the only reading material was a copy of the Bible and 
a weekly farming newspaper her father got, Grit. [344] 
As a child, she had little exposure to doctors, who were considered too expensive and far 
away. The first time she could remember anyone going to a doctor was when she was 9. Her 
brother Bernard’s stomach swelled and he wouldn’t break a fever. Her father placed Bernard 
on a mule and took him to see a doctor, who treated him for a burst appendix and then sent 
him right home, as there were no hospitals nearby taking black children. [345] 
Health information was scarce. The family used coal oil as an antiseptic. No one used – 
or had ever heard of – aspirin. Her first menstrual period was a terrifying experience; she 
recalled practically hyperventilating in school, shocked that she was bleeding and trying to 
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cover her lap so no one noticed. When she did learn about menstruation, it was from a home 
economics teacher who handed out Kotex package inserts. [346] 
“Sex was a secretive thing, not to be mentioned. Children were told that babies were 
brought by storks, or that they came from swallowing watermelon seeds. As youngsters we 
spent a lot of time trying not to swallow a watermelon seed,” Elders later wrote in her 
autobiography, Joycelyn Elders, M.D. [347] 
She was a good student and was valedictorian of her high school class, an achievement 
that opened two doors: First, she gave the valedictory speech at the diploma ceremony – a 
nervous address about doing your best that was her first big brush with public speaking. 
Second, as valedictorian she was awarded a full-tuition scholarship to Philander Smith 
College, a well-regarded Methodist institution in Little Rock. [348] 
In college, she changed her name to Minnie Lee to Minnie Joycelyn, then just Joycelyn. 
The name came from a peppermint candy she liked, and was part of her attempt to 
distinguish herself from the other Minnie Joneses in her family. [349] 
She earned her bachelor’s degree in 1952 and married a Philander Smith student named 
Cornelius Reynolds. She followed him to Milwaukee, where he got a job with the IRS and 
she took a job as a nurse’s aid in a Veteran’s Administration hospital. The couple quickly 
realized the marriage was a mistake, Elders said. She enlisted in the Army in 1953, enticed 
by the promise of GI Bill tuition benefits, and left Milwaukee. [350] 
During her three years in the Army, she trained as a physical therapist. She was assigned 
to a military hospital in Denver, where she treated President Dwight D. Eisenhower after his 
heart attack. [351] She also took several classes, including one on public speaking taught by 
a Catholic priest at a Denver Jesuit school. [352] 
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The priest taught her how to speak with rhythm, and to never read from paper while 
giving a speech. His lessons were later accentuated with advice from her brother Chester 
Jones, who has become a Methodist minister. But her undisputed skill for rousing a room 
was born in that Denver class, she said. “Probably the most valuable course I’ve ever taken,” 
Elders said. [353] 
After the Army, Elders got a medical degree from the University of Arkansas Medical 
School, graduating in 1960. The same year, she married a Little Rock basketball coach, 
Oliver Elders. [354] 
Then, she interned at the University of Minnesota Hospital before returning to Little 
Rock for a pediatrics residency and to earn a master’s in biochemistry. In 1967, she became 
an assistant professor of pediatrics at the University of Arkansas Medical Center, then moved 
up the academic ranks there to become a full professor in 1976. 
Her research focused on pediatric endocrinology and she became an expert on childhood 
sexual development. She met Bill Clinton, a young political star, at a political function when 
he was the state’s attorney general. 
In 1987, when Clinton was governor, he appointed Elders as director of the Arkansas 
Department of Health. She leaned on Tom Butler, the deputy director, and the two formed a 
good working partnership that resulted in improved immunization rates and childhood health 
screenings. Elders proved to be an effective and empathetic speaker as she visited schools 
and health facilities around the state. Butler complimented her once, noting that he was 
initially concerned she would be an aloof academic type. ‘Dr. Elders, at least we don’t have 
to teach you how to be poor,’ she recalled him saying. [355] 
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Her passion for addressing the teenage pregnancy problem lead to an incident that was 
repeatedly raised later: In 1991, after the Arkansas Health Department learned that condoms 
being distributed in the state’s public health clinics had an unusually high rate of breaking – 
50 per 1,000 condoms, which was much more than the FDA’s safety-standard maximum of 4 
per 1,000. Elders quietly ordered the recall of undistributed condoms, but declined to disclose 
the problem to the public, fearing it would scare people away from using condoms. “We 
made a decision for the greater public good,” she later said, in a Senate hearing. [356] 
Generally, she got good marks from other public health professionals, and was elected 
president of the Association of State and Territorial Health Officers in 1992. She was 
“knowledgeable, smart, understood public health issues,” said Dr. Jeffrey Koplan, who was 
CDC Director from 1998 to 2002. 
“It’s a logical stepping stone to be a state health department director and then to move to 
a national level in a parallel role,” he said. [357] 
‘Like low-grade hamburger 
When Clinton was elected President in November 1992 and contacted the 59-year-old 
Elders about the job as U.S. Surgeon General, she initially wasn’t interested. “I felt the job I 
has as Director of Health for the State of Arkansas was, frankly, a better job. I was… 
responsible in a direct way for more people,” she said. [358] 
But Clinton convinced her that she could do something about teenage pregnancy on a 
national level. Elders’ elderly mother was also persuasive: “She told me she saw the 
President on TV today and he just looked pitiful, and she said, ‘You need to go on up there 
and help him,’” Elders recalled. [359] 
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Elders was embroiled in controversy almost immediately. Her race – she stood to be the 
first African-American to hold the Office of Surgeon General – received little public 
comment. But critics were vocal about her abortion rights statements and endorsement of 
frank sex education for kids. 
She said condoms needed to be advertised on television. She backed the medicinal use of 
marijuana. She supported giving the contraceptive implant Norplant to drug-addicted 
prostitutes, gratis. And in comments cited by conservatives as blasphemy against Catholics, 
she said; “Look who’s fighting the Pro-Choice movement – a celibate, male-dominated 
church.” [360] 
She was a lightning rod for controversy, but was not the only one Clinton was dealing 
with. The nomination of Lani Guinier for civil rights chief at the Department of Justice 
exploded in June 1993 when Republicans and some Democrats assailed her academic 
writings as evidence of radical views on minority rights. Clinton dropped Guinier – a move 
that was sharply protested by the NAACP and other groups. [361] Conservatives pressured 
Clinton received to drop Elders too, but abandoning another black nominee would have cost 
him dearly in the African-American community, some political observers noted. [362] 
Some Republicans put up a stiff fight, using parliamentary tricks, delays and allegations 
of financial impropriety to try to derail her nomination. When she was finally confirmed by 
the Senate in September, by a vote of 65 to 34, she told the President; “I came to Washington 
as prime steak, and after being there a little while I feel like low-grade hamburger.” [363] 
Not cowed at all by the political battles she had just weathered, Elders immediately took 
to the road, giving speeches and press interviews at a pace unmatched by any of her 
predecessors. 
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Elders and the Bully Pulpit 
From the very beginning of her term, Elders was in high demand as a speaker. She 
traveled across the country, speaking at colleges, medical conferences, schools, churches and 
many other forums – sometimes giving three speeches in a day. 
It wasn’t a matter of Elders pushing her message on different groups, said Phil Lee, who 
was Assistant Secretary for Health and Elders’ boss. “It was more a pull. People wanted her 
to speak because they knew she would speak out on issues that were controversial,” Lee said. 
[364] 
She was not only controversial, but also a powerful orator capable of stirring an 
audience’s emotions. “Listen to her, and you’d be sitting on the edge of your chair, 
practically. She was that good,” Lee said. [365] 
Her speaking skills were admired even by those who thought she too often allowed 
opinion to supersede science in her talks. “When she talked about the poor and 
disenfranchised… she wasn’t talking theoretically. She was coming from the gut, and she 
was passionate about it, and I give her credit for that,” said Damon Thompson, an HHS 
public affairs officer from 1996 to 2002 who served under Elders’ lower-key successor, Dr. 
David Satcher. [366] 
Her bosses were accommodating. Lee, as the Assistant Secretary for Health, handled 
most administrative matters pertaining to the traditional Public Health Service agencies. And 
Donna Shalala, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, was a firm believer in 
delegating authority, according to Lee and others who worked for her. [367] 
Indeed, at times, the administration promoted her visibility. Along with Koop, Elders was 
used to stump for the need for national health reform. The night Clinton unveiled his health 
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plan to Congress in September 1993, Elders was seated next to Hillary Rodham Clinton in 
the House gallery – guaranteeing the Surgeon General would be repeatedly on television 
when the cameras panned to the First Lady. 
Most of the time, Elders was on the road at speaking engagements, or talking to groups 
that met in Washington. “I always spoke to anybody I wanted to… Nobody told me what I 
was going to say, either,” Elders said. [368] 
That was true of her dealings with the press as well, she said. HHS press secretaries did 
little in the way of funneling calls away from her, and she enjoyed talking to reporters, she 
said. 
She was sometimes surprised, however, when her comments blew up into controversy.  
One such instance occurred in early December 1993, when – in response to a question at 
a National Press Club luncheon – she said legalizing drugs could reduce crime and the idea 
deserved further study. 
She was not the first health official to voice the idea: In one example from the Nixon 
administration (which I previously mentioned), Assistant Secretary for Health Merlin Duval 
had suggested to HEW officials that they hold a public dialog on the legalization of heroin. 
[369] But Elders aired her thoughts in public, at a time when battles between the Clinton 
administration and Republican lawmakers were escalating. The reaction was dramatic. 
Clinton’s press officers immediately distanced the President from Elders’ remark, saying 
he was firmly against legalizing drugs and had no desire to study the issue. Nevertheless, 
Republican Governor Pete Wilson of California called on Clinton to fire Elders. 
Mischaracterizing her comment as an outright call for the legalization of drugs, Wilson 
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characterized her words an insult to the narcotics officers who bravely fought drug 
trafficking. [370] 
Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole was more temperate, but knew political ammunition 
when he saw it. “Americans must be wondering if the Surgeon General is hazardous to our 
health,” Dole said to The New York Times. “I am relieved that the President has disassociated 
himself from Dr. Elders’ remarks but remain concerned with this Administration’s 
commitment to fighting drugs.” [371] 
The fallout grew much worse less than two weeks later, when an arrest warrant was 
issued for Elders 28-year-old son, Kevin. He surrendered a few days later to face a charge 
that he sold cocaine to undercover agents. Elders said she supported her son. Shalala told the 
press she supported Elders, but privately she expressed her displeasure, and Elders learned 
that Shalala had made a point of telling others that Elders had never been her personal choice 
for Surgeon General. [372] 
How Elders lost her job 
The arrest hung over the Elders family the rest of the year, but she was undaunted in her 
public speaking. 
In January, she said she remained convinced the legalization of drugs merited further 
study. [373] In February, she said the Medicaid program must have been developed “by a 
white male slave owner” because “it fails to provide services to poor women to prevent 
unwanted pregnancies, and this failure contributes to poverty, ignorance and enslavement.” 
[374] In March, The Advocate magazine published an interview with Elders in which she 
said an irrational fear of sexuality was behind conservatives’ anti-gay behavior. [375] 
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She called for the government regulation of tobacco products. She thanked abortion 
providers for helping women. She told Congress that sitting in a smoke-free section does not 
adequately protect nonsmokers’ health. 
In June, 87 Republican House members called for Elders to resign, and former Secretary 
of Housing and Urban Development Jack Kemp – who was considering a run for President in 
the 1996 election – said he felt Elders “should have been bounced or fired for her views, 
original views far, far, far to the left on social policy of the American people.” [376] 
Elders thought she always had Clinton’s support. He had stood by her when she first got 
the health director job in Arkansas, on that day they met with reporters and she surprised the 
Governor by saying she would hand out condoms at school-based clinics. Clinton, his face 
turning scarlet, said finally; “I support Dr. Elders.” [377] 
He had stood by her through all her controversial statements since. Indeed, he picked her 
for Surgeon General in spite of them. But his breaking point came in December, after an off-
hand comment Elders made about masturbation. 
On Dec. 1, Elders had given a speech at the United Nations for World AIDS Day. During 
a panel discussion after her speech, a mental health physician – he has been described as a 
psychiatrist or a psychologist in various accounts – asked her a question. He wanted to know 
if she thought the campaign against AIDS should include discussion and promotion of 
masturbation. Elders said she advocated comprehensive health education starting at an early 
age, and that masturbation is a part of human sexuality and perhaps should be taught. [378] 
For several days, her comments went unmentioned in the press. But a reporter for U.S. 
News & World Report decided to include them in a story in the magazine’s Dec. 12 issue. 
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White House Chief of Staff Leon Panetta, who had warned Elders about her off-the-cuff 
remarks, told Clinton about it. [379] 
“There have been a number of statements where the President has indicated he disagreed 
with her views, and this is just one too many,” Panetta said at a Dec. 9 news conference 
announcing her departure. [380] 
Initially, Panetta called her for her resignation, but Elders said no, she had to hear it from 
the President. Clinton called her and, in a brief conversation, told her he wanted her to resign 
immediately. [381] 
“At any other time, we probably could have faced the heat,” Clinton later wrote, in his 
autobiography My Life. 
“But I had already loaded the Democrats down with my controversial budget, NAFTA, 
the failed health-care effort, and the Brady bill and assault weapons ban, which the National 
Rifle Association had used to beat about a dozen of our house members” in the November 
1994 election. “I decided I had to ask for her resignation. I hated to, because she was honest, 
able and brave, but we had already shown enough political tone-deafness to last through 
several presidential terms,” Clinton wrote. [382] 
Elders said she briefly weighed staying in office anyway, but only briefly. While she had 
a four-year term and could not technically be terminated by the President, she determined 
that she could not stump without a travel budget or other support. [383] 
In his autobiography, Clinton said that he hopes one day Elders will forgive him. [384] In 
a recent interview, Elders said an apology wasn’t necessary. “I don’t think Bill Clinton, in 
any way, felt that I did anything wrong. I think it was just the political pressures,” she said. 
[385] 
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Asked about her accomplishments during those 15 months, Elders acknowledged that her 
push to get school-based clinics in all underserved schools ultimately failed, as did health 
care reform and some of the other calls to action she lead or was involved in. “I think my 
proudest accomplishment is that I really increased the awareness of the American people 
about the sexual health of our people, the problem of teenage pregnancy” and other issues, 
she said. [386] 
Elders returned to her old job at the University of Arkansas, and there was one final 
flurry of letters to the editor and opinion pieces commenting on her departure. 
Among the bitter was a letter to the editor of The Seattle Times by a reader named Alison 
Slow Loris, which said in part; “Over and over she has spoken out for common sense and 
honesty and the value of knowledge. It’s not surprising that the Republican commitment to 
upholding ignorance, and Clinton’s commitment to apparently nothing at all, have succeeded 
in driving her out of office.” 
Loris continued; “I suppose we can count on the next Surgeon General being afraid to 
speak up about anything at all; since public speaking is virtually the only power or duty 
attached to the office, the post might as well be abolished. It would save some money.” [387] 
Loris was not the only one to voice such thoughts. Elders departure was followed by 
years of nasty political fighting over who should replace her, and whether the Surgeon 
General should simply be abolished. It was not until 1998 that a distinguished physician 
named David Satcher would, after repeated entreaties, agree to take the job. 
Elders’ short-lived but very prominent turn in the bully pulpit seems to support the Great 
Man and Long Leash theories. She was a strong personality and dynamic speaker who 
courted controversy and those characteristics brought her tremendous public attention. She 
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was able to travel and use the pulpit because of non-interference from Shalala and Lee – until 
the Clinton administration decided Elders was too great a political liability and she was 
forced out of the job. 
DR. DAVID SATCHER, 1998-2002 
Less than three weeks after Dr. David Satcher was sworn in as the 16th Surgeon General, 
a Senate bill was introduced designed to shutter his office. 
It was nothing personal, said Sen. Conrad Burns, the Montana Republican who 
introduced the bill – “The Office of the Surgeon General Sunset Act” – on March 6, 1998. 
[388] 
Burns and other Republicans had been trying for years to abolish the position. They 
viewed Joycelyn Elders’ short-lived term in office as a debacle. And they were outraged 
when President Clinton nominated as her replacement Dr. Henry Foster, a distinguished 
former medical school dean who, it turns out, had performed abortions. 
President Clinton had withdrawn the Foster nomination to end a firestorm of controversy 
in early 1995. Burns had introduced a bill not long afterward to prevent another Clinton 
nominee from ever holding that job again. The bill failed, time passed, and here – in 
February 1998 – David Satcher had taken office. 
Satcher was a proponent of needle-exchange programs, an opponent of a ban on late-term 
abortions and a champion of public health research highlighting the dangers of hand guns. 
But all of that was beside the point, Burns said. 
“This legislation is not about Dr. David Satcher, or about any previous Surgeon General,” 
Burns remarked, when he introduced the bill. “Dr. Satcher will continue to be Surgeon 
General and the office would sunset immediately after he vacates it. This legislation will 
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sunset an office that has become a political football and has long since outlived its 
usefulness.” [389] 
Indeed, Burns argued, the office had been vacant for more than three years “and there 
was no shortage of voices on major health issues.” The Clintons had been talking about 
health reform, the Food and Drug Administration Commissioner David Kessler had been 
railing against tobacco, and so on. “The Surgeon General and his staff of six serve no 
compelling purpose,” Burns said. [390] 
Apparently, others disagreed. “Oh gosh, when he came in there had been a reservoir of 
demand,” said Damon Thompson, the HHS press officer assigned to Satcher. “People were 
just relieved to start talking to the Surgeon General again, and the phone started ringing off 
the hook – even before he got sworn in.” [391] 
Many were optimistic that Satcher, 56, would restore power and dignity to the Surgeon 
General’s bully pulpit. 
“Beyond being eminently qualified, he is also an inspiring individual – an African 
American raised in poverty on an Alabama farm who rose to the highest ranks of his 
profession,” wrote The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, in a February 1998 editorial celebrating 
Satcher’s confirmation. “If the post of Surgeon General is no more than what a person can 
make of it, then the Senate has confirmed someone who has the standing and experience to 
do the job proud.” [392] 
Studying in jail 
David Satcher was born in Aniston, Alabama on March 2, 1941, one of eight children 
who grew up on a 40-acre family farm. He nearly died of whooping cough at age 2, and in 
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the years after his mother would speak gratefully about the black physician that saved him. 
By the time he was 8, Satcher knew he wanted to be a doctor. [393] 
Satcher attended the only black high school in the county, and was so adept at mastering 
math formulas and other material that teachers would ask him to teach class when they were 
ill. But he did most of his studying on the bus, because after school and on weekends he 
worked in the foundry where his father, Wilmer, was employed. [394] 
In 1959, Satcher got a full scholarship to Atlanta’s Morehouse College. He joined Julian 
Bond and other Morehouse students in civil rights protests. But he carried books with him, so 
when he was arrested – and he was, several times – he could study in his cell. [395] 
Satcher graduated Morehouse in 1963 with honors, and then attended Case Western 
Reserve University in Cleveland, graduating with an M.D. and Ph.D. in genetics in 1970.  He 
had married a woman he met while attending Morehouse, and after Cleveland the couple 
moved to Los Angeles where he took a position at Martin Luther Jr. King Medical Center in 
Watts. He later became director of the hospital’s sickle cell disease center and was interim 
director of the King-affiliated Charles R. Drew Postgraduate Medical School. [396] 
His wife, Callie, died of breast cancer in 1978 after giving birth to their fourth child. He 
remarried a California mother of five, who became mother to his children, and the family 
moved to Atlanta where he became head of community and family medicine at the 
Morehouse School of Medicine. [397] From 1982 to 1993, he served as president of Meharry 
Medical College in Nashville, the nation’s largest historically black, private institution 
dedicated to educating scientists, physicians and health-care professionals. 
By the time Clinton was elected, Satcher was considered a national expert on the 
medically underserved. In 1993 – while Elders was Surgeon General – Clinton appointed 
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Satcher the director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta. Satcher had 
no background in public health, but quickly gained a reputation as a data-driven 
administrator and a steady, forceful voice on controversial topics. [398] 
He pushed for progress combating teen-age smoking and in improving immunization 
rates. He helped persuade Clinton to issue an apology to the survivors on the Tuskegee 
experiment. And he championed CDC-funded research into the role firearms play in violent 
injuries and death – a cause that put him in the cross-hairs of gun advocates and forced him 
to contend with budget-restricting maneuvers by Congressional conservatives. 
Phil Lee, serving as Assistant Secretary for Health under Clinton, cited Satcher’s work on 
firearms violence as particularly courageous. He praised Satcher for “his willingness to take 
that on, his willingness to deal with people on the Hill who were confronting him about that, 
his willingness to work very hard to prevent the kind of clobbering of the program that would 
have occurred had he not been there.” [399] 
The White House saw Satcher as a potential Surgeon General early on, and HHS 
Secretary Donna Shalala approached him about the job after Elder’s resignation. He turned 
her down for two reasons: First, he was still new at the CDC and wanted to accomplish some 
things before moving on. Second, although he understood the rationale for Elder’s forced 
resignation, he was uneasy with the politically-charged environment surrounding the office at 
that point in time. “I didn’t want to walk into that situation as I saw it in 1994,” Satcher said. 
[400] 
Combining roles 
Meanwhile, the structure at HHS had been changing. Lee, who had helped create the 
Assistant Secretary for Health position as an administrative replacement for the Surgeon 
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General, was again the ASH and again believed there was a need for change. But this time 
the ASH position was seen as more of a problem that a solution. 
“They got caught up in reinventing government – Al Gore’s thing of ‘let’s simplify 
government, take out the middleman, streamline,’” Thompson, the public affairs officer, 
recalled. In a re-organization, the directors of the CDC, NIH and other public health agencies 
started reporting directly to Shalala. Lee became chief advisor to the Shalala on health 
matters and took on a weaker, coordinating role with the public health agencies. [401] 
When Shalala approached Satcher about the job of Surgeon General again in 1997, Lee 
was getting ready to retire. Lee advised Satcher to also ask for the ASH position. “He was 
saying ‘I believe one person can serve both roles,’” Satcher recalled. [402] 
As a practical matter, there was a lot of upside to following Lee’s advice: It would 
guarantee that Satcher would be the top public health advisor to the Secretary, and though the 
ASH was in a weakened state, the position still commanded a larger budget and staff than 
what was available to the Surgeon General. Those resources would come in handy in issuing 
Surgeon’s General reports, which cost on the order of $1 million each to produce. [403] 
The down-side of the arrangement was that on some issues, a data-driven Surgeon 
General might be compelled to take one position and a politically-appointed ASH might be 
pushed to another. 
Such a situation occurred only two months after Satcher became Surgeon General. While 
he was CDC director, the agency studied needle-exchange programs, an HIV-prevention 
strategy in which drug users can bring in used syringe needles and get clean ones. The 
research concluded needle-exchange cut the spread of HIV and did not contribute to 
increased addiction, and Satcher planned a press conference in April to tout the results. 
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“I remember the day we were getting ready to release it and shortly before noon – with 
reporters on the way – they got word from the White House that the President was going to 
oppose federal funding for needle exchanges,” Thompson said. [404] 
The White House had decided that providing needles to drug addicts would send the 
wrong message. “Well, suddenly you’re in a touchy area there. You’ve got science that says 
this thing works. And you’ve got your President saying he’s not going to support funding for 
it.” [405] 
With 15 minutes to decide, Satcher chose to go on with the press conference. He 
carefully and evenly explained the scientific conclusions and the President’s position. On this 
issue, he said, he disagreed with the President and with a House vote banning federal money 
from being spent on needle exchange programs. “They should find the funds,” Satcher told 
reporters. [406] 
“It was really a proud moment for him. I knew we were going to be all right when he got 
through that day because it was really one of his first challenges and he just really laid it out 
there,” Thompson said. [407] 
Satcher and the Bully Pulpit 
In an interview last fall in Atlanta, Satcher suggested the needle-exchange decision 
wasn’t particularly difficult. 
“I was a student here at the Morehouse College during the civil rights movement.  I went 
to jail for what I believed. I did things in medical school that could have gotten me put out of 
medical school, like walking out on a rotation because I didn’t like the way the patients were 
being treated.  I think my commitment throughout my life has been that if you believe that 
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something is right, you are supposed to do it, and you’re not necessarily so much worried 
about what’s going to happen to you,” Satcher said. [408] 
Nothing happened to Satcher for taking his stand on needle-exchange. Indeed, the Clinton 
Administration relied on him to lead a racial and ethnic health disparities initiative, which 
included a report on tobacco use among minorities that was issued just days after the needle 
exchange press conference. 
In May, Satcher backed warning labels for cigars. In June, he called for televised condom 
commercials. In the months and years following, he addressed parents’ concerns about 
mercury in vaccines, chided the public about habits that lead to obesity, urged state and local 
governments to hike cigarette taxes, and spoke about the impact of the media and gun 
accessibility on youth violence after the 1999 shootings at Colorado’s Columbine High 
School. 
Often, he found himself in disagreement with powerful politicians, business executives, 
religious leaders or others, but the controversy rarely seemed as heated as during the Elders 
era. Health officials who know the two said Elders is a dynamic, emotion-rousing speaker 
who was sometimes too quick with an opinion. Satcher was a bit more measured, a bit less 
inflammatory. 
His academic and CDC credentials gave him gravitas, but his speaking style was also an 
asset, said Dr. Jeffery Koplan, who succeeded Satcher as CDC Director and heard him speak 
many times. 
“I like David Satcher’s style,” Koplan said. “I enjoy his rhythm and cadence and low-key 
manner. I think it’s low-key without being uninteresting, and low-key without being 
soporific.” [409] 
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Satcher was a veteran Sunday school teacher accustomed to speaking in church, 
Thompson noted. “He’s not a thunderous fire-and-brimstone type of speaker. But he spoke 
with a calm authority, and he spoke seriously, and he was good at it,” Thompson said. [410] 
Satcher’s speaking talents were put to frequent use. He put out seven Surgeon General 
reports – more than anyone since Koop. And he chose never-covered-before topics that 
prompted flurries of breaking news stories, second-day features and (mostly) laudatory 
editorials and letters to the editor. 
One of his biggest splashes came in late 1999, when he issued the first Surgeon General’s 
report on mental health. The report was a careful review of earlier research, and concluded 
that 22 percent of the U.S. population had a diagnosable mental disorder. It also attacked the 
stigmatization of mental illness, and was hailed by advocates as a turning point in the 
government’s position on psychological conditions. 
“This is a historic day,” said Michael Faenza, president of the National Mental Health 
Association, in an interview with The New York Times. “It’s wonderful that we have a 
Surgeon General talking about mental health and mental illness, in a voice that has not been 
used in Washington before.” [411] 
A first-ever report on oral health was released the following May, noting that most 
Americans could expect to keep their teeth for life (thanks mainly to fluoride in drinking 
water) but disturbing disparities existed in the dental health of minorities and the poor. It too 
was hailed for putting a government imprimatur on efforts to combat a health issue many felt 
had been under-recognized. “We’re the stepchild of health care in the United States… We 
think this report will help change that,” said Robert Klaus, president of Oral Health America, 
said in an interview with The New York Times. [412] 
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A new administration 
Satcher was in good standing with Vice President Al Gore, whose wife was an advocate 
on mental health issues – an interest stemming from depression she suffered following the 
death of their son from a car accident. In the midst of Gore’s campaign for the presidency, 
Washington insiders speculated that Satcher was a favorite to replace Shalala as Secretary of 
Health and Human Services under the new administration. [413] 
However, George W. Bush emerged the victor and Tommy Thompson, the Wisconsin 
governor, was chosen as the new HHS Secretary. 
There was no call for Satcher to resign his post as Surgeon General – he was, after all, a 
term appointment. But Satcher lost his political appointment as Assistant Secretary for 
Health, and the position was given to Eve Slater, an executive for Merck Research 
Laboratories. 
Life in the Bush administration started fairly well for Satcher. When Thompson met HHS 
staff in January 2001, he was generous in his praise for Satcher. [414] And Slater was an 
intelligent but quiet person who did not fight Satcher for the spotlight. [415] 
The relationship grew tenser in June, when Satcher decided to release a report on sexual 
health. It had actually been completed when Clinton was still in office. But Satcher was 
hampered from releasing it by leaders in the Clinton administration who were contending 
with the fallout from Clinton’s affair with a White House intern, Monica Lewinsky. [416] 
The Clinton administration was not going to sign off on it, and neither were the Bush 
people. “It took me a while to figure out how to get it out,” said Satcher. [417] He settled on 
designating it a ‘Call to Action’ – a new, shorter kind of document that Satcher had started to 
issue when an official ‘Surgeon’s General report’ was deemed problematic. 
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Satcher briefed Thompson on it. Thompson did not endorse it, but he did not forbid it, 
either. 
“I handed him this report and said ‘Tommy, I just want you to read this.  I just want you 
to read it and tell me what you think.’ And he came back to me later and said ‘David, the 
American people need to read this report’ And then he said ‘But you know Washington 
better than I do, and you know that politically we’re going to have trouble with this report,’” 
Satcher said. [418] 
“Now, I’m selective in my hearing sometimes so basically what I heard was ‘the 
American people need to read this report.’ So I started making plans to get it out.  So I called 
him one day and told him that I had scheduled a press conference to release the report.  I 
think he almost fainted on the other end of the line.  But when he recovered he asked me if I 
would wait and I said, ‘Tommy you know, we’ve already paid the money for the hotel and 
everything to release this report so we’ve got a lot of people coming and so we’d rather not 
wait.’  He said ‘I’ll get back to you.’ So I guess he called the White House and then he said 
‘David, go ahead but you’re on your own.  I’m not going to be able to protect you in this one, 
you’re on your own,’” Satcher recalled. [419] 
“We released the report about 10 days later.  He didn’t sign off on it, he didn’t participate 
in the press conference, but he didn’t stop it, and I appreciate that,” Satcher said. [420] 
In the report, Satcher said encouraging youth to abstain from sex was important, but 
schools and communities should also teach about birth control and support clinics that 
provide contraception. And though it said there’s wisdom in abstaining from sex outside of 
committed and monogamous relationships, it didn’t say that relationship had to be a 
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marriage. One more thing – the report said sexual orientation is established early in life and 
there’s no good evidence it can change. 
Conservatives were outraged, and Bush quickly distanced himself from the Clinton 
appointee. “The President understands the report was issued by a Surgeon General that he did 
not appoint, a Surgeon General who was appointed by the previous administration,” Bush 
spokesman Ari Fleischer told the Associated Press. “The President continues to believe that 
abstinence and abstinence education is the most effective way to prevent AIDS, to prevent 
unwanted pregnancy.” [421] 
Many political observers said any hope Satcher had of being re-appointed by Bush ended 
with that report. But nevertheless, the Bush administration found it had a critical need for 
Satcher’s gravitas a few months later, following the anthrax attacks of the fall of 2001 and a 
communication bungling by Secretary Tommy Thompson. 
The Anthrax Attacks 
Satcher was in Boston on Thursday, Oct. 4, to speak at a recognition ceremony held by 
World of Children, a non-profit organization focused on raising awareness of issues that 
affect children. [422] 
In so many words, HHS officials called and explained that Bob Stevens – a Florida-based 
photo editor for a tabloid newspaper called The Sun – has been confirmed to have the inhaled 
form of anthrax. Inhalation was extremely rare. It was the first U.S. case reported in 25 years. 
“No one told him to shut up about this. They just said, ‘You’re in Boston, here’s what 
you need to know, and the Secretary is going to be making a statement,’” said Damon 
Thompson, the press officer assigned to Satcher, who was with the Surgeon General on the 
trip. [423] 
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HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson did make a statement, that morning, at a White House 
briefing. Thompson was accompanied by Dr. Scott Lillibridge, Thompson’s special advisor 
on bioterrorism, who had been the CDC’s director on bioterrorism preparedness. [424] 
Lillibridge was not identified to the reporters as a bioterrorism expert, however, but only as 
another official from HHS. [425] 
Thompson did nearly all the talking. He said the CDC had just confirmed the diagnosis of 
anthrax in a 63-year-old man in a Florida hospital, and it appeared to be an isolated case. 
The press conference was being held less than a month after Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, and 
the first question from reporters was whether the man’s illness was the result of terrorism. 
Thompson said there was no evidence of terrorism. [426] 
He went on to say that the patient had traveled to North Carolina. A reporter asked about 
possible sources of anthrax infection. “That’s why the doctor is here,” Thompson replied, 
turning the microphone over briefly to Lillibridge, who said contact with wool and animal 
hides were possibilities. [427] 
Then Thompson took back control of the microphone, and made a series of statements 
that would be cited for years afterward as a historic blunder in crisis communication. 
Thompson volunteered that investigators know the man was an outdoorsman who, during 
his trip to North Carolina the previous week, drank water from a stream. Thompson said the 
case was still under investigation, and drinking water from a stream was only one possible 
explanation for the man’s illness. But Thompson was very reassuring, his words more certain 
as the press conference went on that there was no need for others to worry. “This is an 
isolated case and it’s not contagious,” Thompson said. [428] 
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But it turned out not to be an isolated case, and Stevens’ illness had nothing to do with 
drinking water from a stream. The next week, officials announced that an assistant to NBC 
News anchor Tom Brokaw had developed skin anthrax after opening a letter. Two days later, 
Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle’s office was quarantined after a letter containing 
anthrax was opened there. More reports streamed in about anthrax letters received at ABC 
News, The New York Post and other media companies. And on Oct. 17, 31 Congressional 
staffers tested positive for anthrax, the House of Representatives was shut down for testing. 
Panic had set in, as well as pointed criticism of the reassurances Thompson had offered 
earlier that month. 
“Shooting from the hip with a definite answer is not a clever way to go… It’s more 
credible to say, ‘We can’t yet make predictions about this or statements about that,’” said Dr. 
Sheila Jasanoff of Harvard University, in an Oct. 23 article in The New York Times that 
would be one of the first of many articles analyzing the government’s handling of the anthrax 
crisis. [429] 
Thompson was faulted for not only what he said, but also for being the one behind the 
microphone answering the questions. A politician with no formal training in medicine or 
public health, the HHS Secretary was an adherent of the Bush administration’s ‘One Voice’ 
philosophy, which dictated that the administration speak with – and in many cases, through – 
one voice on health matters or other topics, said Damon Thompson, the Satcher press officer. 
[430] For about two weeks after the press conference, HHS public affairs staff funneled 
questions about anthrax to the Secretary’s office. [431] 
However, as the anthrax situation spiraled, HHS staff started using Satcher, CDC 
Director Jeff Koplan, NIH scientist Dr. Anthony Fauci and others to answer questions, with 
134 
several of them sometimes appearing together. “An explosion of spokespersons,” said Dr. 
Georges Benjamin, executive director of the American Public Health Association. [432] 
That, too, was problematic, Benjamin said. “The national public health voice had gotten 
confused,” he said, adding that the situation was preferable in the late 1980s when Koop was 
the government’s recognized health authority. [433] 
Dr. Mohammad Akhter, who was the APHA’s executive director at the time, said Satcher 
should have been running the daily briefings. “Our people (public health workers around the 
country) consider him our leader,” Akhter told one reporter in November 2001. [434] 
How Satcher lost his job 
Columnists and other observers later said Satcher was a natural point person for the 
administration on anthrax, given his CDC credentials and performance on other controversial 
topics, but that he was sidelined by the Bush administration because of its lingering distaste 
over the June sexual health report. [435] 
Bill Pierce, who was HHS Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs under Sec. 
Thompson, offered a different explanation. He said Thompson was accustomed to speaking 
for whatever organization he was heading up and the department did the best it could to deal 
with a complicated and spiraling public health emergency that was also tied to a criminal 
investigation. [436] 
In early November, Satcher told reporters that he would not seek re-appointment when 
his term expired in February 2002. He remained active in the bully pulpit, addressing health 
disparities, obesity and a range of other topics in his final months. 
His last week in office, he met with reporters and voiced concern about what would 
happen to the Office of the Surgeon General after his departure. He noted the office's $1 
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million budget did not cover the cost of even one surgeon general’s report, and the lack of a 
“meaningful budget” would damage the office. It was essential, he said, to have a doctor who 
is “independent enough to report directly to the American people on the basis of public 
health and science.” [437] 
Satcher is proof positive of the Great Man Theory, using his government experience, 
speaking skills and personal integrity to pursue first-of-their kind reports and statements on 
issues ranging from mental health to sexual health to needle-exchange programs. 
The Long Leash Theory also applied: He thrived in office in the first part of his term 
because he was given a fair amount of freedom by the Clinton administration. Under the 
more restrictive Bush administration, he was somewhat less visible – especially during the 
anthrax crisis. 
His successor encountered similar difficulties. Satcher was replaced by a doctor known as 
a hard-charging Green Beret who, nevertheless, would virtually disappear into the 
government bureaucracy. 
DR. RICHARD CARMONA, 2002-2006 
If ever a candidate seemed destined to be a bold new voice in the Office of the Surgeon 
General, it was Dr. Richard H. Carmona. 
Carmona grew up in Harlem, was a Green Beret in Vietnam, and gained national 
attention in 1992 when he rappelled from a helicopter to rescue a person stranded on a cliff – 
inspiring a made-for-TV movie. [438] He was a trauma surgeon, a SWAT team member and 
a professor at the University of Arizona. 
Some colleagues in Arizona called him confrontational and out-spoken, an assessment he 
agreed with. Republicans liked him because he was a law-and-order type committed to 
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working on bioterrorism and emergency preparedness (and, by the way, was neutral on the 
issue of gun control). [439] And Democrats thought he seemed enough of a maverick to be a 
strong and independent voice within the Bush administration. 
“We need a strong and independent Surgeon General who will put public health first, and 
leave politics and ideology well behind,” said U.S. Sen. Edward M. Kennedy of 
Massachusetts, in a July 2002 statement welcoming the 52-year-old doctor to the job. [440] 
For his part, Carmona was giddy as a child about the opportunity. “It is as if the fairy 
godmother reached out and touched me and cast me in the best Disney movie ever made,” 
Carmona said at the time of his confirmation hearing. [441] 
But Carmona’s four-year term would prove to be more like a horror film that nobody 
went to see, according to many public health veterans. 
When it was over, Carmona and a few others would detail how he was tightly muzzled by 
the Bush administration after his first year in office, with speaking engagements canceled, 
reports suppressed and his bully pulpit virtually cordoned off. 
Many in the general public, meanwhile, would react to news reports of Carmona’s post-
term disclosures with a collective; “Who?” 
Carmona was a “do-nothing Surgeon General. He faded into the woodwork for whatever 
reason,” said Kim Elliott, deputy director of Trust for America’s Health, a Washington, D.C. 
based public health research organization. “He was M.I.A.” [442] 
A street fighter 
Richard Henry Carmona was born in Harlem on Nov. 22, 1949. A self-described street 
kid from a poor Puerto Rican family, he dropped out of high school. But after talking to an 
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Army Special Forces officer who was passing through the neighborhood, he decided to talk 
to an Army recruiter and, at age 17, enlisted. [443] 
“In retrospect, it was the best thing I ever did,” Carmona would say years later in 
speeches, as he recounted his life story. “It gave me a platform to be successful the rest of my 
life.” [444] 
He was sent to Vietnam, where he was a medic and became a member of Army Special 
Forces. He lost three good friends in combat, and earned two Purple Hearts, a Bronze Star 
and other service awards and decorations. When he got out of the Army, he married his 
childhood sweetheart and decided to go to college and become a doctor. 
He attended the University of California-San Francisco, and struggled at times. “I had 
average intelligence, but I had a great deal of tenacity… It’s something Special Forces instills 
in you,” Carmona said. [445] 
Carmona graduated with a bachelor’s degree in biology and chemistry in 1976, and a 
medical degree from the same university in 1979. After completing residency and fellowship 
in San Francisco, he moved to Tucson, Arizona in 1985, recruited by Tucson Medical Center 
to lead the region’s first trauma care program. In 1986, he became a doctor for the Pima 
County Sheriff’s Department and a leader of its SWAT team. [446] 
He became something of an action hero in the 1990s because of two incidents. In 1992, 
he was part of a helicopter rescue team that responded when another helicopter crashed on a 
mountainside. Carmona was lowered down and carried a survivor to safety. 
Then, in 1999, while driving to work, Carmona stopped at the scene of a traffic accident, 
where a man driving a pick-up truck had hit another vehicle and was threatening the other 
driver with a gun. Carmona ordered the man repeatedly to put down the gun. The man – Jean 
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Pierre Lafitte – fired at Carmona, grazing his scalp. Carmona fired back seven times. Three 
shots hit Lafitte, who died. A few hours later, Lafitte’s father was found stabbed to death, and 
investigators concluded Lafitte had killed him earlier that day. [447] 
Carmona also was a veteran of management conflict. He was fired from Tucson Medical 
Center in 1993, and he filed a wrongful termination lawsuit. In court documents, TMC 
officials said Carmona had alienated doctors and administrators with his “street-fighter” 
attitude. Carmona said he was fired for protesting illegal and unethical practices at the 
hospital, including what he claimed was substandard care by another doctor and unnecessary 
consultations by other physicians. [448] 
The suit was settled two years later, with Carmona receiving $3.9 million and a full-page 
newspaper advertisement in which the hospital apologized and praised his skills. [449] 
Despite the legal turmoil, he was hired in 1994 to run the financially-troubled Kino 
Community Hospital. Carmona eliminated the hospital’s operating deficit in two years, but 
financial reports later showed that a mounting balance of uncollectible accounts made Kino 
seem like it had more money that it actually did. His forced resignation in 1999 prompted 
him to say; “I've exposed problems, and now I'm being held responsible for those problems.” 
[450] 
Carmona was teaching surgery, public health, and family and community medicine at the 
University of Arizona when Bush selected him in 2002. 
Proponents, thinking of the recent terrorist attacks, focused on his law enforcement 
experience as an asset. “That background is particularly valuable at this time,” said Sen. Jeff 
Sessions, an Alabama Republican, at the time of Carmona’s confirmation hearing. [451] His 
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management conflicts were raised at his confirmation hearing, but the Senators quickly 
moved on, and Carmona was approved without opposition or debate. [452] 
Carmona and the Bully Pulpit 
Carmona’s term began with an emphasis on preventing disease, correcting racial health 
disparities and preparing the nation for crises. His first full month on the job – September 
2002 – included meetings at the White House and Pentagon, an event at the National Press 
Club, speaking engagements in California, Arizona and Illinois. 
Eve Slater, the Assistant Secretary for Health who supervised Carmona, was by many 
accounts a reasonable but quiet administrator who was content to let Satcher use his bully 
pulpit and did not try to restrict Carmona, either. 
And Carmona proved to be a very good speaker. He had a standard talk in which he 
narrated his life story with humor, humility and passion, and then finished with a short 
discussion of health disparities or some other health topic. “He had a very good, effective 
story to tell and he used that effectively in getting across messages,” said Bill Pierce, who 
served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs from 2001 to 2005. [453] 
A problem, critics later said, was that the script never changed much. “I think Carmona 
gave the same speech every time,” said Dr. Jeffrey Koplan, who was CDC Director from 
October 1998 to February 2002. “It’s a nice story – up from a tough neighborhood, poor 
background, rose through this and did all these things and now look where he is… But after a 
few times, you got it, and you gotta move on to something else.” [454] 
Another problem was that his health topics – important issues like health disparities and 
health literacy – were not appetizing to the press, observed Dr. Georges Benjamin, executive 
director of the American Public Health Association. 
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The topic of health disparities was a particularly hard sell. It was old news in that it had 
been addressed before, extensively, by Satcher. It was complicated, too: “It’s not a 30-second 
sound bite,” Benjamin said. “They (the media) just simply didn’t cover it,” he said. [455] 
So for various reasons, Carmona started out as somewhat quieter Surgeon General than 
his recent predecessors. But two things would happen in June 2003 that many say would 
mark a turning point in Carmona’s ability to use the bully pulpit. 
The first occurred in early June, during a Congressional hearing on smokeless tobacco 
and ‘reduced risk’ tobacco products. Carmona made strong statements about the dangers of 
tobacco. U.S. Rep. Ed Whitfield, a Republican from the tobacco-growing state of Kentucky, 
at one point asked Carmona if he would support the abolition of all tobacco products. “I 
would at this point, yes,” the Surgeon General replied. [456] 
There was little reaction from the legislators after he said it, but Whitfield later said he 
was disappointed and shocked at Carmona’s sweeping condemnation. “I’ve never heard 
anything like that from any public official” or even from anti-tobacco advocates, Whitfield 
said. [457] 
The White House quickly distanced itself from Carmona’s comments. “That is not the 
policy of the administration,” White House spokesman Scott McClellan told reporters later 
that day. “The President supports efforts to crack down on youth smoking, and we can do 
more as a society to keep tobacco away from kids. That’s our focus.” [458] 
It quickly became conventional wisdom in Washington that Carmona, who had not been 
a particularly high-profile Surgeon General to begin with, was put on a much tighter leash 
following the hearing. “He went off his script and he really took on the industry… I think he 
was muzzled after that,” said Kim Elliott of Trust for America’s Health. [459] 
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It proved to be an unfortunate event that was as much Whitfield’s fault as Carmona’s, 
Benjamin said. “Why would you, a legislator (from a tobacco state), ask the Surgeon General 
of the United States that question? That’s a silly… don’t get me started,” he said. [460] 
A second turning point was a change in management within HHS. Slater had left the 
Assistant Secretary for Health job in February, and was replaced in July by Dr. Cristina 
Beato. By all accounts, Carmona and Beato did not get along. 
Critics of Beato say she had a very Republican ideology that clashed repeatedly with 
Carmona. She pushed him to give more credit to the White House in his speeches, and began 
to exercise a level of bureaucratic control that Carmona hadn’t experienced before, according 
to Pierce and other sources. [461] 
“He and Cristina Beato could not get along if they were the last two people on the face of 
the earth. They would kill each other rather than cooperate. It was as ugly as anything I’ve 
ever seen,” said one person who worked with both and recalled incidents in which they 
screamed at each other. On one occasion at an event in Philadelphia they were nose-to-nose 
and, it seemed, nearly at blows, the official said. (The source shared recollections about some 
of the more confrontations between Carmona and Beato on the condition that the information 
not be attributed.) 
Carmona was not Beato’s only problem. In the summer of 2004, press reports detailed a 
series of questions about her resume. Discrepancies in her credentials included her 
uncorroborated claims that she had a master’s degree in public health from the University of 
Wisconsin, that she had published a scientific paper on inert gases, and that she had been a 
medical attaché to the U.S. Embassy in Turkey. [462] 
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Her Senate confirmation was delayed while Senators sought answers to what increasingly 
appeared to be a series of fabrications. In 2005, she left the post and was replaced by Dr. 
John Agwunobi, a public health official from Florida. 
By that time, when Carmona appeared in the national media, it was usually as part of a 
group of federal health officials appearing together at a press conference – and his comments 
did not challenge the party line. 
One example: In June 2005, he appeared with CDC and NIH officials and Lynn Swann of 
the President’s Council on Physical Fitness and Sports at a press event to discuss obesity and 
the environment. It was billed as a Surgeon General’s press conference but NIH official 
David Schwartz acted as the emcee, and Schwartz and the others did most of the talking. One 
exception came when a question was addressed specifically to Carmona concerning the 
government’s continuing focus on individuals and their personal responsibility for fitness. 
The question: Besides haranguing people to eat right and exercise, wasn’t there something 
more the government could do to attack the problem, perhaps through regulation? “As far as 
regulatory issues, yes, sir, that is above my pay grade,” Carmona replied. [463] 
The pattern held true in the days after Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast, an occasion 
in which Carmona’s oversight of the Commissioned Corps might have been on full display. 
Carmona and the Commissioned Corps 
The military had turned Carmona’s life around when he was a young man, and he quickly 
took to the position’s military vestments. 
The Commissioned Corps was a historic sub-component of the Public Health Service that 
had been re-invigorated under C. Everett Koop. Koop wore the Navy-model uniform 
accorded to the Surgeon General, which by virtue of title was a three-star admiral in the 
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Commissioned Corps. Koop required others to wear the uniform more often, too, and 
promoted recruitment to the Corps and revised mobilization guidelines. 
Carmona had similar goals. He wore the uniform, worked to instill pride in the Corps and 
was a happy participant in the many ceremonies and traditions that went with being a Corps 
member. He also spoke frequently with officials in the Department of Defense to improve 
relations between the Commissioned Corps and other uniformed services, said Jerry Farrell, 
executive director of the Commissioned Officers Association of the U.S. Public Health 
Service. [464] 
Carmona “emphasized the uniform service identity very heavily, and struggled mightily 
to do as much as he could to recentralize his authority over the Commissioned Corps,” 
Farrell said. [465] 
However, under Beato’s authority, the responsibilities for Commissioned Corps 
compensation and other personnel issues were split up and distributed to different HHS 
officials. “Nobody was quite sure any more who was in charge,” Farrell said. [466] 
When Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast, it was necessary to mobilize Commissioned 
Corps members who were working at the CDC, the Indian Health Service and other federal 
public health agencies. Though Carmona was the titular head of the Corps, he did not simply 
call up people and send them out. The HHS Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness coordinated the personnel response to the disaster, telling Carmona how many 
people were needed in what location for what purpose, and he put together which individuals 
made the trip. [467] 
About 2,000 officers – or roughly a third of the Commissioned Corps – were deployed 
for Katrina. [468] Carmona went to the Gulf, too, as part of a touring group of Bush 
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administration officials that included Mike Leavitt, a former Utah governor who had replaced 
Tommy Thompson as HHS Secretary in 2005. 
Carmona appeared at press conferences, but usually as one of several officials standing 
on stage. Someone else would do most of the talking – as Department of Homeland Security 
Secretary Michael Chertoff did at a Sept. 3 press conference on hurricane relief, or Leavitt 
and CDC Director Julie Gerberding did at a Sept. 6 press conference on the public health 
response. [469] 
When he was one on one with a reporter, he frequently would get asked why he didn’t 
stand out more, as Koop and Elders had. When the question came in a November 2005 
interview with The Houston Chronicle, he answered this way; “I’m the 17th Surgeon General 
of the United States and, of those (other Surgeons General), only a couple had to step up and 
take a very forcible, visible, vocal position. I think you choose those moments wisely 
because you don’t want to expend your political capital if you can move the agenda another 
way.” [470] 
How Carmona lost his job 
Carmona put out three reports during his term. Two were released in 2004 – the first was 
a report on smoking and health that concluded that smoking causes illness in nearly every 
organ of the body; the second gave statistics and predictions about the prevalence of 
osteoporosis. 
Though praised by some health advocates, Carmona’s reports did not get the kind of 
media attention that accompanied the higher-profile reports of Satcher, Elders, Koop, 
Richmond and Steinfeld. As his first term drew to a close, he worked hard to get at least one 
more major document out. 
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He succeeded. In late June, Carmona released his final report, which addressed the health 
hazards of secondhand smoke. The report looked back on two decades of studies and 
concluded that even trace amounts of cigarette smoke is dangerous to non-smokers. 
“The debate is over as far as I’m concerned,” Carmona told the media. “Based on the 
science, I wouldn’t allow anyone in my family to stand in a room with someone smoking.” 
[471] 
Carmona got what would be his biggest media splash since his ‘ban all tobacco products’ 
comment in 2003. Anchorman Charles Gibson lead the ABC World News Tonight broadcast 
that evening with news of Carmona’s report, emphasizing the finding that even a brief 
exposure to smoke could cause harmful cellular changes, and noting the report likely would 
be important ammunition for advocates across the country pushing for local smoking bans. 
[472] Carmona was on CBS’s The Early Show the next morning, advising co-host Hannah 
Storm not to go into any room where someone was smoking. [473] 
“I think that Carmona saw this report as the crowning achievement of his time as Surgeon 
General,” said Dr. Arthur Kellermann, an Atlanta-based emergency medicine specialist who 
recently finished a fellowship as a health policy staff member for U.S. Rep. Henry Waxman. 
[474] 
That report was a major accomplishment, said Dr. Harmon Eyre, former medical director 
of the American Cancer Society. “It will change the landscape of the debate,” Eyre said, in a 
2007 interview. [475] 
Others were less impressed. Many newspapers played the story inside, noting that 
Surgeons General had been warning of the dangers of second-hand smoke since the 1970s. 
Some public health experts said a national push for local smoking ordinances was already 
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well underway, and reacted to the report with a shrug. They noted it did not lead to 
Congressional briefings, as was customary in the wake of past Surgeon General reports. And 
it did not help along any federal tobacco-control legislation, said Sherry Kaiman, who at the 
time was a staffer for U.S. Sen. Christopher Dodd of Connecticut. 
“There was nothing” in terms of the report’s impact on Capitol Hill, said Kaiman, who is 
now director of policy development at Trust for America’s Health. [476] 
It apparently also had little immediate impact on the general public. A Gallup poll 
conducted in early July, less than two weeks after the release of Carmona’s report, found 
attitudes were basically unchanged on the subject, with about 56 percent considering 
secondhand smoke to be very harmful, about what a similar poll had shown the previous 
summer. [477] 
About six weeks later, Carmona’s term expired. HHS officials who knew him said they 
believe he had hoped to be reappointed to a second term, but as the date approached, he 
heard nothing from the Bush administration. “They were moving boxes out of his office and 
he still hadn’t been told officially from the President that he was not to be renewed,” said Dr. 
Karen Near, who served as Carmona’s senior science advisor. [478] 
Finally, Carmona announced he was resigning, though he offered no specifics of what he 
would do next. HHS officials made no announcement about it, and referred questions to the 
White House, which declined to comment. [479] Asked about it in an interview three months 
later, Carmona said he had no idea why the administration declined to renew him. [480] 
Near and other colleagues said Carmona had carried out his job with honor, and lamented 
that no proper appreciation ceremony marked his departure from office. 
Others said the relative silence over his departure was apropos of his entire term. 
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“It’s hard to remember another Surgeon General who was so largely invisible as he has 
been, and that’s a tragedy,” said Dr. Sidney Wolfe, of Public Citizen’s Health Research 
Group, in an interview with The Arizona Daily Star. [481] 
Carmona Speaks Out 
Carmona did not quietly fade away after leaving Washington, however. In January 2007, 
while speaking at the annual dinner of the Public Health Service Commissioned Officers 
Foundation, he made pointed comments about the Bush administration. “I increasingly 
witnessed a government that was more and more using theology and ideology to drive its 
policies and its people: stem cells, abortion, Plan B, the war and many more,” he said. [482] 
Kellermann was there, and relayed the comments to Waxman’s office. In July 2007, 
Waxman convened a hearing on the office of the Surgeon General in which Carmona, Koop 
and Satcher appeared together. Each talked about moments when the presidential 
administrations they served under hindered their attempts to use the bully pulpit. But 
Carmona gave examples never discussed publicly before, and was clearly the star of the 
show. 
He said his speeches were vetted and censored by HHS officials, and he was prohibited 
from talking about the ‘Plan B’ emergency contraception drug, stem cell research and other 
topics. “In fact, I had two speechwriters that ultimately quit because they were so intimidated 
and browbeaten by appointed officials who would vet my stuff and rewrite it,” Carmona said. 
[483] 
He said he was not allowed to speak freely with reporters. He said he was pushed to 
speak at events benefiting Republicans, but wasn’t allowed to make a speech at the Special 
Olympics because of the program’s long-standing association with the Kennedy family. And 
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he said he was prohibited from pursuing his wish to issue reports on emergency preparedness 
and mental health. Reports on prison health and global health were also suppressed. [484] 
The global health report was particularly galling to Carmona and some of his colleagues. 
Some perceived the villain to be William Steiger, a 30-something political appointee who 
headed the HHS Office of Global Health. He had once worked for Thompson, and his family 
had ties both to President Bush and to Vice President Cheney. Carmona didn’t name Steiger, 
but his testimony suggested that Steiger was the official who prohibited Carmona from 
mentioning global warming and pushed the Surgeon General to spend more of the report 
talking about how the United States had helped people in Iraq and Afghanistan and other 
countries. [485] 
An HHS spokesman told reporters that Carmona’s report was never published because 
the science was poor. [486] Pierce, the former press officer, said he believed it was Steiger’s 
staff who really did the rewrite and that Steiger is a “good and capable guy.” [487] 
“My advice to Carmona was ‘Screw Steiger. Publish it. Who’s going to stop you?’” said 
Farrell, the head of Commissioned Officers Association. 
“You know, he was more cautious than that, probably because he has aspirations for 
something beyond Surgeon General,” added Farrell, who noted Carmona’s name had been 
floated as a candidate for political office in Arizona. [488] 
Koop, the former Surgeon General, said Carmona used to call him for advice. Koop said 
he gradually formed the opinion that Carmona did not want to take a step that might cost him 
his job. “Carmona – he plays by the rules, and he’s afraid to get fired,” Koop said, in a July 
2006 interview, near the end of Carmona’s term. [489] 
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Some applauded Carmona for finally coming forward, and said they could understand an 
impulse to stay in office and accomplish at least some things rather than simply walk away in 
disgust.  
Fitzhugh Mullan, the public health historian, gave good marks to Carmona for his efforts 
to revitalize the Commissioned Corps and said it is no small matter that he opened up at the 
Waxman hearing. “The fact that he came forward and described the ways that his issues were 
handled, I think, is important. I think it brought public attention to this area of political 
management,” Mullan said. Indeed, Carmona may be remembered for having done his most 
important work as Surgeon General after he left office, Mullan said. [490] 
Others said it was too little, too late. Carmona could have quietly told members of 
Congress while it was going on, or made a more public stand, said Jeff Levi of Trust for 
America’s Health. 
Surgeons General have multiple options for voicing their concerns while still in office, he 
argued. “When these things are happening to you, at a certain point you give voice to that,” 
Levi added. “He’s wanting us to see him as a hero in retrospect.” [491] 
Carmona was a textbook example of the dark side of the Long Leash Theory, with tight 
restrictions from the Bush administration effectively keeping him muzzled. Some say the 
Chorus Theory may also have been in play during his term, with Gerberding being seen as a 
more useful and trustworthy communicator by HHS leaders and as credible by the public. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, I will first present the results of a survey of health journalists regarding 
the credibility and newsworthiness of the Surgeon General as contrasted with other federal 
health officials who communicate health messages to the public. The survey will begin with 
an abstract of the findings, and then a full description. 
Then I will present a discussion of themes I saw develop from key informant interviews, 
archived documents, the survey and other sources. 
PART A: SURVEY OF HEALTH JOURNALISTS 
Context: Anecdotally, some observers say the U.S. Surgeon General has lost visibility and 
status in recent years as a primary federal communicator of public health messages. 
Journalists are seen as a primary conduit – a megaphone, of sorts – of government health 
messages. 
Objective: To survey journalists with the most experience reporting on government public 
health and health policy, and ask their opinions about the credibility and newsworthiness of 
different federal health officials. 
Design, Setting and Participants: The Association of Health Care Journalists, with 1,023 
U.S. members, is the largest journalists-only group of media professionals covering medical 
issues, health care, public health and health policy. Through e-mail messages posted on the 
Association’s listserv in fall 2007, AHCJ members were invited to take an anonymous Web-
based survey. 
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Results: The Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention was seen as the 
most newsworthy and most credible of six prominent U.S. health officials, according to the 
journalists surveyed. In comments, many journalists said the way they ranked health officials 
depended at least in part on whether they believed the health official would provide accurate 
and complete information even in situations where doing so would run counter to political 
considerations. The Surgeon General was most often ranked near the bottom in both 
credibility and newsworthiness. 
Conclusion: In the survey, the Surgeon General was often perceived as being among a 
group of HHS officials who are influenced by politics and so are considered as sources with 
relatively low credibility. 
The influence of the media in U.S. society is widely recognized. “The mass media’s 
ability to set the public agenda and amplify and lend legitimacy to the voices and views of 
our nation’s political debates render them essential participants in social change of any kind,” 
as Lawrence Wallack and his co-authors stated in their text Medica Advocacy and Public 
Health. [1]  
Journalists play many roles – such as dispassionate informer, conscientious watchdog, 
cheeky entertainer and incendiary editorialist. But in their coverage of government, they also 
serve as megaphones for authority. That role is the focus of this chapter. 
Reporters are not stenographers. Journalists evaluate what government sources tell them, 
choosing the most useful or important information to their readers, listeners and viewers, and 
dropping the rest. Although journalists may be directed to certain spokespersons by 
government agencies, the reporting process involves making decisions about which sources 
to approach and how prominently to quote them in the story. 
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There is little in the peer-reviewed literature about how journalists view different federal 
health officials in terms of their value as a source of information. This survey study attempts 
to fill that gap, with the additional motive of learning journalists’ views of the U.S. Surgeon 
General (the subject of this dissertation). 
Methods 
Participants 
In the United States, there are thought to be approximately 116,000 professional 
journalists working for mainstream news media in 2002, according to a survey study by 
Weaver et al. [2] The study estimated that about 1,700 covered “health and family” issues, 
although no more specific breakdown was made. [3] 
The exact number covering health issues, including medical science, health care business, 
public health and government health policy, has not been studied. But rough estimates by 
professional associations put the number at about 3,000. [4] Given that Weaver’s work did 
not incorporate freelancers or other health reporters no in mainstream media, the 3,000 
estimate sounds plausible. 
Many professional health journalists belong to one or several professional associations, 
some of which – like the American Medical Writers Association and the National 
Association of Science Writers – also include people who work in media relations and public 
affairs. 
In 1998, a group of reporters founded the Association of Health Care Journalists in an 
attempt to create a new, journalists-only professional group. AHCJ has grown steadily, and 
now has a membership of more than 1,000 members. It is the largest health-journalists-only 
association in the United States. 
180 
I am an AHCJ member, and an elected member of the AHCJ Board of Directors. In the 
summer of 2007, I approached the organization’s executive director and other members of 
the governing board about my hope to survey AHCJ members for this dissertation project. 
After receiving their consent, I posted an e-mail invitation to participate on Sept. 27. Follow-
up e-mail requests were posted on Nov. 1 and Nov. 29. 
The survey was reviewed and approved by the UNC IRB, as was the wording of the first 
solicitation e-mail posting and of the follow-up solicitation postings. 
Survey Content 
I asked 12 questions in a survey designed to take only five to ten minutes. The first six 
were demographic in nature, asking the respondent to give his or her gender and age. They 
also were asked whether they were a full-time employee of a media organization (many 
AHCJ members are freelancers); what type of media company is their primary employer; 
what type of health issues do they focus on (medical science and research, health care 
business, public health and health policy, or a mix); and how long they’ve been doing health 
journalism. 
The next two questions were designed to check how often respondents interacted with the 
health officials they are being asked about. The intent was to see if there’s a difference in the 
perceptions of those who regularly interview federal health officials as compared to the 
views of health journalists who don’t often deal with the government. 
The next two questions asked journalists to rank six prominent federal health officials in 
terms of their newsworthiness, and then in terms of their perceived credibility. The six – 
director of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; director of the National 
Institutes of Health; director of the NIH’s National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
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Diseases; U.S. Surgeon General; U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services; and 
Assistant Secretary for Health at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 
The final two questions were open-ended, asking respondents to look at the two officials 
they deemed most credible and explain why, and to do the same for the two officials they 
deemed least credible. 
Admittedly, “newsworthiness” and “credibility” are two imprecise measures. 
Newsworthy is generally defined simply as timely and important or interesting, and opinions 
about what is newsworthy are formed by a journalist’s own experiences and interests as well 
as their view of the judgments of editors and of the journalists’ audience. Credibility is 
commonly defined as believability, or the quality of being a trustworthy source of accurate 
information. 
Newsworthiness and credibility are not synonymous – for example, White House 
reporters may dutifully cover a President because of his importance/newsworthiness, even if 
they question the accuracy of his statements. But they may also seek out other sources they 
see as credible, even if that source is lower and in the government hierarchy. 
Statistical Analysis 
A simple analysis was done using tools available on Microsoft Access and Excel. 
Results 
I used SurveyMonkey, a popular Web-based survey service. 
The survey netted 103 responses, a small result representing about a 10 percent response 
rate for the 1,023-member Association. That is low, but considered to be in the customary 
response rate range for mailed questionnaires. [5] 
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SurveyMonkey records the Internet Protocol address of each person taking the survey to 
guard against an individual taking the survey multiple times. An IP address is a unique 
address that certain electronic devices use to identify and communicate with each other. It’s 
commonly thought of as a unique identifier for each computer, but servers, printers, some 
telephones and other machines can have IP addresses. 
There were duplicate IP addresses among the responses. Four responses came from one 
IP address, three from two others, and two from three others. 
I was unable to track the responses back any further – SurveyMonkey did not provide e-
mail addresses, names or additional identifying information for each respondent to this 
anonymous survey. 
I carefully compared each response from these IP addresses. I considered the possibility 
that perhaps some respondents timed out or aborted an initial attempt to take the survey, but 
came back to complete it, listing answers that were consistent with the earlier attempt. I also 
looked for signs of different complete responses, including age, sex and other identifying 
information: It’s possible two different people used the same machine, perhaps a husband 
and wife pair of journalists who use the same home computer, or two people at the same 
workplace. 
I e-mailed a detailed report on the different responses to Ned Brooks, my dissertation 
committee chair, and gathered his advice on which it made sense to include and which to 
exclude. 
Based on that consultation, I prepared an analysis that excludes seven responses. 
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Analysis – 96 responses 
This is how the 103 responses were whittled down to 96: In instances where multiple 
responses came from the same IP address, responses were kept that identified as different 
individuals in terms of age, sex, place of employment and/or other characteristics. In a case 
in which the same person appeared to be trying to answer multiple times, all the responses 
were dropped from the analysis. 
Each survey participant did not answer every question. Most answered demographic 
questions, but fewer answered the later questions about how often they interview health 
officials, and fewer still ranking health officials in terms of newsworthiness and credibility. 
Of the 96 responses, 95 (99 percent) answered all of the demographic questions; 73 (76 
percent) answered all the questions about how often the interview health officials; 72 (75 
percent) answered the rank-the-officials questions in accordance with directions. 
Responding journalists were predominantly women (58 of the 94 who answered the 
question about gender, or 62 percent). That’s consistent with AHCJ membership’s 
demographics – 61 percent of the Association members are female, according to an AHCJ 
census that includes gender information on about 75 percent of the membership. [6] 
Most were employed by newspapers (34 percent) or were freelancers/self-employed (26 
percent). That is similar to AHCJ’s overall membership – about 40 percent of the 
Association’s members have identified themselves as newspaper journalists, and 24 percent 
as freelancers/self employed. 
In terms of age, the largest group (34 percent) was in their 50s. The next largest groups 
were people in their 40s (26 percent), those in their 30s (17 percent), and those under 30 (13 
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percent). There is no AHCJ breakdown of the membership by age, or by what type of health 
coverage they specialize in. 
Of particular interest was the breakdown of how often people interview federal officials. 
Those who interview federal officials a few times a month or more are the most likely to 
cover the kinds of issues and announcements for which the Surgeon General or other health 
officials would act as spokesperson. 
Of those 73 that answered the question about how often they interview federal health 
officials, 23 _ or 31.5 percent _ said they interviewed federal health officials a few times a 
month or more. That suggests that many of the responses on the newsworthiness and 
credibility of different federal health officials were from journalists who based their opinions 
less on recent, direct observations than on past experiences or on perceptions formed in other 
ways. 
In total, 73 of the respondents answered the questions asking them to rank different 
health officials by newsworthiness and credibility. However, respondents were supposed to 
give a No. 1 vote to only one of the officials, a No. 2 vote to only one, etc. One respondent 
gave No. 1 rankings to several officials in each question, so her response was not counted. 
That left 72 – including all of the 23 who said they interview health officials a few times a 
month or more. 
For the overall group, the CDC Director (currently Dr. Julie Gerberding) was ranked No. 
1 in terms of newsworthiness in 42 responses. That means 42 of the 72 responses (or 58 
percent) that did do rankings put CDC Director at the top. 
The results were similar in rankings in terms of credibility: CDC Director was ranked No. 
1 in 41 (or 57 percent) of the responses that answered this question. 
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In the newsworthiness rankings, no other position came close. The next highest was the 
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, who was ranked No. 1 in 
10 of the responses. The rest – the NIH Director got six first-place votes for most 
newsworthy, the NIAID Director got six, the Surgeon General six, and the HHS Assistant 
Secretary for Health got one. 
In the credibility rankings, the CDC Director again was ahead by a large margin. The 
NIAID Director (currently Dr. Tony Fauci) was next, with 19 of the responses listing him 
No. 1. The NIH Director was listed as most credible in six of the responses; the Surgeon 
General in three; the HHS Secretary got two and the HHS Assistant Secretary for Health in 
one. 
It’s worth noting that the Surgeon General was ranked least credible in 13 of the 73 
responses that did rankings, or 18 percent. The Assistant Secretary for Health was ranked 
least credible in 28 of the responses, and the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services 
was ranked the least credible the most often, in 27 responses. 
I created a scoring system: Looking at the Surgeon General in terms of newsworthiness, 
the scoring was 1 (for ranking) x 6 (for the number of journalists ranking Surgeon General a 
No. 1 in newsworthiness), then that was added to 2 (ranking) x 18 (number of journalists 
giving the Surgeon General a No. 2 in newsworthiness) and so on. The final sum was divided 
by the number of journalists who ranked the Surgeon General in terms of newsworthiness.  
I made similar calculations for each of the six federal health officials in terms of both 
newsworthiness and credibility. The lower the score, the more newsworthy or credible the 
respondents considered each official to be. Here are the results, in table form. 
First, newsworthiness (Table 1): 
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Table 1 - Newsworthiness 
CDC Director 1.78 
NIH Director 3.22 
Surgeon General 3.34 
NIAID Director 3.63 
HHS Secretary 3.83 
Assistant Secretary for Health 5.00 
 
 
Now, credibility (Table 2): 
 
 
Table 2 - Credibility 
CDC Director 1.82 
NIAID Director 2.31 
NIH Director 2.85 
Surgeon General 3.74 
HHS Secretary 4.82 
Assistant Secretary for Health 5.00 
 
Another analysis focused on the responses of those who interview federal health officials 
a few times a month or more (what I will call “the megaphone group,” because it is these 
journalists who are most likely to write or broadcast what federal health officials say). 
In this 23-person megaphone group, no one ranked the Surgeon General at No. 1 in terms 
of newsworthiness. Five ranked the position at No. 2, four at No. 3, six at No. 4, four at No. 5 
and four at No. 6. 
One person in the megaphone group ranked the Surgeon General tops for credibility. Five 
ranked the position at No. 2, one ranked it at No. 3, ten ranked it at No. 4, three ranked it at 
No. 5 and three ranked it at No. 6. 
In looking at other federal offices, 13 ranked CDC Director as most newsworthy (or 56 
percent), and 12 ranked that position as most credible (52 percent). The HHS Secretary got 
the next largest number of votes for newsworthiness, with five votes, but was somewhat 
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lower in the rankings in terms of credibility. The NIAID Director, Dr. Tony Fauci, got eight 
votes for most credible, placing him second to the CDC Director in that assessment. 
I created a scoring system specific to the megaphone group, too. As was the case with the 
larger group, the lower the score, the more newsworthy or credible the respondents 
considered each official to be. 
First, the newsworthiness results: 
 
 
Table 3 - Newsworthiness 
CDC Director 1.78 
NIAID Director 2.96 
HHS Secretary 3.04 
NIH Director 3.26 
Surgeon General 3.91 
Assistant Secretary for Health 4.83 
 
 
Next, credibility: 
 
 
Table 4 - Credibility 
CDC Director 2.04 
NIAID Director 2.26 
NIH Director 2.52 
Surgeon General 3.78 
HHS Secretary 4.91 
Assistant Secretary for Health 4.96 
 
(Note in the credibility results, the standings were the same in both the overall and 
megaphone groups. But in newsworthiness, there was a difference. In the overall group, the 
NIH Director and Surgeon General were second and third most newsworthy. But in the 
megaphone group, the NIAID Director leaped to second place.) 
In the last questions, survey participants were asked specifically about the credibility 
rankings and why they rated certain positions ate the top and at the bottom. 
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Far and away, the leading reason given as to why a certain official did or did not have 
credibility had to do with politics. Those journalists felt that officials with strong political 
motivations or influences were less likely to provide frank, complete and accurate science-
based information. 
The words “politics,” “political,” “politician(s),” or “politicization” were used in 30 of 
the 66 responses that wrote comments about why certain officials were ranked most credible. 
That’s about 45 percent of those responses.  The same words appeared in 46 (or 70 percent) 
of the responses of who ranked least credible. Similar points were made in other responses, 
though using different words. 
Some examples, that spoke specifically about the Surgeon General:  
“Political hacks,” wrote a female freelancer in her 60s, of the Surgeon General and HHS 
Secretary, who she ranked as the two least credible. 
“The Surgeon General’s office has proven in the past year to be politically run, and HHS 
has long been political as well,” wrote a female freelancer in her 40s. 
“U.S. Surgeon General has become a political position. Carmona did not have public 
health expertise, and even when he tried to put out evidence-based reports, he was squelched 
by political operatives,” wrote a male freelancer in his 50s who ranked Surgeon General as 
least credible. 
“Appear to most influenced (sic) by political/lobbyist pressures,” wrote a male freelancer 
in his 50s, who ranked the Surgeon General as least credible. 
“The credibility of the Surgeon General’s Office has been destroyed by the Bush 
administration. Ditto the assistant secretary slots,” wrote a magazine writer in her 50s who 
put the Surgeon General at fifth in credibility, above only the Assistant Secretary for Health. 
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“Particularly U.S. Surgeon General, the role is a talking head in regards to policy matters 
and usually mirrors whatever administration’s policies are during their time in office,” wrote 
a journalist in her 30s who ranked the Surgeon General dead last. 
Some were more kind: 
“Good speakers,” wrote a male wire service reporter in his 40s (not me), who ranked the 
Surgeon General as most credible and CDC Director as second-most credible. 
“The CDC Director and Surgeon General are usually more scientific and less political,” 
wrote a male magazine writer in his 50s. 
“The CDC seems to be the closest to the science and the least politically influenced. The 
Surgeon General also is (supposed to be) immune from political influence, and generally 
his/her statements are backed by sound data,” wrote a female magazine writer in her 30s. 
“They have, in my experience, been shown to stick to the science, leaving politics out of 
the question,” wrote a male journalist in his 40s who works at a trade publication, who 
ranked the NIH Director and the Surgeon General as the most credible officials. 
“Surgeon General has always had somewhat of an air of independence from the 
Administration. Same is true for the Director of NIH,” wrote a male newspaper reporter in 
his 60s, who ranked the Surgeon General as the most credible. 
“I’d actually rank them equally, so for both, they have the medical background to speak 
with some authority and knowledge...,” wrote a female newspaper reporter in her 50s, who 
put the CDC Director and Surgeon General at the top of her list. 
Discussion 
There have been few survey studies looking at perceptions about the credibility of the 
credibility of the Surgeon General and other federal health officials. The best known was a 
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1991 national telephone survey, published in Public Health Reports, in which 1,622 
Americans were asked to assess the reliability of the Surgeon General, the CDC and state 
health departments on the subject of HIV and AIDS. More people had heard of the Surgeon 
General than of the other entities, although the CDC was ranked higher in terms of reliability. 
[7] 
This survey attempted, with limited resources, to address a gap in the literature in terms 
of surveyed perceptions of federal health officials’ credibility. 
Limitations of the survey include its small sample size. Only about 9 percent of the 
AHCJ’s membership submitted responses, and only 6.5 percent submitted complete 
responses that included ranking the six named U.S. health officials in terms of their 
newsworthiness and credibility. 
Although the demographics of the response sample seem similar to that of AHCJ as a 
whole, the size of the sample makes it difficult to generalize the findings to that of the whole 
Association, let alone to the larger pool of all U.S. health journalists. Likewise, it is not 
possible to generalize these findings to the audiences of the participating journalists. 
However, this survey is believed to be the one of the first of its kind – no similar surveys 
were found in a literature search. Therefore, it offers some new insights into how journalists 
who cover public health and medicine view the credibility of certain key federal health 
officials who often are primary sources of public health information. 
Because this dissertation is focused on the Surgeon General, it was noteworthy that more 
journalists deemed the Surgeon General among the least credible of federal health officials 
than considered the Surgeon General among the most credible. 
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In reviews of journalists who most often covered federal health officials, the gap was 
equally as stark – just one of the journalists in that group deemed the Surgeon General as 
most credible, and none saw the position as most newsworthy. In contrast, three ranked 
Surgeon General as least credible and four as least newsworthy. 
My scoring system also showed that the megaphone group, who do the most coverage of 
these federal health officials, hold the Surgeon General in somewhat lower esteem than do 
the respondent group of journalists as a whole, particularly in terms of newsworthiness. 
Again, these numbers are small, but the findings suggest that at least some of the so-
called megaphone journalists are not placing much priority on covering announcements from 
the Surgeon General, or in seeking out the Surgeon General for comment on important 
issues. 
Judging from the written comments of those survey respondents who explained their 
reasons for ranking the Surgeon General’s credibility as high or low, a primary consideration 
in journalists’ minds was whether the Surgeon General is likely or unlikely to make 
statements that are not influenced by political considerations. Although some respondents 
noted the Surgeon General has had a history of being considered an independent voice, a 
larger number indicated they believe the office now is likely to stick to political scripts, even 
at the expense of complete and frank science-based information. 
Only two officials consistently scored less credible with the journalists. One was the 
Assistant Secretary for Health – the position created in the 1960s to supervise the Surgeon 
General and assume many of his past administrative duties. The other was the HHS 
Secretary. 
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These finding suggest a credibility problem with the Surgeon General and his/her 
supervisors, and indicate that the CDC Director and the NIAID Director currently are seen as 
most credible to journalists.  
CASE STUDY THEMES 
In this section, I will first discuss the challenges of assessing the bully pulpit performances of 
different Surgeons General. Then I’ll discuss themes and possible explanations for why some were 
perceived as being more skillful in the bully pulpit than others. 
Challenges 
It is difficult to measure how well any Surgeon General uses the Bully Pulpit. Ideally, a good 
Surgeon General communicates information and advice to the public in so effective a manner that it 
leads to both changes in personal behavior and in public policy, with an ultimate effect of improving 
the public’s health. But even the textbook examples of successful Surgeons General’s 
communications are open to interpretation. 
For example, Dr. Luther Terry’s landmark 1964 report on Smoking and Health is widely cited as 
the most influential report ever issued by Surgeon General, and many contend it was a crucial first 
salvo in the nation’s public health campaign against tobacco. But a look at smoking rates during 
Terry’s term in office show that U.S. cigarette consumption dropped by about 20 percent in the three 
months after the report was issued, but later creeped back to near normal levels. The most substantial 
declines did not occur until the 1980s.  That’s not to say experts are not correct about the importance 
of Terry’s report, but showing a cause-effect impact of the report on smoking rates is no simple 
matter. 
Conversely, the last two Surgeons General – Dr. David Satcher and Dr. Richard Carmona – 
spoke frequently about the negative health effects of obesity, and strongly urged people to exercise 
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and eat better. But U.S. obesity rates continued to escalate during Satcher’s term, then began to level 
off under Carmona. [8] How do we interpret that? Was the leveling off due to Carmona? Was it a 
delayed pay-off from the work of Satcher? Or was it triggered by factors completely unrelated to 
these two men? We can’t say for sure. 
In her 2000 dissertation, former Surgeon General Dr. Antonia Novello used research compiled 
for her by the Office of the Public Health Service Historian. Novello chose as measures of success 
the number of times each Surgeon General gave speeches, appeared at Congressional hearings, 
issued reports, was named in articles in The New York Times, and authored articles in two journals 
(Public Health Report and the Journal of the American Medical Association). [9] 
That approach, too, is imperfect. 
In terms of counting speeches, Dr. Julius Richmond wasn’t particularly fond of public speaking, 
and Dr. Jesse Steinfeld loathed giving the same speech over and over and also passed on speaking 
opportunities. Yet Richmond is seen by some as being a paradigm-shifting Surgeon General who, 
through his Healthy People report, helped the media and the public view health as a matter of 
personal responsibility. And Steinfeld, in his day, was considered an influential and more visible 
presence than some of his successors who were more active public speakers. 
Also problematic is the measure of Congressional hearing appearances. Dr. Joycelyn Elders 
spoke at five hearings during her short term in office, and Dr. C. Everett Koop spoke at 30 during his 
eight years in office. That suggests both were less visible that Richmond and Steinfeld, who both 
appeared at 36. [10] But it’s difficult to determine if they had more influence on legislators than 
Elders or Koop. And we must grapple with the common observation that Elders and Koop are by far 
the two best remembered Surgeons General, no matter the tally of trips to Capitol Hill. 
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Counting citations of a Surgeon General’s name in the media is not easily accomplished in a 
meaningful way. Nexis is the best and largest current data base of newspaper articles, broadcast 
media reports, press conference transcripts and press release archives, but the growth of its data base 
has been gradual, and the contributions of many media outlets didn’t start appearing in the data base 
until the 1990s or later. (I know this from experience: I was working as the health writer at The 
Florida Times-Union in Jacksonville in the mid-1990s. That paper joined the Nexis data base in 
early 1996. I can use Nexis to look up my Times-Union articles published on or after Jan. 21, 1996, 
but Nexis does not contain any of the hundreds of pieces I wrote for the paper before that date. So it 
might appear from the Nexis data base that I had – until early 1996 – deemed the Surgeon General 
unworthy of coverage, when that wasn’t the case at all.) 
That limitation of Nexis makes it impossible to comprehensively compare the media interest in a 
Surgeon General who served, say, in the early 1970s to a Surgeon General who served a few years 
ago. Novello attempted to get around that problem by focusing only on citations in The New York 
Times, a presumably complete data base from decade to decade. The Times is perhaps the nation’s 
most important and influential newspaper. Nevertheless, one publications’ decision to cover or not 
cover an activity by the Surgeon General may not be consistent with what the majority of other news 
outlets did that day, and cannot be considered representative. 
(As a point of information, I’ll mention that Novello’s review – which looked at Terry, Stewart, 
Steinfeld, Richmond, Koop, Elder and the beginning of Satcher’s term – reported 1,108 New York 
Times citations for Koop, 109 for Terry, 82 for Stewart, 63 for Steinfeld, 41 for Elders, 26 for 
Richmond, and 10 for Satcher as of the time of her writing.) [11] 
Novello’s measurement of how many articles Surgeons General authored in Public Health 
Reports in JAMA is not instructive. Doctors are indeed part of a Surgeon General’s audience, but 
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these are only two publications and are not necessarily the most prestigious or influential journals 
that reach U.S. physicians. What those numbers tell us is not clear. Elders wrote three articles for 
JAMA while Richmond wrote only one. Does that indicate Elders had more important messages to 
communicate with doctors, or that Richmond was too busy with his ASH responsibilities to write for 
that particular journal? Koop had 13 articles in Public Health Reports while Steinfeld, Richmond and 
Elders didn’t have any. Does that mean Koop was a better writer, or saw more importance in having 
something published in that particular journal, or none of the above? [12] 
Judging a count of Surgeon General reports is challenging as well. The reports, as we know them 
today, first appeared during the term of Luther Terry. (That document, it should be noted, was not a 
report by the Surgeon General, but rather the report of an advisory committee to the Surgeon 
General.)  Terry is credited with only one report, though it is considered the most influential report 
ever issued by a Surgeon General, indicating that volume may not be as important as content or 
timing. Elders issued only two, but again was a highly visible Surgeon General and a prolific 
communicator. 
There’s more to consider on that topic: Generally, the reports are not authored by Surgeons 
General or their staffs, but rather by a collection of people from the CDC, other agencies or outside 
experts. Generating a single report costs an estimated $1 million, and the Office of the Surgeon 
General has consistently had an annual budget too small to foot such a bill, so production of the 
reports has often relied heavily on the ability of a Surgeon General to beg or borrow resources to put 
them out. C. Everett Koop – by all accounts an outlier – issued 22 reports during his eight years in 
office, far and away surpassing the production of the other Surgeons General. But next on the list 
were Julius Richmond and David Satcher, who both issued seven but who both also served as 
Assistant Secretary for Health and therefore had more administrative power and budgetary resources 
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available for generation of the reports. [13] “I took advantage of the resources and the authority of 
the ASH” to bolster Surgeon General activities, Satcher said. [14] 
Also worth noting is that there have been changes through the years in how Surgeons General 
report summarizations of science to the general public. Satcher began the practice of issuing shorter 
documents called ‘Calls to Action,’ which generally are thinner and less thoroughly vetted 
documents that the more traditional ‘reports.’ Topics were handled with ‘Calls to Action’ for various 
reasons, including concerns that political or resource-procurement obstacles would make growing 
them into full reports too difficult, according to former Surgeon General staff member Dr. Karen 
Near and others. [15]  The Office of the Surgeon General also holds ‘workshop’ meetings on 
different health topics, and proceedings from those meetings have been released as a source of 
information to the public, though with less trumpeting than a report or ‘Call to Action.’ [16] 
Satcher said he never meant for his ‘Calls to Action’ – which included controversial documents 
on sexual health and suicide – to be considered less weighty than conventional report. “A ‘Call to 
Action,’ from my perspective, was meant to be a report, but we were using that terminology to draw 
attention to something that we considered to be almost an emergency” action that could prompt swift 
reaction from the public, Satcher said. [17] But he acknowledged historians and medical librarians 
have often grouped those documents in a separate category from reports. [18] 
A measurement not discussed by Novello is polls and surveys of public and media  perceptions 
of the credibility and importance of Surgeon General messaging. That too, alas, is problematic 
because few such polls seem to have been done. 
A literature search found only a few examples. Among them:  
(1) A 1973 survey done for Philip Morris Inc. found that only about 3 percent of smokers were 
aware of the Surgeon General’s health warnings of about the dangers of smoking. [19] 
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(2) A 1991 national telephone survey, published in Public Health Reports, in which1,622 
Americans were asked to assess the reliability of the Surgeon General, the CDC and state health 
departments on the subject of HIV and AIDS. More people had heard of the Surgeon General, 
although the CDC was ranked higher in terms of reliability. [20] 
(3) A 1999 survey by Perea and Slater looked at responses by 73 Mexican American and Anglo 
American young adults to televised drinking-and-driving warnings, and found that Latinos rated ads 
featuring the Surgeon General as the source of information as more believable than ads without the 
Surgeon General. They found that for Anglo Americans, the opposite was true. [21] 
Like most surveys, these were snapshots of opinions of a limited group of people at a certain 
point in time and focused on a specific set of questions. Because the surveys were not repeated in 
years prior to or afterward, the results can’t be used to determine whether public perceptions of the 
Surgeon General changed over time. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, I did a survey of journalists that attempted to assess how 
the Surgeon General was perceived in relation to five other top federal health officials. That survey 
was limited by a low participation rate and cannot be considered clear evidence of how well a 
Surgeon General is heeded. 
In my 30 key informant interviews, sources offered various ideas as to why some Surgeons 
General were considered better in the bully pulpit than others. Those ideas boil down to four 
theories – ‘the Great Man Theory,’ ‘the Long Leash Theory,’ ‘the Chorus Theory’ and ‘the Great 
Issue Theory.’ 
The Great Man Theory 
The theory suggests we can explain history by focusing on the genius, charisma or other 
outstanding personal attributes – or lack thereof – of key people in history. The nineteenth-century 
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Scottish historian Thomas Carlyle is considered the historical proponent of this thinking. Carlyle 
once declared; “The history of the world is but the biography of great men.” 
The theory has become passé in academic circles.  “Most historians… hate ‘the Great Man 
theory’ of history” said Howard Markel, a public historian at the University of Michigan. 
Nevertheless, the theory is probably at least part of the explanation for why some people did better in 
the Surgeon General job that others, he said. [22] 
Key informants offered a list of personal attributes that are important for success in the bully 
pulpit. 
Richmond said it’s important for a Surgeon General to have a plan, and not just be reactive. “I 
don’t mean this immodestly, but you had to have some vision about policy and looking down the 
road at institutionalizing health goals for the nation,” he said. [23] 
Steinfeld said passion for doing the right thing is another requisite. “I’ve always been a zealot,” 
he said. [24] 
Personal characteristics seem to have been important in the success of Koop, an outsider to 
Washington who arrived in Washington facing a very difficult situation. His new colleagues at HHS 
feared he was a religious extremist and many steered clear of him. The American Public Health 
Association and some Democratic lawmakers strenuously opposed his nomination. Newspaper 
editorial writers predicted he would be a disaster. And he was placed under a strong Assistant 
Secretary for Health who was part of a group that made sure he had no substantial administrative 
powers. 
But he won people over. Colleagues grew to respect and sympathize with Koop as they watched 
him report to work every day through the difficult confirmation process, and he made friends who 
would later help him as he put together reports and stepped up into the bully pulpit. Reporters, too, 
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were impressed by his communication skills and authoritative, unblinking responses to tough 
questions. Indeed, some of the people who were his biggest detractors at the beginning of his first 
term became some of his biggest fans by the end of his second term, including U.S. Rep. Henry 
Waxman. 
“He had something that was very, very important, and that was an enormous amount of integrity. 
He was willing to take on the tobacco industry. He was willing to take on the AIDS epidemic, even 
though he came from a social conservative point of view… He saw his job as representing public 
health, and he wasn’t going to be turned away from doing what he thought was the right thing to 
do,” Waxman said. [25] 
Koop agrees that his personal traits were part of the reason he is considered one of the greatest 
bully pulpit practitioners – especially when it came to dealing with the media. 
“In a sense, the Surgeon General has the ability to build his own credibility. And the better he 
builds it, the more powerful he becomes. I have to be immodest and say that it needs a little bit of 
charisma to do it. If you’re pretty dull on your feet and don’t respond quickly to questions and you 
don’t respond accurately to questions, the press pays very little attention to you,” he said. [26] 
Relations with the media is, by all accounts, a key part of how successful a Surgeon General is in 
the bully pulpit. Reporters can become megaphones for the health messages of Surgeons General. “I 
made the snowballs and they threw ‘em,” Koop said, of his relationship with reporters. [27] 
But reporters are not stenographers, and holding a press conference doesn’t mean anyone will 
cover it. It’s important to recognize that reporters are attracted to controversy and to officials who 
seem willing to speak truth to power, said several key informants, including Elders. 
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“I never really had any problems with the press. The press got to where they felt they could ask 
me anything they wanted to and Number One, I would answer them, and Number Two, I would give 
them a very straightforward answer,” Elders said. [28] 
It is perhaps no accident that among the Surgeons General with the lowest visibility while in 
office was Carmona, who demonstrated little willingness to speak out on controversial issues or to 
contradict his political bosses on issues he felt strongly about. (The same has been said about 
Novello, who also had a relatively low profile.) But many who know Carmona praise him as a man 
of great personal integrity, and his colorful life story indicates that courage is not one of his deficits. 
His example offers a segue into an alternate theory. 
The Long Leash Theory 
The Long Leash Theory, as I call it, suggests that each Surgeon General’s success in the bully 
pulpit was influenced by the political and administrative environment in which he or she worked. An 
important facet of that involves each Surgeon General’s relationship with his or her political 
superiors – including the Assistant Secretary for Health, the Secretary of HHS/HEW, and key 
officials in the White House. 
Under this theory, Koop was successful because after his initial year or two in office, he worked 
for ASHes and HHS Secretaries who were willing or even eager to let him speak for the department 
on difficult and controversial topics. Margaret Heckler, who became HHS Secretary in 1983, was 
described as unfamiliar with clinical issues and averse to controversy. She was willing to let Koop 
do the talking on the Baby Doe issue. James Mason, who became the Acting ASH in 1984, was busy 
with two administrative jobs and was happy to let Koop speak to the public about tobacco and other 
issues. Otis Bowen, appointed HHS Secretary in 1985, likewise was a non-meddling administrator 
who gave Koop a very long leash. 
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Like a talented and eager young football player, Koop had the personal characteristics to succeed 
on the field but needed there to be an opening for him in the game, and for his coaches to put him in, 
or so the theory goes. Koop agrees with that. 
“The reason I got into AIDS is that in a double-term presidency, an awful lot of the people that 
the president kept with him in the first term started going home. They started going home about 
Election Day so by the time the new term has arrived, it’s just as empty in the White House as it was 
before he came. And I filled a lot of vacuums. People were asking questions, nobody was giving 
answers and… they were answers that I could give succinctly,” Koop said. [29] 
Gary Bauer and some others in the White House were unhappy with the freedom and stardom 
that Koop was enjoying, but those critics were not in a position to give Koop the hook, and he knew 
that, he said. 
The Long Leash Theory resonates in the story of every other recent Surgeon General as well. 
Steinfeld, though courageous in his use of the pulpit, faced an increasingly unfriendly Nixon 
administration which progressively separated him from important public health issues and 
engineered his early resignation from office. 
Richmond, despite holding the ASH job and having a larger budget and staff than other Surgeons 
General, was never the government’s lead spokesman on smoking and some other key health issues 
because he worked for the limelight-loving Joe Califano. Ditto Novello, who had to contend with 
HHS Secretary Louis Sullivan and his desire to be the main spokesman on smoking and even racial 
health disparities. 
Elders and Satcher, both counted among the best in the bully pulpit, both also served under 
President Clinton and HHS Secretary Shalala. The majority of the time, Shalala was a hands-off 
administrator who allowed Surgeons General and other health officials great leeway in how they did 
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their job. But both ran into trouble when Clinton faced political turmoil. Clinton called for Elders’ 
resignation in 1994, when he decided she had become too much of a political liability. And Satcher 
was discouraged from issuing a sexual health report late in Clinton’s send term, when the Monica 
Lewinsky scandal was in the newspapers. 
And then of course there’s Carmona, the poster boy for the Long Leash Theory. He was on an 
extremely short leash, especially after his 2003 statement agreeing with a ban on all tobacco 
products. Initially, Carmona worked under HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson, who often acted as 
the main voice for the department. He also served under ASH Cristina Beato, who was described as 
a political ideologue who restricted his access to the press and made sure he didn’t deviate from the 
administration’s script. 
“I was blocked at every turn,” Carmona said in his appearance last summer before Waxman’s 
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. “I was told the decision had already been 
made. ‘Stand Down. Don’t talk about it,’ he said, referring to how issues like stem cell research 
would be addressed by the government. [30] 
Koop was sympathetic. 
“… You’re expecting a Surgeon General who is wearing a muzzle and wrapped in a 
straightjacket to take care of the health of this country, and he can’t do it,” Koop said, in a 2006 
interview shortly before Carmona left office. 
“I never had to fight any of that,” he continued. [31] 
However, he added that he would not have handled the situation the same way Carmona did. 
“I’m a little different kind of character than Carmona. Carmona, he plays by the rules and he’s afraid 
to get fired,” Koop said. [32] 
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The Chorus Theory 
The Chorus Theory holds that how well a Surgeon General stood out was influenced by how 
many other government health officials were speaking to the public at the time and whether what 
they were saying was similar or different from what the Surgeon General was stumping on. 
Under this theory, Koop succeeded in the bully pulpit because he was perceived as the only 
Reagan administration official who was tough on tobacco, who would answer questions on Baby 
Doe, and who would speak frankly about AIDS. 
“Uncorrupted by AIDSpeak, Koop was able to talk in a way that made sense; at last, there was a 
public health official who sounded like a public health official,” wrote Randy Shilts in And The 
Band Played On, as he described how Koop’s report to the nation on AIDS was a watershed moment 
in how the government talked to the public about the disease. [33] 
In the 1990s, the Clinton administration would create the position of National AIDS Policy 
Coordinator – the so-called ‘AIDS Czar.’ Clinton chose Kristine Gebbie, a state health official from 
Washington who had been an outspoken opponent of the Reagan administration on the issue of 
AIDS testing. She was a political appointment and her job was supposed to be largely 
administrative, but “what I ended up doing was being extremely responsive to this incredible flood 
of speaking invitations from around the country,” Gebbie said, in an interview with Office of the 
Public Health Service Historian in 1999. [34] 
“I spent between a third and a half of my time on the road,” speaking, she added. [35] 
Gebbie spoke frankly about the need for needle exchange programs and better sex education, and 
the existence of an AIDS Czar theoretically lessened the need for Elders, the Surgeon General at the 
time, to speak on AIDS as often as Koop had. But Gebbie’s role did little to diminish Elders’ 
visibility. I did a Nexis search for both Gebbie and Elders for the period Aug. 1, 1993, to Aug 1, 
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1994, when both were in office. The search resulted in 422 articles, transcripts and other media 
material that mentioned Gebbie, and 3,312 that involved Elders. 
Gebbie’s tough talk served her no better, in terms of job longevity, than Elders’ did. Gebbie 
resigned under fire in the summer of 1994, after less than a year in the job, issuing a statement that 
the administration hadn’t supplied her with the resources she needed to gain the trust of the AIDS 
community. She was embattled during almost her entire term, with outsiders criticizing her as 
ineffectual and some White House officials complaining she was not doing enough to publicize the 
administration's accomplishments, such as increased funding for research or faster federal approval 
of some AIDS drugs. [36] 
In an interview, Elders acknowledged there were other federal voices on AIDS and other health 
topics during her time in office. But her voice rose above the other because her selection of topics 
included not only AIDS but also controversial subjects like sex, teenage pregnancy and other 
sexually-transmitted diseases. “The media loves controversy. If it’s not controversial, it gets a day or 
two of play and it’s gone,” she said. [37] 
Elders’ comments suggest that the voice of a Surgeon General – a term appointment who 
(technically) cannot be fired without cause – is able to rise above those of serves-at-the-pleasure-of-
the-President political appointments. The Surgeon General has more freedom to discuss 
controversial subjects than those other officials, and the Surgeon General’s office has more historical 
credibility with the media and the general public than many other federal health positions, key 
informants said. 
But other voices do sometimes take center stage, especially if the head of the federal health 
department wants to be primary spokesman. Califano was much more visible than Richmond. A 
Nexis search shows that Sullivan was mentioned in the media more often that Novello in every year 
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of their shared time in office except for 1992, when her fight against the Joe Camel ads was in full 
swing. 
In Carmona’s term, it appears, something a bit more complicated occurred. Carmona served 
under two HHS Secretaries, the vocal Tommy Thompson and the not-as-prominent Mike Leavitt. 
Judging from Carmona’s testimony, his primary challenge was not a stage-hungry HHS Secretary 
but rather muzzling by political appointees in the department. However, another factor was at play as 
well – a talented communicator at the CDC, Dr. Julie Gerberding. 
I searched Nexis for the period Aug. 1, 2002 to Aug. 1, 2006 for three federal health officials 
who all came into office in 2002 – Carmona, the Surgeon General; Gerberding, the CDC Director, 
and Dr. Elias Zerhouni, head of the National Institutes of Health. (I also searched Dr. Anthony 
Fauci, an NIH infectious disease expert who was in office previous to 2002 but is commonly 
mentioned as a respected, Surgeon General-like straight-talker with a high media profile.) 
The results: 
 
Julie Gerberding -- 4,043 hits 
Richard Carmona -- 2,218 hits 
Tony Fauci -- 2,190 hits 
Elias Zerhouni -- 1,542 hits 
 
Wondering if the public has come to think of the position of CDC Director as a more valued 
source than the Surgeon General on public health matters, I also searched David Satcher and Jeffrey 
Koplan for the 1998-to-2002 period they were Surgeon General and CDC Director, respectively. 
The results of that search: 
 
David Satcher -- 5,568 
Jeffrey Koplan -- 1,588 
 
Here’s what I think is going on, based on key informant interviews and other information: The 
CDC Director is the head of the government’s public health agency, and holds administrative 
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responsibilities that once fell under the Surgeon General. The CDC Director has a bully pulpit, and is 
an obvious choice to serve as spokesperson for the government in times of public health 
emergencies. But, as with the Surgeon General, personal characteristics are in play in this equation. 
Koplan was in some respects a Richmond-like figure, sound and quietly influential in his 
science, but not as eager as others to step before the media. During the anthrax attacks in fall 2001, 
he declined to go on 60 Minutes after Bush officials urged him to. [38] It was during that time that 
Gerberding, a lower-tier official, emerged as an eloquent and effective communicator who was 
willing to carry the agency’s message to the media. 
When Koplan left office, Gerberding was tapped to replace him. And though her administration 
has been plagued by internal dissent and morale problems, she has consistently received high marks 
for her communication skills. 
“Jeff Koplan is not a good television personality,” said Dr. David Sencer, who was CDC 
Director in the 1960s and 1970s. “On the other hand, Julie Gerberding came along and she was 
beautiful on television and articulate, so Tommy Thompson just turned to her and did Jeff in.” [39] 
 Members of the media have been impressed by her too, according to responses in my survey of 
U.S. Health journalists. In the survey, respondents ranked Gerberding as far and away the most 
newsworthy and credible among a list of six top federal health officials that included the Surgeon 
General and the HHS Secretary. 
“The CDC is the agency most involved with disease and Julie Gerberding seems to be an honest 
source,” wrote a reporter in her 60s, as part of her survey response. “Honestly I think they’re all 
mouthpieces who are constrained in what they can say. But Julie Gerberding is generally 
straightforward and accurate,” wrote another, 40-something journalist. 
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Carmona was muzzled, but his visibility in the chorus of federal officials was also hurt by 
Gerberding’s respected voice. 
A chorus of voices is a challenge to the Surgeon General’s bully pulpit, and can be a problem for 
the media and general public. In the case of the 2001 anthrax attacks, government’s handling of 
health communications went from one extreme to the other, with Tommy Thompson’s flawed 
performance as the government’s one voice giving way to committees of officials that each talked 
about sub-components of the situation. 
“An explosion of spokespersons” that was too problematic, said Dr. Georges Benjamin, 
executive director of the American Public Health Association. [40] 
“The national public health voice had gotten confused,” he said, adding that the situation was 
preferable in the late 1980s when Koop was the government’s recognized health authority. [41] 
The Great Issue Theory 
One other idea discussed in key informant interviews was ‘the Great Issue Theory,’ in which 
some Surgeons General (like Koop) benefited from unusual circumstances that occurred on their 
watch. 
The theory’s premise borrows from the idea that Abraham Lincoln, considered one of the United 
States’ greatest presidents, was both cursed and blessed by being in office at the time of an unusual 
set of issues and challenges. His wisdom and leadership might not have been as dramatically 
demonstrated had he lived and held office at another time in U.S. history. 
In that vein, Koop may also have been in the right place at the right time. The nation’s AIDS 
crisis erupted during his watch and, after other federal health officials failed to provide effective 
public leadership, Koop assumed that role. 
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In interviews, Koop has agreed that the AIDS crisis was an unusual situation that largely defined 
his term in office. “If ever there was a disease – an opportunity for a command performance, in 
reference to the Surgeon General, AIDS is it!” [42] 
Richmond endorsed this theory as well. 
“So when people ask, ‘How come I hear so much about Dr. Koop and I didn’t hear so much 
about you?’ I say ‘Well, that’s good because we didn’t have a crisis,’” Richmond said. [43] 
“There were some (crises) that we might have had,” he continued. He referred to Three Mile 
Island accident in 1979, in which radioactive gases were released from a Pennsylvania nuclear 
power plant. It might have been a calamity requiring a massive federal public health response that 
would have deeply involved, who was both Surgeon General and the Assistant Secretary for Health. 
But no immediate deaths or injuries resulted. 
“I have often said a book ought to be written about crises avoided. But you don’t ever get public 
credit for that, and some of them you avoid you can’t very well talk about, because the story would 
be told a different way as to who really had the credit for it,” Richmond said. [44] 
Howard Markel, the public health historian, said the Great Issue Theory was a factor in Koop’s 
success. “HIV/AIDS – that was a real watershed moment in how we talked about human sexuality,” 
he said. [45] 
Of course, events like the AIDS crisis don’t erupt every decade, so while it may have helped 
distinguish Koop, we must look to other theories to judge the merits of say, Satcher as compared to 
Carmona, or Elders as contrasted with Novello. 
Markel said there are other aspects of timing to consider. Yes, being in office at the time of a 
major public health crisis can impact a Surgeon General’s bully pulpit importance. But another 
factor is whether a Surgeon General hits the right topic at the appropriate moment in history. 
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“The time has to be right where people are receptive to hearing about it. Twenty years ago, 
obesity was not as huge a problem, but it was a problem. I don’t think people were ready to hear 
that” then, he said. [46] 
Plus, Koop was probably not the right person to deliver that message. “You could conceive of a 
situation where someone is saying ‘Don’t get fat’ or ‘Don’t eat too much,’ and they might be heavy 
themselves. Koop, for example, wasn’t exactly thin. That may not have been the best cause for him,” 
Markel said. [47] 
Markel’s thoughts make sense. Timing is important. As a journalist who makes daily decisions 
about what is and is not “news” appropriate for the national wire, I weigh what officials say, 
checking whether it’s significantly different from prior statements and previously released 
information. I also consider reader interest, as demonstrated through how earlier stories on a topic 
played in the media. 
The American Public Health Association’s Georges Benjamin said part of Carmona’s problem 
was he focused on issues that fell on reporters’ deaf ears. He has a point. Racial health disparities, 
though an important topic that deserves continuing coverage, is not as ground-breaking an issue as 
when Novello, Elders and Satcher discussed it. Reporters have been hearing about it for more than a 
decade, and we now have fairly extensive research documenting how the problem plays out. The 
problem has been reported, repeatedly. It’s old news. 
Carmon’s emphasis on documenting family health histories is also important, but it’s a story 
easily told once. Issues that have an enduring presence in the media are those that have many facets, 
or that change significantly as new information or research emerges or – yes, Elders is right – are 
controversial. Stem cell research was a natural topic for someone in Carmona’s position to take on, 
to offer authoritative guidance to a public policy discussion confused by evolving science and strong 
210 
and opposing points of view from other prominent voices. Had Carmona spoken to the media on that 
topic, it’s likely he would have been extremely visible. 
The Bush administration last year nominated Dr. James W. Holsinger Jr. to serve as the next 
Surgeon General. A confirmation hearing was held last July, but the nomination has been on hold 
since then. Senate officials asked for more information from Holsinger before moving forward. The 
Bush administration, so far, has not provided it, said David Bowen, a key aide to Sen. Edward 
Kennedy. [48] 
While considering Holsinger and other candidates, Bush administration officials had already set 
an agenda for the next Surgeon General. “When President Bush nominated Dr. Holsinger for the 
position of Surgeon General, he specifically charged him with working on the childhood obesity 
issue,” HHS spokeswoman Rebecca Ayer told me. [49] 
Ayer said that topic was selected because of its impact on the nation’s health and because it 
would continue public health efforts that were already underway. When I asked other key informants 
why they thought the topic was selected, some said other reasons might explain it. 
“You want the cynical answer?” said Jerry Farrell, of the Commissioned Officers Association. 
“The cynical answer is because that’s one way of channeling him to make sure he doesn’t talk about 
anything that might make the Administration uncomfortable.” [50] 
Conclusions 
Nearly ever key informant I asked said a combination of factors explains why some Surgeons 
General thrive in the bully pulpit while others do not. 
Everyone, Koop included, said a long leash is a necessity. Although a Surgeon General is 
appointed for a four-year term and theoretically cannot be removed from office for saying something 
the White House or HHS Secretary doesn’t like, the fact is politicians and their appointees can 
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isolate a Surgeon General from the media, interfere with his or her ability to respond to speaking 
invitations and silence a Surgeon General or cause him or her to leave office in frustration. 
The Great Man Theory is also applicable. Koop was praised from all quarters for having a 
variety of attributes that served him well. Many lauded not only his charisma and gravitas but also 
his integrity. Novello saw in him an admirable skill in navigating tricky political waters. Sencer, 
conversely, thought Koop was special because of his ‘Damn the torpedoes’ attitude which enabled 
him to carve out a role for the Surgeon General that hadn’t really been seen before. 
“The bully pulpit didn’t really come about until Koop,” Sencer said. [51] 
Setting Koop’s remarkable example aside, one can still argue that personal attributes helped 
distinguish one Surgeon General from another. Steinfeld and Carmona both served under Republican 
presidential administrations that were notoriously guarded in their dealings with the media. 
Steinfeld, a self-described zealot who refused to accept a second-banana role in his department, 
became a high-profile Surgeon General who ignited important national discussions about the 
influence of television on children and the dangers of secondhand tobacco smoke. Carmona, who 
was accustomed to military chain of command and was happy just to be there, accepted the 
restrictions placed upon him by political appointees and was – many say – a non-presence. 
In fairness, comparisons are difficult. In Steinfeld’s case, the role of Assistant Secretary for 
Health was very much in its infancy then. Arguably, he had more latitude to carve out a role in an 
unsettled terrain like that than did Carmona, who came on board well into Bush’s first term. The 
individuals were different as well, and perhaps Carmona, transported through time, might have been 
bolder in the Nixon administration than he was under Bush. It’s impossible to know. 
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The Chorus Theory, though worthy of consideration, can be thought of as a variation on the 
Great Man and Long Leash theories. Alternative voices succeed or fail for the same reasons 
Surgeons General do. 
Julie Gerberding had a more visible bully pulpit than Carmona did. Her skills as a speaker are 
uncontested, but Carmona is a good speaker, too. Her success came from not only her personal 
attributes but also from the Bush administration’s willingness to let her take center stage on a wide 
variety of health topics. 
Tony Fauci has been an important national voice on AIDS and infectious diseases since the 
1980s, and has been a leading voice on many other issues as well. He was one of the first officials 
brought up to the dais during the anthrax letters crisis after HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson 
stumbled. “What he (Fauci) does is takes a complex issue and he speaks about it in English that the 
average finds accessible. And he answers tough questions and is willing to say ‘We don’t know all 
of that right now,’” said Kim Elliott, of Trust for America’s Health. “He would be the perfect 
Surgeon General.” [52] 
The Great Issue Theory helped Koop, but doesn’t explain the high profiles of Surgeons General 
like Satcher, who made news with important reports on subjects like mental health, or Elders, who 
generated headlines simply by saying what no one else would. 
In summary, I believe the Great Man and Long Leash theories best explain the respective bully 
pulpit performance of the nation’s last seven Surgeons General. Any proposal to strengthen the 
Office of the Surgeon General must bear those theories in mind. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
PROPOSAL 
 
DISCUSSION 
My research concluded that the ability of Surgeons General to use the bully pulpit has 
been affected by political meddling, resource constraints and – some would argue – the 
selection of sub-optimal people for the job. 
If the Office of the Surgeon General is to be maintained, and if policy makers decide the 
Surgeon General’s bully pulpit should be enhanced, then those three issues must be 
addressed. 
My proposal targets those concerns. 
Why We Need A Surgeon General 
Before I discuss my proposal, I’ll note that there are a variety of opinions on whether the 
Surgeon General still has a place in U.S. society.  
Conservative pundits have referred to the position as ‘the nation’s nanny’ – an 
unnecessary scold who gets paid by the government to tell people what to eat and tsk-tsk 
them about smoking and drinking. And periodically there have been legislative and executive 
attempts to sunset the office and do away with the Commissioned Corps that falls under it. 
Even some former health officials who admired past Surgeons General say that shuttering 
the office may not be such a bad idea. 
“I sort of suspect the Surgeon General thing has had its time,” said Hale Champion, the 
former HEW undersecretary for health during the Carter Administration. [1] 
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He said the mystique of the office has faded in recent years. More and more people 
understand that the Surgeon General is a paper tiger with no real power, he added. And it’s 
become clear that some of the people who would be best in the job don’t want it because of 
concerns about political meddling or because they would have to give up too much power 
and income in their current jobs to take a Surgeon General position that pays about $148,000 
a year in base salary. [2] 
Champion and former CDC Director David Sencer said they feel that officials at the CDC 
should perhaps take complete control of the federal bully pulpit on matters of public health. 
“There are some very able people at the CDC,” Champion said. [3] 
Most of the key informants I interviewed, however, said it is a crucial position with the 
power to drive national conversations about health policy and educate the public about 
dangerous threats. 
What’s more, most said, is that changes are need not only to preserve the office but to 
make sure Surgeons General are unfettered in their ability to address important health issues 
and bring accurate and uncensored information to the public’s attention. 
“I think it’s an imperative public health issue that we corral this problem and fix it as 
soon as possible,” said the University of Michigan’s Howard Markel. “I think we have to 
come up with safeguards that are as ironclad as possible… because our health depends on it.” 
[4] 
Under the best of circumstances, the Surgeon General is a one-of-a-kind position in U.S. 
public health, an ombudsman-like figure that can help the public cut through the growing 
mass of medical studies, government announcements and other information. It is a trusted 
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authority who can offer guidance not only on life-enhancing personal behavior but also on 
evidence-based public policy. 
The Surgeon General should not be the spokesperson for the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services on all public health matters. The Department already has officials who 
can act as spokespersons on specific health topics, and it is inevitable – and, at times, logical 
– that the department will use people other than the Surgeon General to inform the public on 
certain topics. The CDC Director or one of her investigators may have the most complete and 
up-to-date information on a disease outbreak as it first unravels. An NIH official may be best 
suited to explain the intricacies of a brand-new scientific discovery. The HHS Secretary has 
the right to present a policy initiative that he or the President designed. 
These people handle the breaking news, that’s fine. But the Surgeon General must be able 
to come in after – sometimes right after – and review what the other officials said, interpret 
the information and turn it into guidance for the public. If a CDC study is poorly done, the 
Surgeon General must be free to question it. If a President adopts a health policy that 
contradicts scientific consensus, the Surgeon General must be allowed to say the President is 
wrong. The Surgeon General is not – or, rather should not be – subject to the political 
controls faced by the CDC Director or other officials. 
What Can Be Done 
But how can we make sure that each Surgeon General is protected enough so that they 
can be unrestricted and uncensored enough to do such work? Even Koop and Satcher – the 
most accomplished in the bully pulpit since Thomas Parran – had to struggle to get reports 
out, with Koop circumventing White House review to get his AIDS report out, and Satcher 
having to delay his sexual health report until Clinton left the White House. 
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Former HEW Secretary Joseph Califano said there is nothing that can be done. He 
dismissed recent House and Senate bills designed to offer such protections as a waste of time. 
“I don’t think laws like that do a lot of good in the real world. You’ve got to get the right 
President and you’ve got to get the right Surgeon General. There are all kinds of things in the 
federal government that are ‘insulated.’ It doesn’t work,” he said. [5] 
It’s instructive to look at some instances where Congress designed certain other 
ombudsman-like federal positions and tried to insulate and protect them from political 
meddling and censorship. 
I’ll explore two examples – the head of the Government Accountability Office, and the 
Inspectors General of various federal agencies. 
The GAO, as it is called for short, is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for 
Congress and is charged with investigating how the federal government spends taxpayer 
dollars. The head of the GAO – the Comptroller General – is appointed to a 15-year term by 
the President from a slate of candidates proposed by Congress. The lengthy term is designed 
to give the office a level of independence that is rare within the government, and he or she 
can only be removed for reasons of malfeasance or misfeasance through a joint-resolution of 
Congress. The GAO’s annual budget, currently about $490 million, is appropriated by 
Congress and cannot be restricted by the Executive Branch. 
The Inspectors General are positions established within federal agencies to investigate 
fraud and abuse. The Inspector General Act of 1978 gave IGs direct access to records and 
information, and authorized them to conduct whatever investigations they deems appropriate 
and to hire and control their own staff and contract resources. The President nominates IGs at 
Cabinet-level departments. Only a President can remove an IG, and both Houses of Congress 
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must be notified if that occurs. Although the IG is under the general supervision of the 
Secretary over his or her Department, the IG has an independent relationship with Congress. 
Aspects of the Inspector General Act were echoed last year in two bills that were 
introduced regarding the Surgeon General. 
The bills came on the heels of the July testimony by former Surgeon General Richard 
Carmona, who testified he was muzzled during his entire four-year term in office. He said he 
was walled off from media interviews, that his speeches were scripted and several of his 
reports suppressed. 
On August 3, U.S. Rep. Henry Waxman introduced H.R. 3447 – called ‘the Surgeon 
General Independence Act.’ 
The bill would keep the Surgeon General's term in office at four years, appointed by the 
president from a list of six nominees presented by the HHS Secretary. (Currently, the 
Secretary can nominate any physician.) 
Under Waxman’s bill, the Secretary’s list of six nominees would have to include at least 
three names compiled by a committee of Commissioned Corps officers that makes 
recommendations for promotions to senior rank. (In the bill, that entity is referred to as the 
‘Regular Corp,’ the Corps’ official name.) In other words, at least three nominees would 
have to be members of the Commissioned Corps. 
The bill would have the Surgeon General submit a budget proposal directly to the 
President for review and submission to Congress. He or she would have permission to hire 
and fire a staff of his choosing. 
The Surgeon General would issue an annual report to Congress on the state of the nation's 
health, the bill also says. He shall choose the topics of the reports, calls to action and other 
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communications he issues based on his professional judgment. Only the HHS Secretary 
could disapprove issuance of a Surgeon General's report, call to action or other 
communication. But to disapprove such a communication would entail the Secretary 
providing a full explanation to Congress about the reasons why. 
That bill, with 13 cosponsors, is currently sitting in the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee. 
Waxman was not the first out of the gate, however. On July 12, only two days after 
Carmona’s testimony, Sen. Edward Kennedy introduced S. 1777 – the ‘Surgeon General 
Integrity Restoration Act.’ 
The bill would keep the Surgeon General's term in office at four years, appointed by the 
President from a list of ten names provided by the Institute of Medicine. There are no 
requirements that any of them be members of the Commissioned Corps. 
The matter of the budget for the Office of the Surgeon General was handled in a similar 
manner as Waxman's bill. The Secretary is afforded an opportunity to comment, but not 
change, the budget proposal. It is also says that the budget proposal must be made available 
not only to members of Congress but also to the general public. 
It says the Surgeon General may submit the draft of any report or speech to the Secretary 
or other members of HHS for comment, but the Surgeon General can release the report or 
deliver the speech regardless of any objection that is raised. 
It also says the Surgeon General can hire his own staff or consultants without obtaining 
Department clearance. And it prohibits any modification or censorship of a Surgeon 
General's work product for political reasons. 
There is much to admire in the proposals, but I would make some changes. 
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First, I believe the term of office should be lengthened. 
The Comptroller General is appointed to a 15-year term because it gives the office a level 
of independence and continuity of leadership that can stand apart from the political 
scaffolding erected by any specific President. I am not suggesting 15 years for a Surgeon 
General – there is a potential downside in having an individual in office that long, should he 
or she prove to be a milquetoast, an incompetent or worse. But four years is not long enough, 
judging from the experience of many Surgeons General in the last 40 years. 
For various reasons, Koop didn’t really hit his stride in the office until his second term. 
Carmona wasn’t able to set out his reports on global health and other key issues in four years. 
And Steinfeld, despite his ambitions for the office, was thwarted in part by a term that ended 
too soon. 
“Jesse wasn’t there long enough to have much impact,” said former U.S. health official 
Dr. Charles C. Edwards, in a 1988 interview with the Office of the Public Health Service 
Historian. [6] 
I propose a Senate-like term of six years. It’s only a little longer than the current term, but 
guarantees a Surgeon General will outlive a one-term President and his or her political 
cronies, should they become an obstacle in the Surgeon General’s performance as 
ombudsman. 
I would also borrow language from the Inspector General legislation to make sure the 
Surgeon General is guaranteed complete access to scientific research and expert personnel at 
HHS agencies. 
I would specify that the Surgeon General may not hold another appointment while in 
office. 
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Both Richmond and Satcher held the position of Assistant Secretary for Health as well as 
Surgeon General, a situation that afforded them more funding, staffing and administrative 
power than they would have had serving solely as Surgeon General. Satcher felt the 
arrangement made sense for him at that point in history, given the politics of the time and the 
need to re-establish the visibility and productivity of the Office of the Surgeon General after 
the office had been vacant of a permanent appointment for four years. But even he and others 
noted an ASH is pulled by political considerations and a good Surgeon General by other 
motivations. Asked in an interview if a Surgeon General today should also serve as ASH, 
Satcher replied; “That’s not my preference.” [7] 
If a Surgeon General is granted an adequate budget and an independent staff, as is 
provided for in the Waxman and Kennedy bills, then there’s no need for a Surgeon General 
to hold a political appointment. 
My last change would have to do with how candidates are selected in the nomination 
process. 
Choosing the right individual for the job is absolutely crucial. In this age, a Surgeon 
General must be an authoritative and talented communicator who is comfortable with the 
press and who will give a frank and accurate assessment of science and health issues, no 
matter the circumstances. 
I found it interesting that several key informants – including Koop, Elders and Sencer – 
shared the opinion that a Surgeon General has to be accomplished enough and determined 
enough to be willing to walk away from the job if his or her ability to speak truth to power is 
compromised. “You’ve got to have a person who is willing to make decisions and be willing 
to lose a job if it is necessary to make a right decision,” Sencer said. [8] 
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Koop and Elders, the best remembered Surgeons General of the last 40 years, both said 
they had the mindset that building and maintaining credibility with the public was 
paramount. 
“… The first week I was in Washington, in an interview with the press, I said ‘If I am 
ever asked to say something that I do not believe, I will go home. And if ever I am asked not 
to say something that I do believe, I will go home,’” Koop said. [9] 
“I think it’s an important attitude to have… I felt I was the people’s Surgeon General and 
I was there to serve and work in their best interest. I was not the President’s Surgeon General 
or the Congress’s Surgeon General,” Elders said. [10] 
What is the best way to find such a person? 
The Senate bill would place selection of the list of nominees in the hands of the Institute 
of Medicine, a nonprofit organization chartered in 1970 to serve as a national source for 
unbiased, science-based advice on matters of biomedical science, medicine and health. Its 
membership includes a lengthy and esteemed list of researchers and policy experts, most of 
them from universities. 
The House bill leaves it to the Secretary to come up with as many as three nominees on 
his own, and at least three nominees from the ranks of the Commissioned Corps. It’s a 
proposal that honors the tradition behind the Office of the Surgeon General, recalling an era 
when Surgeons General always worked their way up through the Corps’ ranks. It also 
recognizes that the Surgeon General is the official head of the Corps, and a Corps member 
would better understand that aspect of the job. 
I would suggest another option. 
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My idea is borrowed from Jeff Koplan, the former CDC Director, in a key informant 
interview. Koplan was explaining why he thought Elders was very qualified for the job when 
she came in. She “had previously been the state health director in Arkansas, and to me that’s 
worth a lot… it’s a logical stepping stone to be a state health department director and move 
to a national level in a parallel role,” he said. [11] 
I don’t believe that former state health directors automatically make the best Surgeons 
General. But the pulpit power of Elders and the accomplishments of Satcher suggest to me 
that experience as the head of state or federal public health agencies – and all the dealings 
with the media that are attendant – is as or more important than being respected by the 
Institute of Medicine or the Commissioned Corps. 
I therefore would argue that the list of nominees should be drawn up by the nation’s 
leading public health organizations. A list of six nominees should be presented to the 
president. Two would come from the American Public Health Association. Two would come 
from the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials. And one would come from the 
National Association of County & City Health Officials. 
These organizations would not be required, or even encouraged, to draw nominees from 
their own memberships. But they would be expected to forward names of people who had 
stood in a public health bully pulpit before and performed admirably. 
Regarding Kennedy’s idea of relying on the Institute of Medicine, I would speculate that 
such a body is more likely to recommend a Richmond-like personality than a Koop or 
Satcher. Richmond had many attributes, but if we’re looking for someone to move the 
masses, we need someone who will not only put together important reports but also will sell 
them (so to speak). 
226 
Regarding Waxman’s use of the Commissioned Corps, I have questions about the Corps 
provides a broad enough talent pool for such an important position and whether the culture of 
the Corps is one that nurtures a spirit of speaking truth to power. 
In recent months, Jerry Farrell – the executive director of the Commissioned Officers 
Association – has complained in the organization’s monthly newsletter about Corps members 
who had communicated directly with Congress about their unhappiness with recent uniform 
and grooming rules. “Approaching Congress about personal preference issues for uniforms 
and grooming standards is not only silly, it may violate regulations that prohibit federal 
employees from lobbying the legislative branch,” Farrell wrote, in the November 2007 issue 
of the Association’s COA Frontline newsletter. [12] 
His comments were not well received by some federal health officials, who said they saw 
a troubling philosophical underpinning to Farrell’s words. “Although we may agree with 
Jerry Farrell… regarding both the content and manner these opinions have been expressed, 
we must also dissociate ourselves with the view that dissent can only be directed through the 
chain of command. The position that CC Officers give up their freedom of expression when 
joining the Corps is seriously wrong,” according to an unsigned, March 3, 2008 positing on a 
blog for CDC employees. [13] 
Here then (on the next page) is my bill. I used as a basis the Waxman proposal, which is 
more detailed than Kennedy’s bill. Much of the wording is borrowed verbatim from the 
current Waxman legislation.  My additions and changes are in bold type and underlined. 
A BILL 
 
To amend the Public Health Service Act to ensure the independence of the Surgeon 
General from political interference. 
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Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America 
in Congress assembled, 
 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
 
This Act may be cited as 'the Surgeon General’s Bully Pulpit Act’. 
 
SECTION 2. INDEPENDENCE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC 
HEALTH SERVIVE 
 
(a) In General – Section 204 of the Public Health Service Act 942 US.C. 205) is 
amended to read as follows: 
 
SURGEON GENERAL 
 
Sec. 204. (a) Appointment: 
 
(1) IN GENERAL – The Surgeon General shall be appointed for a 6-
year term by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
 
(2) REQUIREMENTS FOR APPOINTMENT – The Surgeon General 
shall be appointed from individuals who – 
 
(A) are licensed physicians with specialized training and 
significant experience in public health. 
(B) are, or agree upon appointment to become, members of 
the Regulars Corps; and 
(C) are nominated by the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services pursuant to paragraph (3). 
 
(3) NOMINATIONS – The Secretary shall submit to the President a list of 
five nominees, who meet the requirements of paragraph (2) Two of those 
names must be recommended by the American Public Health 
Association; two must be recommended by the Association of State and 
Territorial Health Officials; and one must be the recommendation of the 
National Association of County & City Health Officials. The Secretary 
shall forward such list to the President, the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Health, 
Education, labor and Pensions of the Senate. 
 
(4) TERM LIMIT – An individual shall serve no more than three full 
terms as Surgeon General. 
 
(5) GRADE AND NUMBER – Upon expiration of an individual’s service 
as the Surgeon General, the individual, unless reappointed, shall revert to the 
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grade and number in the Regular Corps or Reserve Corps which the individual 
would have occupied if not for such service. 
 
(6) CONCOMITANT SERVICE – The Surgeon General will not be 
permitted to hold any other administrative position or office within HHS 
or any other federal agency or department during his/her term(s). 
 
(b) Removal – The President may only remove the Surgeon General during a term 
for cause. If a Surgeon General is removed, the Secretary shall provide to the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions of the Senate a written 
explanation as to the cause for the removal. 
 
(c)Line of Authority – Notwithstanding section 201, the Surgeon General, under 
the supervision and direction of the Secretary, shall administer the Office of the 
Surgeon General, the Regular Corps and the Reserve Corps. 
 
(d) Budget Authority – Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for each 
fiscal year, the Surgeon General shall prepare and submit, directly to the President for 
review and transmittal to the Congress, an annual budget estimate (including the 
number and type of personnel needs for the Surgeon General) for the Office of the 
Surgeon General, after reasonable opportunity for comment (but without change) by 
the Secretary. That proposal shall also be made available to the general public. 
 
(e) Staff – Subject to the availability of appropriations, the provisions of this title, 
and applicable federal civil service laws, the Surgeon General shall have the authority 
to hire and terminate employees of and consultants to the Office of the Surgeon 
General without obtaining approval by, or clearance from, any employee or 
consultant to the Department of Health and Human Services. 
 
(f) Reports, Calls to Action, and Other Communications – 
 
(1) IN GENERAL – The Surgeon General shall from time to time 
issue reports, calls to action and other communications on matters of 
importance to the health of the American people. 
 
(2) ANNUAL REPORT – In carrying out paragraph (1), the 
Surgeon General shall submit to the Congress and make publicly available 
an annual report on the state of the nation’s health. Each such report shall 
include an analysis of the potential impact of global health trends on the 
nation’s health. 
 
(3) PUBLIC HEALTH SCIENCE – The reports, calls to action, 
and other communications issued under paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be 
based on the Surgeon General’s professional judgment regarding the best 
available public health science. 
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(4) ACCESS TO SCIENCE – To ensure access to the best 
available public health science, the Surgeon General is authorized to 
have access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, 
recommendations or other material available on whichever matters of 
medicine or public health he/she deems necessary to carry out his/her 
duties. 
 
(5) ROLE OF THE SECRETARY – The Secretary shall have 
exclusive authority to disapprove the issuance of a report, call to action or 
other communication proposed by the Surgeon General. If the Secretary 
disapproves the issuance of a report, call to action or other communication 
proposed by the Surgeon General, the Secretary shall, within five days of 
disapproval, submit to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the 
House of Representatives and the Committee on Health, Education, Labor 
and Pensions of the Senate a full explanation of the reasons for such 
disapproval. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: IRB Consent Form 
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill 
Consent to Participate in a Research Study 
Adult Participants  
Consent Form 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
IRB Study # 
Consent Form Version Date: 08-20-07 
Title of Study: The Surgeon General and the Bully Pulpit 
 
Principal Investigator: Mike Stobbe, MPH, MSJ. 
UNC-Chapel Hill Department: Health Policy and Administration 
Email Address: MikeStobbe@gmail.com 
Faculty Advisor:  Ned Brooks 
Funding Source: None 
 
Study Contact telephone number:  404.377.9180 
Study Contact email:  MikeStobbe@aol.com 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
What are some general things you should know about research studies? 
 
You are being asked to take part in a research study.  To join the study is voluntary.  You 
may refuse to join, or you may withdraw your consent to be in the study, for any reason, 
without penalty. 
 
Research studies are designed to obtain new knowledge. This new information may help 
people in the future.   You may not receive any direct benefit from being in the research 
study. There also may be risks to being in research studies. 
 
Details about this study are discussed below.  It is important that you understand this 
information so that you can make an informed choice about being in this research study. 
 
You will be given a copy of this consent form.  You should ask the researchers named above 
any questions you have about this study at any time. 
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
We want to how the Surgeon General and other health officials influence public attitudes 
toward health risks and behaviors through speeches and other communications with the 
public. We are doing this study as part of a dissertation project. 
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How many people will take part in this study? 
If you decide to be in this study, you will be one of dozens of key informants interviewed as 
part of this research study. 
 
How long will your part in this study last? 
The interview will take about one hour.  You can choose to stop the interview at any time. 
 
What will happen if you take part in the study? 
We will ask you to discuss your experiences, observations and knowledge concerning the 
office of the Surgeon General, the Surgeon General’s role in the U.S. government public 
health efforts, and the Surgeon General’s efforts to communicate with the media and the 
public. You may also be asked about the role of other public health officials relating to the 
Surgeon General’s communication efforts. 
 
What are the possible benefits from being in this study? 
Research is designed to benefit society by gaining new knowledge.  Your participation is 
important to help us understand how public health can be influenced through 
communications from public health officials, but you may not benefit personally from being 
in this research study. 
 
What are the possible risks or discomforts involved from being in this study? 
We do not think you will experience any risks or discomforts during the interview or 
afterward. You may stop the interview at any time, and may request that certain information 
be treated as “on background” information that will not be attributed to you in any way. 
 
How will your privacy be protected? 
In addition to being used for the dissertation, information from the interview might also be 
used for a future book or piece of journalism on the subject by Mike Stobbe. It is assumed 
that information that you provide is eligible for inclusion in both works. 
 
We would like to tape record the interview so that we can more completely and more 
accurately capture your comments. However, you will not be taped without your prior 
knowledge and consent. A transcript of the audiotape will be provided to you as part of an 
accuracy check. 
 
During the interview, you may ask to speak “on background” if you wish to provide 
information that you do not wish attributed to you. If such an occasion arises, please stop the 
interview and discuss with Stobbe your wishes to say something “on background.” If you and 
Stobbe both agree, the information will not be attributed to you, and Stobbe will not divulge 
your role as source of that information to anyone. However, he will take notes in order to 
remember the information. 
 
We will not make copies of our written notes, which will be kept in a locked filing cabinet in 
Stobbe’s home. We will secure any electronic files by password protecting them on our 
computers. Handwritten notes and other documents will be kept in a locked filing cabinet in 
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Stobbe’s home. If you wish to review a transcript of the interview, Stobbe will work with you 
to make sure it is delivered in a secure fashion. 
 
Will you receive anything for being in this study? 
You will not receive anything for taking part in this study. 
 
Will it cost you anything to be in this study? 
There will be no costs for being in the study 
 
What if you have questions about this study? 
You have the right to ask, and have answered, any questions you may have about this 
research. If you have questions, or concerns, you should contact the researchers listed on the 
first page of this form. 
 
What if you have questions about your rights as a research participant? 
All research on human volunteers is reviewed by a committee that works to protect your 
rights and welfare.  If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject 
you may contact, anonymously if you wish, the Public Health Institutional Review Board at 
919-966-9347 or by email to IRB_subjects@unc.edu. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
 
Participant’s Agreement: 
 
I have read the information provided above.  I have asked all the questions I have at this time.  
I voluntarily agree to participate in this research study. 
 
_________________________________________ _________________ 
Signature of Research Participant Date 
 
_________________________________________ 
Printed Name of Research Participant 
 
 
_________________________________________ _________________ 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent Date 
 
_________________________________________ 
Printed Name of Person Obtaining Consent 
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Appendix B: IRB / Guiding Questions For Key Informants 
 
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill 
Questions for Key Informants 
________________________________________________________________________ 
IRB Study # Consent Form Version Date: 08-20-07 
 
Title of Study: The Surgeon General and the Bully Pulpit 
 
Principal Investigator: Mike Stobbe, MPH, MSJ. 
UNC-Chapel Hill Department: Health Policy and Administration 
Faculty Advisor: Ned Brooks 
 
Study Contact telephone number:  404.377.9180 
Study Contact email:  MikeStobbe@aol.com 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please state your name, current city of residence and current title or occupation. 
 
Please briefly describe any past jobs or positions that would have given you knowledge about 
the Office of the U.S. Surgeon General. Please describe when you held that position or those 
positions. 
 
Please share any observations about how the Surgeon General of that time viewed his or her 
“bully pulpit” role. 
 
Please share observations about people, policies or other factors that may have motivated the 
Surgeon General to seek to speak to the media or public gatherings in an effort to influence 
public opinion or behaviors. 
 
Please share observations about people, policies or other factors that may have served as 
obstacle or deterrents to the Surgeon General in his or her efforts to speak to the media or 
public gatherings in an effort to influence public opinion or behaviors. 
 
Please share observations about any coordination or competition between the Surgeon 
General and other government public health officials in delivering public health messages to 
the public. 
 
Please assess the effectiveness of the current Surgeon General in communicating with, and 
persuading, the public. Contrast that with the effectiveness of past Surgeons General, and say 
why you think the current office holder is more or less effective (including personal 
characteristics, organizational and environmental restrictions or assets, etc.). 
 
Are there any organizational or environmental factors that suggest future Surgeons General 
will become more or less effective in their “bully pulpit” role? Please explain. 
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Can a Surgeon General be influential without being highly visible? Please explain. 
 
Were you aware of polling results or other information at the time you (or the Surgeon 
General in question) were in office that spoke to how you/they were perceived by the public? 
 
Were you (or the Surgeon General in question) advised or warned not to discuss certain 
topics? Were your (or his/her) attempts to generate a Surgeon’s General report on a certain 
topic blocked? Please tell what happened. 
 
How much direction did you (or he/she) receive from other HHS or Administration officials 
about what topics to address in the Surgeon General’s bully pulpit capacity? Did you (he/she) 
need clearance before doing public speaking or doing press interviews? If yes, please 
elaborate. 
 
Tell me a story of when you believe you had the greatest influence, and how you exercised 
that influence. 
 
Tell me of your most concerted effort to influence policy or opinion that did NOT succeed, 
and discuss why you think it didn’t? 
 
What was the most controversial moment in your (his/her) tenure? 
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Appendix C: IRB / Fact Sheet For Key Informants 
 
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill 
Information about a Research Study 
________________________________________________________________________ 
IRB Study # Consent Form Version Date: 08-20-07 
 
Title of Study: The Surgeon General and the Bully Pulpit 
 
Principal Investigator: Mike Stobbe, MPH, MSJ. 
UNC-Chapel Hill Department: Health Policy and Administration 
Faculty Advisor: Ned Brooks 
 
Study Contact telephone number:  404.377.9180 
Study Contact email:  MikeStobbe@aol.com 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
What are some general things you should know about research studies? 
You are being asked to take part in a research study.  To join the study is voluntary.  You 
may refuse to join, or you may withdraw your consent to be in the study, for any reason, 
without penalty. 
 
Research studies are designed to obtain new knowledge. This new information may help 
people in the future.   You may not receive any direct benefit from being in the research 
study. There also may be risks to being in research studies. 
 
Details about this study are discussed below.  It is important that you understand this 
information so that you can make an informed choice about being in this research study.  
You will be given a copy of this consent form.  You should ask the researchers named above 
any questions you have about this study at any time. 
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
We want to how the Surgeon General and other health officials influence public attitudes 
toward health risks and behaviors through speeches and other communications with the 
public. We are doing this study as part of a dissertation project. 
 
How many people will take part in this study? 
If you decide to be in this study, you will be one of dozens of key informants interviewed as 
part of this research study. 
 
How long will your part in this study last? 
The interview will take about one hour.  You can choose to stop the interview at any time. 
 
What will happen if you take part in the study 
We will ask you to discuss your experiences, observations and knowledge concerning the 
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office of the Surgeon General, the Surgeon General’s role in the U.S. government public 
health efforts, and the Surgeon General’s efforts to communicate with the media and the 
public. You may also be asked about the role of other public health officials relating to the 
Surgeon General’s communication efforts. 
 
After the interview but before the project is completed, the investigator will send you a 
transcript of your interview. You will be asked to read it as part of a check for accuracy. 
 
What are the possible benefits from being in this study? 
Research is designed to benefit society by gaining new knowledge.  Your participation is 
important to help us understand how public health can be influenced through 
communications from public health officials, but you may not benefit personally from being 
in this research study. 
 
What are the possible risks or discomforts involved from being in this study? 
We do not think you will experience any risks or discomforts during the interview or 
afterward. You may stop the interview at any time, and may request that certain information 
be treated as “on background” information that will not be attributed to you in any way. 
 
How will your privacy be protected? 
In writing up our notes, we will record your gender and some other personally identifying 
information. In addition to being used for the dissertation, information from the interview 
might also be used for a future book or piece of journalism on the subject by Mike Stobbe. It 
is assumed that information that you provide is eligible for inclusion in both works. 
However, you may ask to speak “on background” if you wish to provide information that you 
do not wish attributed to you. If you and Stobbe both agree, the information will not be 
attributed to you, and Stobbe will not divulge your role as source of that information to 
anyone. All notes will be locked in a filing cabinet or kept on Stobbe’s password-secured 
computer. 
 
As a research subject, however, you always have the right to withdraw your participation in 
the study. 
 
Will you receive anything for being in this study? 
We are not going to pay you for your information, but your information is very important to 
us. 
 
Will it cost you anything to be in this study? 
There are no costs for being in the study. 
 
What if you have questions about this study? 
You have the right to ask, and have answered, any questions you may have about this 
research. If you have questions, or concerns, you should contact the Principal Investigator at 
404.558.1084 during regular business hours. You can also contact him at the email address 
listed above. 
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What if you have questions about your rights as a research participant? 
All research on human volunteers is reviewed by a committee that works to protect your 
rights and welfare.  If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject 
you may contact, anonymously if you wish, the Public Health Institutional Review Board at 
919-966-9347 or by email to IRB_subjects@unc.edu. 
 
Thank you for helping us with this study. 
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APPENDIX D: SALUTATION, QUESTIONS FOR JOURNALISTS’ SURVEY 
 
Dear Health Journalist, 
 
Hi, this is from Mike Stobbe, the Associated Press reporter who covers the CDC. I’m also 
membership co-chair with the Association of Health Care Journalists. I’m pursing a doctoral 
degree right now, and was hoping you could help me on this project by completing this brief 
survey. 
 
The question I’d trying to address: Which government health officials have the most 
credibility and speak with the most authority, and how did that come to be?  I’m exploring 
this question through interviews and looking at historical documents, but believe a 
confidential and anonymous survey of health journalists would also help me. 
 
Please take a few minutes to do this. As you know from covering health and medicine, the 
larger the sample size, the stronger the data, so every response is important. The responses 
will be anonymous. Participating in the survey should take between five and ten minutes. The 
overall results will be used in a study to be submitted for presentation and publication. 
 
Taking the 
 
If you have any questions about the project, please contact me at 404.558.1084 or at 
mikestobbe@gmail.com. 
 
Thanks in advance for your help. 
 
 
Mike Stobbe 
Doctoral candidate, the University of North Carolina School of Public Health 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This confidential survey is part of a doctoral dissertation research project. A general theme of 
the project is how the federal government communicates important public health messages to 
the public, including communications with and through the media. It is hoped the research 
will provide the public with insight into how the government makes decisions about how to 
carry out such communications. 
 
The survey should take no more than 10 minutes to complete. The risk of completing it is no 
greater than what is involved in other every day activities. The cost to participating is only 
the time spent answering the questions. There is no reimbursement or payment for your 
participation. 
 
The survey is being done by Mike Stobbe, an Associated Press medical writer, who is also a 
doctoral student at the University of North Carolina School of Public Health. Mike is a 
member of the Association of Health Care Journalists and has received permission from the 
organization’s executive director to post this survey. 
 
The survey results will be submitted to UNC faculty as part of Mike’s dissertation 
submission. It may also be mentioned in a future article or book, and Mike will share the 
results with AHCJ staff for a possible article in a future AHCJ newsletter. 
 
No one who participates in the survey will be identified. Your confidentiality will be 
maintained in that no participant’s name will appear in the study or any journalistic products 
that come out of it. The data will be reported only in aggregate form. 
 
By clicking the NEXT button and filling out the survey, you are voluntarily agreeing to 
participate in the research. 
 
Thank you for your assistance. If you have any questions regarding the study, please contact 
Mike Stobbe at (404) 558-1084 or at mikestobbe@aol.com. If you have any questions 
regarding your rights as a participant in research, you may also contact the University of 
North Carolina Institutional Review Board at (919) 966-9347. 
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1.  How long have you been doing medical, health and/or health care journalism? (check one) 
O Less than one year 
O 1-4 years 
O 5-9 years 
O 10-14 years 
O 15-19 years 
O 20-24 years 
O 25 years or more 
 
2.  Do you: (check one) 
O Write mainly about medical science and research 
O Write mainly about health care and medical business 
O Write mainly about public health and/or health policy 
O Mixed 
 
3.  Are you a full-time employee of a media organization? (check one) 
O Yes 
O No 
 
4.  What is your primary employer? (check one) 
O Newspaper 
O Magazine 
O Trade publication 
O Wire service or syndicate 
O Television network or station 
O Radio network or station 
O Newsletter 
O Web/online news site 
O Freelance or self-employed 
 
5.  Are you… (check one) 
O Male. 
O Female. 
 
6.  How old are you? (check one) 
O 30 years old or younger. 
O 31-39. 
O 40-49 
O 50-59 
O 60-69 
O 70-79 
O 80 or older. 
 
7.  How many times a month do you interview local or state health officials, including 
spokespersons or leaders employed by state or local health departments, state departments of 
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medical licensure and professional regulation, state or local Medicaid officials, state or local 
insurance regulators? (check one) 
O Never 
O Once a month, if that 
O A few times a month 
O At least once a week 
O Every day, or nearly every day 
 
8.  How many times a month do you interview federal health officials, including 
spokespersons or leaders employed by  the NIH, CDC, CMS, FDA or other agencies or units 
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services? (check one) 
O Never. 
O Once a month, if that. 
O A few times a month. 
O At least once a week. 
O Every day, or nearly every day. 
 
9.  Please rank these officials in terms of their newsworthiness on matters that affect the 
health of the general public – including a outbreak of a new disease or an act of bioterrorism. 
(That is, whose press conference would be most likely to attend.) Place a “1” next to the 
source you see as most newsworthy, and number them in descending order. 
O Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
O Director of the National Institutes of Health. 
O Director of the NIH’s National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. 
O U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services. 
O Assistant Secretary for Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 
O U.S. Surgeon General. 
 
10.  Please rank these officials in terms of their credibility on matters that affect the health of 
the general public – including outbreak of a new disease or an act of bioterrorism. (That is, 
who would you trust to give franks and accurate information.) Place a “1” next to the source 
you see as most credible, and number them in descending order. 
O Director of the Centers for Disease control and Prevention. 
O Director of the National Institutes of Health. 
O Director of the NIH’s National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, 
O U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services. 
O Assistant Secretary for Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 
O U.S. Surgeon General. 
 
11.  For the two officials that you deemed most credible, please say why (for each). 
 
12.  For the two officials you deemed least credible, please say why (for each). 
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Appendix E: H.R. 3447 
110th CONGRESS 
1st Session 
H. R. 3447 
To amend the Public Health Service Act to ensure the independence of the Surgeon General 
from political interference.  
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
August 3, 2007 
Mr. WAXMAN (for himself, Mrs. CAPPS, Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, Ms. LEE, Ms. 
SLAUGHTER, Ms. SOLIS, Mr. TOWNS, Ms. BALDWIN, Ms. DEGETTE, Mrs. 
CHRISTENSEN, Mr. COHEN, Ms. HOOLEY, Mr. COOPER, and Mr. LEWIS of Georgia) 
introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce  
 
A BILL 
To amend the Public Health Service Act to ensure the independence of the Surgeon General 
from political interference.  
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the `Surgeon General Independence Act'. 
SEC. 2. INDEPENDENCE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC 
HEALTH SERVICE. 
(a) In General- Section 204 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 205) is 
amended to read as follows: 
`SURGEON GENERAL 
`Sec. 204. (a) Appointment- 
`(1) IN GENERAL- The Surgeon General shall be appointed for a 4-year term 
by the President, in accordance with paragraph (2), by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. 
`(2) REQUIREMENTS FOR APPOINTMENT- The Surgeon General shall be 
appointed from individuals who-- 
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`(A) are licensed physicians with specialized training and significant 
experience in public health; 
`(B) are, or agree upon appointment to become, members of the 
Regular Corps; and 
`(C) are nominated by the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (3). 
`(3) NOMINATIONS- The Regular Corps shall submit to the Secretary and 
the President a list of 6 nominees, who meet the requirements of paragraph 
(2), and of whom not fewer than 3 shall be Regular Corps officers of flag 
rank, to fill any existing or pending vacancy in the position of Surgeon 
General. The Secretary shall forward such list to the President, the Committee 
on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives, and the 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate. 
`(4) TERM LIMIT- An individual shall not serve more than 3 full terms as 
Surgeon General. 
`(5) GRADE AND NUMBER- Upon expiration of an individual's service as 
the Surgeon General, the individual, unless reappointed, shall revert to the 
grade and number in the Regular Corps or Reserve Corps which the individual 
would have occupied if not for such service. 
`(b) Removal- The President may only remove the Surgeon General during a term for 
cause. If a Surgeon General is removed, the Secretary shall provide to the Committee 
on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate a written explanation as to the 
cause for the removal. 
`(c) Line of Authority- Notwithstanding section 201, the Surgeon General, under the 
supervision and direction of the Secretary, shall administer the Office of the Surgeon 
General, the Regular Corps, and the Reserve Corps. 
`(d) Budget Authority- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for each fiscal 
year, the Surgeon General shall prepare and submit, directly to the President for 
review and transmittal to the Congress, an annual budget estimate (including the 
number and type of personnel needs for the Surgeon General) for the Office of the 
Surgeon General, after reasonable opportunity for comment (but without change) by 
the Secretary. 
`(e) Staff- Subject to the availability of appropriations, the provisions of this title, and 
applicable Federal civil service laws, the Surgeon General shall have the authority to 
hire and terminate employees of and consultants to the Office of the Surgeon General 
without obtaining approval by, or clearance from, any employee of or consultant to 
the Department of Health and Human Services. 
`(f) Reports, Calls to Action, and Other Communications- 
`(1) IN GENERAL- The Surgeon General shall from time to time issue 
reports, calls to action, and other communications on matters of importance to 
the health of the American people. 
`(2) ANNUAL REPORT- In carrying out paragraph (1), the Surgeon General 
shall submit to the Congress and make publicly available an annual report on 
the state of the Nation's health. Each such report shall include an analysis of 
the potential impact of global health trends on the Nation's health. 
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`(3) PUBLIC HEALTH SCIENCE- The reports, calls to action, and other 
communications issued under paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be based on the 
Surgeon General's professional judgment regarding the best available public 
health science. 
`(4) ROLE OF THE SECRETARY- The Secretary shall have exclusive 
authority to disapprove the issuance of a report, call to action, or other 
communication proposed by the Surgeon General. If the Secretary 
disapproves the issuance of a report, call to action, or other communication 
proposed by the Surgeon General, the Secretary shall, within 10 days of 
disapproval, submit to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House 
of Representatives and the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions of the Senate a full explanation of the reasons for such disapproval.'. 
(b) Conforming Amendment- Section 201 of the Public Health Service Act (42 
U.S.C. 202) is amended by striking `The Public Health Service' and inserting `Subject 
to section 204(c), the Public Health Service'. 
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Appendix F: S. 1777 
110th CONGRESS 
1st Session 
S. 1777 
To amend title II of the Public Health Service Act to restore the integrity to the office of the 
Surgeon General. 
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
July 12, 2007 
Mr. KENNEDY introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 
 
A BILL 
To amend title II of the Public Health Service Act to restore the integrity to the office of the 
Surgeon General. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the `Surgeon General Integrity Restoration Act'. 
SEC. 2. AMENDMENT TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ACT. 
Section 204 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 205) is amended to read as 
follows: 
`SEC. 204. SURGEON GENERAL. 
`(a) Appointment- 
`(1) IN GENERAL- The Surgeon General shall be appointed for a four-year 
term by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate as 
provided for in paragraph (2). 
`(2) REQUIREMENTS FOR APPOINTMENT- The Surgeon General shall be 
appointed from individuals who-- 
`(A) are, or who agree to become, members of the Regular Corps; 
`(B) have specialized training or significant experience in public health 
programs; and 
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`(C) who are nominated by the Institute of Medicine under paragraph 
(3). 
`(3) NOMINATIONS- Upon a vacancy in the position of Surgeon General, 
the Institute of Medicine shall submit to the Secretary and the President a list 
of 10 nominees, that meet the requirements of paragraph (2), to fill such 
vacancy. The Secretary shall recommend to the President a nominee from 
such list unless the Secretary has rejected all such nominees. If the Secretary 
rejects all such nominees, the Secretary shall provide a written explanation as 
to why each such nominee was unsatisfactory. 
`(4) EXPIRATION OF TERM- Upon the expiration of the term of service, the 
Surgeon General, unless reappointed under this subsection, shall revert to the 
grade and number in the Regular or Reserve Corps that he or she would have 
occupied had he not served as Surgeon General. 
`(b) Budget Authority- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for each fiscal 
year, the Surgeon General shall prepare and submit, directly to the President for 
review and transmittal to Congress, an annual budget estimate (including the number 
and type of personnel needs for the Surgeon General) for the Office of the Surgeon 
General, after reasonable opportunity for comment (but without change) by the 
Secretary. Such estimate shall also be submitted to the Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate and the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce of the House of Representatives and made available to the general public. 
`(c) Release of Reports- The Surgeon General may submit any draft of a speech or 
report prepared by the Surgeon General to the Secretary or any employee of the 
Department of Health and Human Services for comment. The Surgeon General may 
issue, deliver, or release such speech or report notwithstanding any comment or 
objection of the Secretary or any such employee. 
`(d) Staff- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Surgeon General shall 
have the authority, subject to Federal civil service laws, to directly hire staff without 
otherwise obtaining clearance or undergoing review as generally required within the 
Department of Health and Human Services. 
`(e) Prohibition of Censorship- With respect to any work product of the Surgeon 
General, such work product may not be censored in any manner (except to comply 
with Federal national security or privacy laws) by any Federal entity or official for 
political reasons. The Surgeon General shall identify and separately label any 
proposed modifications to such a work product that the Surgeon General does not 
consent to accept.'. 
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Appendix G: SURGEON GENERAL ‘SUNSET’ PROPOSAL OF 1998 
105th CONGRESS 
2d Session 
S. 1725 
To terminate the Office of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service.  
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
March 6, 1998 
Mr. BURNS (for himself, Mr. HELMS, Mr. THOMAS, and Mr. KYL) introduced the 
following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Labor and Human 
Resources  
 
A BILL 
To terminate the Office of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the `Office of Surgeon General Sunset Act'. 
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 
For purposes of this Act: 
(1) ASSISTANT SECRETARY- The term `Assistant Secretary' means the 
Assistant Secretary for Health of the Department of Health and Human 
Services. 
(2) FEDERAL AGENCY- The term `Federal agency' has the meaning given 
to the term `agency' by section 551(1) of title 5, United States Code. 
(3) FUNCTION- The term `function' means any duty, obligation, power, 
authority, responsibility, right, privilege, activity, or program. 
(4) OFFICE- The term `office' includes any office, administration, agency, 
institute, unit, organizational entity, or component thereof. 
(5) OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY- The term `Office of the 
Assistant Secretary' means the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health of 
the Department of Health and Human Services. 
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SEC. 3. TERMINATION AND TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS. 
(a) TERMINATION- The Office of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service 
and the position of such Surgeon General are terminated. 
(b) TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS- There are transferred to Office of the Assistance 
Secretary for Health all functions which the Surgeon General exercised before the 
date of the enactment of this Act (including all related functions of any officer or 
employee of the Office of the Surgeon General). 
SEC. 4. DETERMINATIONS OF CERTAIN FUNCTIONS BY THE 
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. 
If necessary, the Office of Management and Budget shall make any determination of 
the functions that are transferred under section 3. 
SEC. 5. DELEGATION AND ASSIGNMENT. 
Except where otherwise expressly prohibited by law or otherwise provided by this 
Act, the Assistant Secretary may delegate any of the functions transferred to the 
Assistant Secretary by this Act and any function transferred or granted to such 
Assistant Secretary after the effective date of this Act to such officers and employees 
of the Office of the Assistant Secretary as the Assistant Secretary may designate, and 
may authorize successive redelegations of such functions as may be necessary or 
appropriate. No delegation of functions by the Assistant Secretary under this section 
or under any other provision of this Act shall relieve such Assistant Secretary of 
responsibility for the administration of such functions. 
SEC. 6. REORGANIZATION. 
The Assistant Secretary is authorized to allocate or reallocate any function transferred 
under section 3 among the officers of the Office of the Assistant Secretary, and to 
establish, consolidate, alter, or discontinue such organizational entities in the Office 
of the Assistant Secretary as may be necessary or appropriate. 
SEC. 7. RULES. 
The Assistant Secretary is authorized to prescribe, in accordance with the provisions 
of chapters 5 and 6 of title 5, United States Code, such rules and regulations as the 
Assistant Secretary determines necessary or appropriate to administer and manage the 
functions of the Office of the Assistant Secretary. 
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SEC. 8. TRANSFER AND ALLOCATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS AND 
PERSONNEL. 
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the personnel employed in connection with, 
and the assets, liabilities, contracts, property, records, and unexpended balances of 
appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and other funds employed, used, held, 
arising from, available to, or to be made available in connection with the functions 
transferred by this Act, subject to section 1531 of title 31, United States Code, shall 
be transferred to Office of the Assistant Secretary. Unexpended funds transferred 
pursuant to this section shall be used only for the purposes for which the funds were 
originally authorized and appropriated. 
SEC. 9. INCIDENTAL TRANSFERS. 
(a) IN GENERAL- The Director of the Office of Management and Budget, at such 
time or times as the Director shall provide, is authorized to make such determinations 
as may be necessary with regard to the functions transferred by this Act, and to make 
such additional incidental dispositions of personnel, assets, liabilities, grants, 
contracts, property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, 
authorizations, allocations, and other funds held, used, arising from, available to, or to 
be made available in connection with such functions, as may be necessary to carry out 
the provisions of this Act. 
(b) TERMINATION OF AFFAIRS- The Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget shall provide for the termination of the affairs of all entities terminated by this 
Act and for such further measures and dispositions as may be necessary to effectuate 
the purposes of this Act. 
SEC. 10. EFFECT ON PERSONNEL. 
(a) IN GENERAL- Except as otherwise provided by this Act, the transfer pursuant to 
this Act of full-time personnel (except special Government employees) and part-time 
personnel holding permanent positions shall not cause any such employee to be 
separated or reduced in grade or compensation for one year after the date of transfer 
of such employee under this Act. 
(b) EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE POSITIONS- Except as otherwise provided in this 
Act, any person who, on the day preceding the effective date of this Act, held a 
position compensated in accordance with the Executive Schedule prescribed in 
chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, 
and who, without a break in service, is appointed in the Office of the Assistant Secretary to a 
position having duties comparable to the duties performed immediately preceding such 
appointment shall continue to be compensated in such new position at not less than the rate 
provided for such previous position, for the duration of the service of such person in such 
new position. 
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(c) TERMINATION OF CERTAIN POSITIONS- Positions whose incumbents are 
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, the 
functions of which are transferred by this Act, shall terminate on the effective date of 
this Act. 
SEC. 11. SAVINGS PROVISIONS. 
(a) CONTINUING EFFECT OF LEGAL DOCUMENTS- All orders, determinations, 
rules, regulations, permits, agreements, grants, contracts, certificates, licenses, 
registrations, privileges, and other administrative actions-- 
(1) which have been issued, made, granted, or allowed to become effective by 
the President, any Federal agency or official thereof, or by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, in the performance of functions which are transferred 
under this Act, and 
(2) which are in effect at the time this Act takes effect, or were final before the 
effective date of this Act and are to become effective on or after the effective 
date of this Act, 
shall continue in effect according to their terms until modified, terminated, 
superseded, set aside, or revoked in accordance with law by the President, the 
Assistant Secretary or other authorized official, a court of competent jurisdiction, or 
by operation of law. 
(b) PROCEEDINGS NOT AFFECTED- The provisions of this Act shall not affect 
any proceedings, including notices of proposed rulemaking, or any application for 
any license, permit, certificate, or financial assistance pending before the Office of 
the Surgeon General at the time this Act takes effect, with respect to functions 
transferred by this Act but such proceedings and applications shall be continued. 
Orders shall be issued in such proceedings, appeals shall be taken therefrom, and 
payments shall be made pursuant to such orders, as if this Act had not been enacted, 
and orders issued in any such proceedings shall continue in effect until modified, 
terminated, superseded, or revoked by a duly authorized official, by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, or by operation of law. Nothing in this subsection shall be 
deemed to prohibit the discontinuance or modification of any such proceeding under 
the same terms and conditions and to the same extent that such proceeding could have 
been discontinued or modified if this Act had not been enacted. 
(c) SUITS NOT AFFECTED- The provisions of this Act shall not affect suits 
commenced before the effective date of this Act, and in all such suits, proceedings 
shall be had, appeals taken, and judgments rendered in the same manner and with the 
same effect as if this Act had not been enacted. 
(d) NONABATEMENT OF ACTIONS- No suit, action, or other proceeding 
commenced by or against the Office of the Surgeon General, or by or against any 
individual in the official capacity of such individual as an officer of the Office of the 
Surgeon General, shall abate by reason of the enactment of this Act. 
(e) ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS RELATING TO PROMULGATION OF 
REGULATIONS- Any administrative action relating to the preparation or 
promulgation of a regulation by the Office of the Surgeon General relating to a 
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function transferred under this Act may be continued by the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary with the same effect as if this Act had not been enacted. 
SEC. 12. SEPARABILITY. 
If a provision of this Act or its application to any person or circumstance is held 
invalid, neither the remainder of this Act nor the application of the provision to other 
persons or circumstances shall be affected. 
SEC. 13. TRANSITION. 
The Assistant Secretary is authorized to utilize-- 
(1) the services of such officers, employees, and other personnel of the Office 
of the Surgeon General with respect to functions transferred to the Office of 
the Assistant Secretary by this Act; and 
(2) funds appropriated to such functions for such period of time as may 
reasonably be needed to facilitate the orderly implementation of this Act. 
SEC. 14. REFERENCES. 
Reference in any other Federal law, Executive order, rule, regulation, or delegation of 
authority, or any document of or relating to-- 
(1) the Surgeon General with regard to functions transferred under section 3, 
shall be deemed to refer to the Assistant Secretary for Health of the 
Department of Health and Human Services; and 
(2) the Office of the Surgeon General with regard to functions transferred 
under section 3, shall be deemed to refer to the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Health of the Department of Health and Human Services. 
SEC. 15. SAVINGS. 
Any amounts appropriated for the Office of the Surgeon General for fiscal year 1998 
and remaining available on the date of enactment of this Act shall be transferred to 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services and utilized to carry out child 
immunization programs. 
SEC. 16. ADDITIONAL CONFORMING AMENDMENTS. 
(a) RECOMMENDED LEGISLATION- After consultation with the appropriate 
committees of the Congress and the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget, the Assistant Secretary shall prepare and submit to the Congress a legislative 
proposal in the form of an implementing bill containing technical and conforming 
amendments to reflect the changes made by this Act. 
(b) SUBMISSION TO THE CONGRESS- Not later than 6 months after the effective 
date of this Act, the Assistant Secretary shall submit the implementing bill referred to 
under subsection (a). 
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(c) REPEALS- Sections 204 and 205 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 205 
and 206) are repealed. 
(d) ADDITIONAL CONFORMING AMENDMENTS- 
(1) Section 202 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 203) is amended-- 
(A) by striking paragraph (1); and 
(B) by redesignating paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) as paragraphs (1), (2), 
and (3), respectively. 
(2) Section 206(a) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 207(a)) is 
amended-- 
(A) in the first sentence by striking `The Surgeon General' and all that 
follows through `the Chief Medical Officer' and inserting `The Chief 
Medical Officer'; and 
(B) by striking the second sentence. 
SEC. 17. EFFECTIVE DATE. 
This Act shall be become effective on the date on which the individual who is serving 
as the Surgeon General on the date of enactment of this Act resigns or is terminated 
or the date on which the term of service of such individual as Surgeon General 
expires, whichever occurs first. 
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